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Foreword 
  
The role of the Single Market policy has increased with the introduction of the single 
currency since 1
 
January 1999. This stresses the need at least for: (1) close moni-
toring of macroeconomic and budgetary developments in the member states of the 
European Union to ensure sustained convergence and (2) monitoring of member 
states’ structural policies in labour, product and service markets as well as of cost and 
price trends. 
  
In all European Union member states unemployment is causing severe social prob-
lems. Since the majority of welfare state programs are designed to function in full or 
high employment societies, a high level of unemployment gradually erodes the fi-
nancial -- and possibly the legitimacy -- basis of the welfare state. Different countries 
have tried to tackle unemployment with different measures.  
 
In order to get a real picture of the developmental patterns in the European welfare 
states, we must combine effects caused by institutions (social policy) , structural 
needs ( unemployment, the elderly population etc.) and benefits. This book “Social 
Policy in Tandem with the Labour Market in the European Union“ focuses on the 
main trends in gender specific labour force participation,in part-time/atypical em-
ployment,in early retirement, and in the structure of the income package and the level 
of economic well-being of different age groups in different countries.  
 
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not nec-
essarily represent the views of the Ministry. The book is edited by Professor Olli 
Kangas from the University of Turku and Deputy Director-General Rolf Myhrman 
from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. 
  
The Ministry hopes that this publication will for its part help further discussions on 
the European social policy in tandem with the changes in the labour market. 
 
 
Helsinki, July  1999 
 
Markku Lehto 
Permanent Secretary 
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Olli Kangas and Rolf Myhrman 
 
   
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the articles 
 
In his book "Social Policy“ Richard Titmuss (1974) made a famous distinction between three 
ideal types of the welfare state: the marginal, industrial achievement, and institutional models. 
Each of these types has its own specific way to deliver social benefits to citizens. In the mar-
ginal welfare state benefits are meagre, while the relative importance of family and markets 
(occupational benefits, individual insurance policies subsidised by the state) are pronounced. In 
the industrial achievement model work and work related benefits form the germ of social pro-
visions. Benefits are of good quality but the scope of beneficiaries is limited to the employed. 
The institutional welfare state guarantees benefits to all citizens or residents. 
Recent social policy discourse has revitalised Titmuss' trichotomy. The revitali-
sation can be seen in two partially overlapping areas. First, researchers have tried to unravel the 
way in which advanced welfare states cluster in terms of their social policy solutions. Here, the 
focus has been in the institutional set ups of social policy programs in different countries: who 
gets what and in what terms. Comparative social policy studies have almost without exception 
involved the question of welfare state models and an immense amount of printer's ink has 
flowed as disputes have raged about the potentially correct number of welfare state models and 
the principles on which the differentiation of models should be based.  Instead of three models 
(e.g., Titmuss 1974; Esping-Andersen 1990), some discussants have postulated four (Castles & 
Mitchell 1991; Korpi & Palme 1998), and some even more. 
Second, the possibilities offered by a number of comparable databases, especially 
by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, contains data for about 30 countries), have stimulated 
numerous studies of the distributional consequences of different ideal types of social policy 
(see e.g. Mitchell 1991; Korpi & Palme 1998). Here, the central task is to unravel which kind of 
  
 
5 
 
distributional consequences different social policy solutions have. Since there now are several 
waves in LIS (e.g. there are data available for several points in time), it is possible to integrate 
cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses to unravel developmental patterns in income distri-
bution and poverty. This offers possibilities to evaluate what consequences, if any, changes in 
social policy programs, changes in the labour market (unemployment, atypical labour contracts 
etc.) have had in terms of social expenditure, poverty and income inequality. 
All welfare state models described above seem to tackle with more or less severe 
problems. Unemployment, “atypical“ labour contracts, the ageing population, international 
economic competition, free movement of persons and capital, and the strict rules of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union strain the public budgets causing financial and possibly also legitimacy 
problems for the present welfare states everywhere in the Western hemisphere. In their analysis 
of present trends in Europe Bosco and Chassard (1999) summarise three inter-linked phe-
nomena that the welfare states must react on: 
 
 Longevity is no longer a major risk, but the risk of becoming unemployable after 55 be-
comes real. 
 The nature of unemployment has changed: it is no longer just an effort of geographical 
mobility which is expected from those who lose their job; a growing proportion of them has 
to undertake an effort of skills’ mobility to have a chance of re-entering the labour market. 
 New patterns of work - characterised by a low degree of social protection - are spreading and 
entail new demands for security on social protection systems. 
 
These three issues are crucial for all welfare states – be the number of them three or eighteen. 
One of the most important questions in Western societies seems to be the relationship between 
economic and other social institutions. It is evident that economy to perform well needs inte-
grative institutions guaranteeing social integration, order and trust. Weberian instrumental 
rationality harnessed to solely serve economic growth cannot be the ultimate principle of any 
society. And to put it other way round, social institutions such as the welfare state must be 
somehow integrated with the main institutions in economy. Without economy and production 
there is nothing to distribute and without distribution economy is not possible to sustain. Thus, 
there is, always has been and always will be an interplay between the “economic“ and the 
“social“.   
This interplay may take different forms in different points in time and in different 
places. It is hard to find the only one or “the best“ institutional solution to social problems and, 
consequently, there exist various welfare state models each basing on different historical and 
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political configurations and each of them defines social problems differently and each of them 
tries to solve these problems in their own ways. And in fact, some solutions are good in certain 
surroundings but implanted in some other surroundings they may be a total disaster. Precisely 
in the same vein there is no one single institutional solution to “demands“ of globalisation or of 
the changes in the labour markets much depends on the context (see e.g. Esping-Andersen 
1996).  
The old adage says that there are several ways to skin a cat. The purpose of this 
book is to offer some empirical data on various national solutions related on issues of the 
changes in social policy and distributional consequences of social policy and the transforma-
tions in the labour market in a number of European countries. 
 
 
1.2 The Articles 
 
Olli Kangas compares social policy programs and their consequences in terms of poverty and 
poverty reduction in Western countries and in post-socialist countries in his article ‘Social 
Policy in Settled and Transitional Counties’: a comparison of institutions and their conse-
quences’. There is a large variation when it comes to the institutional set-ups of social policy 
programs. He pays some preliminary attention to poverty levels according to age groups and 
family types. The post-socialist countries seem to perform pretty well in this comparison. Es-
pecially in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic relative poverty is very low, even 
surprisingly low. Why then, should we be worried about the poor situation in the transition 
economies? Their social security programs seem to work very well or at least satisfactorily, 
locating in between the Scandinavian and American extremes. However, the picture is perhaps 
not that sunny. First, it is probable that the income register data is more sparse in economies in 
transition. It means that income differences between the rich and the poor are much wider than 
that displayed by the official statistics. And consequently, relative poverty will be much higher, 
too. Secondly overall review of the economic development in different countries indicated that 
differences in the absolute living-standard or in the economic well-being have increased be-
tween the Western world and economies in transition.  
In 1990 the income level in the transitional economies corresponded to 35% of 
the median for the 31 nations studied. Five years later the corresponding ratio was only 24%. 
Thus, there is the problem of absolute and relative measurement of poverty. The problems arose 
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immediately when the average income level in the settled economies and in the transition 
economies are compared. For example the Estonian real GDP per capita was US$ 4 062 in 
1995, and at the same time as much as US$ 26 977 in the United States. Furthermore, the 
overall relative poverty rates in Poland and Hungary are a bit lower than in the United States but 
the median income from which the national poverty lines are derived in those two post-socialist 
countries is only about one tenth of the U.S. median (US$ 1700, and US$ 14 000, respectively). 
The American poor would be rich in those countries. The problem concerns relative and ab-
solute poverty. In the rich western countries poverty is to a greater extent relative, whereas in 
the transition economies its character is more absolute. 
Europe has been plagued by high unemployment and low employment rates, as 
well as slow growth in the number of the employed in comparison with other OECD countries. 
The EU has in the 1990s taken steps towards more integrated economic and monetary policies, 
but also towards greater co-operation in the field of employment policy. With the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997), greater social integration and prevention of social exclusion were added to 
the aims of employment policy. As the content of employment policy has expanded from re-
ducing unemployment to increasing employment, the target group of policies has widened. 
Extended unemployment leads easily to exclusion from the labour market, but not necessarily 
to social exclusion if the level of income remains sufficient and social networks are maintained. 
Anita Haataja in her article ‘Unemployment, employment and social exclusion’  estimates the 
connections between unemployment and the threat of social exclusion by establishing how 
common or deep poverty is among the employed and the unemployed. She also assesses the 
extent to which income transfers prevent poverty in different social policy models.  
Among the Nordic countries, Finland and Sweden are examples of how social 
policy has been fairly successful in preventing relative poverty despite extensive changes in the 
economy and the unemployment rate. England and the USA, as well as Australia of the targeted 
model form the group of countries where unemployment constitutes a great and growing pov-
erty risk. In these countries income transfers either had a negligible impact (the USA) or a great, 
but insufficient impact on the poverty rate (Australia and England). Germany stood out as the 
only representative of the model that emphasises earnings-related benefits. The situation pre-
vailing in Germany can be characterised as stable polarisation because unemployment was 
there a great poverty risk but the difference between the employed  and others was no growing. 
Income transfers clearly reduced poverty in Germany, but not as effectively as in the Nordic 
model. Minimal social security and highly uneven income distribution are not cheap, either. 
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Low social expenditure can lead to increased expenditure elsewhere and may in the end be as 
expensive as high expenditure aimed at preventing poverty.  
Structural changes will cause changes in needs. The greater the percentage of the 
aged, the unemployed, single parents, and children dependent on any of these categories, the 
greater the inputs a government needs to make in order to obtain a high level of post-transfer, 
post-tax equality. Tiina Mäkinen examined in her article ‘Structural Pressures, Social Policy 
and Poverty in 15 OECD Countries’ how structural changes affect poverty and income trans-
fers. The results show that in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland and Spain, the growth of 
income transfers has reduced poverty. The situation was not so favourable in Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the USA. Reduction in income transfers led to an 
increase in poverty in every country examined. As a common trend it can be said that from the 
early 1980’s until the mid-1990s poverty increased slightly regardless of the development of 
income transfers. 
Of the two demographic variables studied, children’s share in the population is 
connected to a decrease in social security transfers. In the case of older population groups, the 
results are the opposite. This can be explained by the fact that social policy has in many coun-
tries consisted primarily of pension policy, and the investments in the aged are now beginning 
to bear fruit. In future the aged will have an increased impact on how society’s resources are 
distributed.  
Unemployment is in a crucial position when we think about the welfare state’s 
future. There are several ways to deal with the high unemployment rates. Some of them have a 
real effect on the numbers of the unemployed (e.g. active labour market policy). However, there 
are also methods that do not alleviate the basic problem, but merely change its nature. One 
example of this is when the unemployed receives, instead of unemployment benefits - as a 
consequence of early retirement - pension or disability pay. Unemployment rates will be lower, 
but the basic problem does not disappear. Such measures may even increase the total sum of 
income transfers. The socio-economic changes in Western European countries are presenting 
different welfare states with increasingly similar challenges and problems. While there is no 
evidence that welfare states are gravitating towards a single model, there are some signs of 
convergence. Welfare states are moving towards more flexible, less redistributive and leaner 
systems than the previous ones. Weather this prophesy of convergence is true or not remains to 
be answered by the future studies.  
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  Proliferation of education (’education expansion’) is one of the most striking 
international developments of the past couple of decades. The educational level of women has 
traditionally been lower than that of men, but women are everywhere making good this gap and 
in some EU countries the situation has indeed been reversed. The correlation between the level 
of education and employment is considerably stronger among women than among men. 
Part-time and fixed-term (short-term/ temporary) contracts are central tools in striving for 
increased flexibility and efficiency of labour markets. The independence gained through paid 
labour is of primary importance. The forms and conditions of participation in paid labour differ 
between men and women in ways that make women’s labour market position weaker than 
men’s. Part-time and temporary work, interruptions in career paths, lower status and low wages 
are typical of women’s labour markets. Part-time and temporary work are the main types of 
atypical employment. Atypical work creates inequality in the labour markets as it does not fulfil 
the conditions set in most countries for gaining the rights to social security. Kaarina Nurmi 
investigates in her article ‘Changes in women’s and men’s labour market positions in the EU’ 
the increase in women’s labour market participation and the rise of atypical employment.  
  Marriage and child rearing keep fewer and fewer women away from the labour 
market. The models of male wage earner and full-time motherhood are giving way to the 
dual-earner model. Part-time work as form of labour market flexibility is fairly gender specific. 
In all countries, most part-time work (between 70 and 90 percent) is undertaken by women. 
Half of part-time employment within the EU in 1997 was voluntary. The gap between the sexes 
is striking, however: 65 percent of women and 35 percent of men did not want full-time 
employment. Temporary work is also more typical feature of women’s than men’s labour 
markets but not to the same extent as with part-time work. There is no uniform direction to the 
changes in the gender difference.  Temporary employment serves the needs of employees only 
rarely as in 1997 only 8 percent of temporary workers within the EU did not want permanent 
work. Over half were in temporary employment because they had not managed to find 
permanent work.  
  Changes in labour markets and family structures (including increase in women’s 
wage labour, rise of atypical and more flexible labour markets, increased divorce rates, single 
parenthood and neo-families, and declining birth rates) call for a fundamental reassessment of 
employment policies and welfare state structures.  During recent years EU has increasingly 
committed itself to integrating equality between men and women into all areas of EU policy 
making. 
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Current trends in the European labour market indicate that the form of employ-
ment for which social insurance was originally designed will decrease in importance in the 
future, as at the same time when unemployment is high the new jobs that are being created are 
increasingly part-time and fixed-term. When it comes to atypical work, the issue of gender is 
crucial. The eligibility conditions in the prevailing social security systems, based on continuous 
employment history and minimum weekly hours or earnings thresholds, hinder women's equal 
access to benefits, given their overrepresentation in low-paid, precarious and atypical em-
ployment. The question is, how can such a system  protect the needs of those (mainly women) 
who work part-time, temporarily and/or are engaged in caring? The over-60 age group, mainly 
retired people, will rise by almost 50% during the next 25 years. It must be noted that ageing 
generates not only a growing demand for traditional benefits and services, but also new de-
mands both on the side of the aged themselves (e.g. nursing care) and on the side of the family 
members (almost exclusively women) who perform caring tasks. Social insurance schemes 
tend to concentrate benefits on risks which no longer automatically generate need, while they 
increasingly fail to intervene where the demand is more urgent.  Marika Kanerva examines in 
her article ‘Social rights of atypical workers in the European Union’  how atypical workers 
fare in relation to the ‘standard’ full-time workers, when in need of benefits.  
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There is still great variation in the principles guiding the benefit systems in the 
EU. The level of benefits varies greatly between the countries. The highest benefits are paid in 
Central and Northern Europe, whereas benefits are lower in Southern Europe and Ireland and 
the UK. Even though a part-time worker regularly ends up with lower benefits than a full-time 
worker, the replacement rates show that there is some compensation for low income whereas 
carers receive less compensation. Especially in pensions, carers have to settle for lesser com-
pensation. Atypical work poses a financial problem as atypical workers pay less tax, but are 
more vulnerable and more often in need of benefits. The latter will undoubtedly be of great 
importance in the future if we are to see more part-time work and fragmented periods of em-
ployment.  
To secure a proper social protection for the atypical workers, it is not only about 
simply improving the benefit levels and eligibility conditions, but also about  social policy in a 
broad sense. Nevertheless, having said that, with no improvements in the current social pro-
tection system, it is certain that benefits paid to atypical workers are very likely to be below the 
poverty line which means, especially in the case of pensions, that the number of poor people 
will continue to rise in the EU.  
  Much social policy is concerned with families and family life. Almost every 
action that welfare states take has impacts on families and family life. Economic well-being of 
families and children are based on a combination of four types of resources: work (including 
earnings and non-market ‘home’ work), social services and government benefits; and taxes to 
pay for them. Welfare states differ from each other in the way they offer different income 
package opportunities to the families. The effectiveness of different family policy systems can 
be evaluated by analysing the outcomes of welfare states. The quality of family policy systems 
can be measured for example by comparing child poverty rates, social assistance dependency, 
infant mortality, birth rates and other indicators of well-being. In her article ‘Family policies 
and the economic well-being of children in some OECD countries’ Katja Forssen compares 
family policy legislation and family policy outcomes. The special interest is shown to the 
European countries, because the role of family policy in European Commission is still quite 
unclear.  
  There are several types of family policy systems which create different outcomes. 
The notion that the responsibility for children's welfare belongs to the family has survived in 
both liberal and corporatist countries. This reflected in tough means-testing for benefits and 
services and scarcity of individual social rights, these again reflected in the high child poverty 
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rates that have grown worse in many countries in the past few years. The absence of 
comprehensive family policies is linked to overly high regard for family privacy. Yet more and 
more women have been compelled to find employment outside the home. The necessary 
services have had to be purchased either from the private or unofficial sectors. Those without 
enough money to buy these services have been provided with means-tested day care services, 
often planned specifically for children at risk. It is hard to understand why many developed 
welfare states keep on having high and constantly increasing child poverty rates. In the 
ideological level every welfare state wants to quarantine the well-being of children. For some 
reason child poverty continues to be increasing problem in many advanced welfare states.  
 Labour market participation and life outside work no longer follow regular patterns, 
and a ‘de-standardisation’ of life cycles is now evident in industrialised societies. These irregu-
larities present social policy with new challenges. The changes in life patterns are most evident 
when we observe trends in the periods of active labour market participation. The duration of la-
bour market participation has shortened in all Western countries. Whereas in the 1960s the aver-
age European worked for 45 years, the average worker in the 1990s retires after 35 years. The 
duration of retirement has correspondingly increased, as a result of both earlier retirement and 
longer life expectancy, from 15 to 25 years. Changes in active labour market participation in 
combination with destandardisation of life patterns have had an impact on citizens’ sources of 
income. Tiina Mäkinen investigates the impact of irregularities in labour market participation on 
income packages in her article ‘Income packages of the aged 11 OECD countries’. What are the 
differences between countries and country groups or welfare state models?  
 The income package under study consists of wage/salary, income from private 
enterprise, capital income, sickness daily benefit, work disability and unemployment benefits, 
legislated pensions, occupational pensions, means-tested benefits and other miscellaneous in-
come. Income package analysis depicts the average share of an individual income component of 
the gross income of a household. Income from work has remained the primary source of income 
among the 50-54 and 55-59-year-olds in all the countries included in this comparison. 
 Among the countries of the basic security and targeted models, the share of income 
from work is larger in Australia and the USA than it is in Finland and in the Netherlands. The 
small share of income from work in Finland and the Netherlands is partly explained by the labour 
market participation rates that are lower than in the countries with basic security and targeted 
social policy regimes. The scarcity of opportunities for early exit from the labour market is ob-
vious from the share of earned income in the income packages of the 60-64-year-olds. Among the 
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countries with basic security models, the USA has a clearly higher share of income from work 
than the countries of continental Europe where there are more opportunities for early exit. Among 
the countries of the encompassing model, Norwegian and Swedish pension systems have offered 
fewer opportunities to opt for early retirement than the Danish and Finnish systems. In Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark wage labour has retained its position as the primary source of income of the 
60-64-year-olds, whereas in Finland the significance of work as a source of income is much 
smaller. In the case of Denmark, the larger share of earned income is partly explained by the 
higher retirement age. The divergence of Finland from the other Nordic countries is evident when 
we combine the income from pensions and other transfers: Finland, France and the Netherlands 
stand out as countries where the share of the so-called social income in the gross income of the 
60-64-year-olds is highest. 
 The differences between the welfare state models become most evident when we 
focus on the income packages of the over 65-year-olds. Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden 
stand out as countries where the share of earned income is low, whereas in the USA and in Aus-
tralia income from work forms a more significant share of the total income package of the aged. 
Alongside earned income, the share of income from capital among the over 65-year-olds is larger 
in Australia and in the USA than in the countries of the encompassing model. 
 Work has remained the principal source of income until the age of 60 in all the 
countries compared here. After this, the different institutional arrangements become more evident 
in the income packages of the aged. However, the prevalent trend is that the relative share of 
income from work and enterprise has declined in all age groups since the beginning of the 1980s, 
regardless of the welfare state model. Earned income has been increasingly replaced by the 
so-called social income i.e. income from pensions and other income transfers. 
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 Olli Kangas  
  
 
SOCIAL POLICY IN SETTLED AND 
TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES: 
A COMPARISON OF INSITUTIONS AND THEIR 
CONSEQUENCES 
 
1.  Introduction1 
 
In all societies people seek shelter against such risk where their livelihood is for some reason 
endangered. Childhood, sickness, accidents, and old age are classical examples of social risks 
that a society somehow must encounter. A society that does not take care of its vulnerable 
members is not a sustainable one. Therefore, some kind of collective risk pooling and collective 
safety nets are necessary for a society to sustain itself. However, the degree of collectivism and 
the institutional set-ups of safety nets vary greatly between different points in time and between 
different places. Questions of public policy are more or less conflictual political issues of 
distribution of resources: who gets what under what conditions, e.g., in which way and to what 
extent the free play of market forces should be modified by statutory involvement. Because of 
this chronological and geographical variation it is hard to find the one or “the best“ institutional 
solution to social problems and, consequently, there exist various welfare state models each 
having been based on different political configurations, each of them defining social problems 
differently, and each of them trying to find their own solutions.   
 Because of this variation, there also is a multitude of accounts and classifications of 
social policy models. Probably one of the most famous ones is developed by Richard Titmuss 
(1974) who, in his "Social Policy", made a distinction between three ideal types of welfare 
state: the marginal (typical for the Anglo-Saxon countries), industrial achievement (typical for 
the Central European countries), and institutional models (typical for the United Kingdom and 
the Scandinavian countries). Recent social policy discourse has revitalized this trichotomy. The 
revitalization can be seen in two partially overlapping areas. 
                                                 
1
 The paper was presented at a seminar “Elaboration of national strategy for poverty eradication in Estonia“, the 
15.-17. June 1998. I wish to thank Dagmar Kutsar and Avo Trumm for their comments and for providing the 
Estonian data to me. I also wish to thank Antti Parpo for excellent research assistance. 
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 First, researchers have tried to unravel the way in which advanced welfare states 
cluster in terms of their social policy solutions (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Castles and 
Mitchell, 1990; Kangas, 1994; Ferrera, 1996). In particular various income transfer schemes 
have been in focus here. The research community has tried to categorize similarities in the 
insitutional set-ups in income transfer systems in different countries. Central questions here 
have been such as: Who gets what and on which terms? What is the level of benefits? Who is 
entitled to benefits? How are benefits financed? Lots of articles have been published on these 
topics (e.g., Korpi 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990; Palme 1990; Kangas 1991; Wennemo 1994; 
Carroll 1998). 
 Second, the possibilities offered by a number of comparable databases, especially 
by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), have stimulated numerous studies of the distributional 
consequences of different ideal types of social policy (see e.g. Smeeding, O'Higgins and 
Rainwater, 1990; Fritzell, 1991; Mitchell, 1991; Ritakallio, 1994; Kangas & Ritakallio 1998). 
Here the central questions have been as follows: In which countries or groups of countries have 
social policy programs achieved the most equal income distributions? In which countries do 
social policy programs most effectively alleviate poverty?  
Empirical analyses of the institutional set-ups and distributional consequences of 
different welfare state models have mainly been based on comparisons of a number of advanced 
OECD countries. Comparisons including post-communist countries have been quite rare. 
However, there is a growing need for such enterprises. First, there are scientific reasons: How 
do the models constructed to describe the development of social policy in the Western world fit 
into the “Eastern“2 world. Second, such comparisons would provide important information on 
the similarities and differences between “western“ and “eastern“ countries. The latter task is 
politically important, especially now when many of the former socialist countries are applying 
for the membership of the European Union. Third, such comparisons would provide useful data 
for policy makers in countries in transition from socialism to capitalism. For example analyses 
on consequences of different social policy solutions would be useful guiding lines when 
weighing up various policy options. Different social policy models derived from international 
comparisons may serve as a fruitful base-line from which new alternatives in national poli-
cy-making in the transitional countries can be contrasted and evaluated. This is what the present 
study aims to do: to place the experiences of transitional economies in a “western“ frame of 
reference. 
                                                 
2
 “Eastern“ here does not pertain to geographical entities: many of the “eastern“ countries are to the west of some 
of the “western“ countries. 
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 The structure of our study is as follows: Firstly, we describe the data used in this 
study. Secondly, in order to set the study of social policy in a wider frame of references it is 
fruitful to inspect economic development in post-socialist countries and in western nations. 
Thereafter follows a section on institutional arrangements guaranteeing social protection in 
case of old-age, sickness, childbirth, and unemployment. Fourthly, in addition to institutional 
set ups we are interested in analyzing the effectivity of those institutions. Effectivity will be 
measured by using some standard methods in this field of study: income distribution and 
poverty. Moreover, we will study the effectivity of social transfer systems to alleviate poverty 
in various countries. Fourthly, and lastly, we are interested in the costs of social security. What 
are the total costs and how is the burden divided between different sources of financing? What 
is the proportion of the insured, employers, and the public sector in the financing of social 
security in different countries? 
 
2. Data and Methods 
 
Data on macroeconomic indicators is mainly derived from various international publications. 
Information on the institutional set-ups of social policy schemes is partially based on the Social 
Citizenship Indicators Project (SCIP) housed at the Swedish Institute for Social Research, 
University of Stockholm (led by Professor Walter Korpi and Associate Professor Joakim 
Palme). SCIP contains data on various income maintenance programs in the major OECD 
countries. Data is also collected from national sources – especially so for the post-socialist 
countries – and from the Social Security Programs Throughout the World published by the U.S. 
Department for Social Security and Administration. 
 Income distribution data is obtained from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) that 
contains commensurate information from over 20 countries. Each country's data-set includes 
accurate information on 2,000 to 16,000 households' income and income formation, i.e., how 
much of their income consists of salaries, capital or business income and various kinds of 
received and paid redistributive sources. Also, for each household, information is available on 
the essential structural features, such as the type of household, age of provider, number of 
children, and numbers of wage earners or recipients of other incomes, as well as educational 
attainment, profession and social group of the provider. For most countries, there is also a 
prodigious amount of cross-sectional data (for the United States, for example, there is 
cross-sectional data from the years 1969, 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991 and 1994). In practice, the 
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LIS databank makes it possible for income distribution, poverty, or, say, income-equalizing 
effects of socio-political schemes to be compared flexibly and accurately through the use of 
micro-level data (see Smeeding, O'Higgins & Rainwater 1990; http:lissy.ceps.lu/ineq.htm). 
Estonia is not (yet) a member in the LIS database and we utilized the national Household 
Budget Survey conducted in 1997 by Statistics Estonia (Kutsar, Trumm & Oja 1998). There-
fore the Estonian data is not fully comparable with that of the other countries. 
 There are also some other problems dealing with the comparability of data. First, 
data used for the inspection of income distribution is derived from the beginning of the 1990s 
(except the Estonian data that was compiled in 1997) and data does not properly reflect the 
present day situation in the transitional countries. There is also a discrepancy between our 
institutional indicators and poverty measures. The former pertain to the mid-1990s and the 
latter to the early 1990s. Therefore, the results on income distribution and poverty must be 
regarded as a heuristic device to show what was the base-line from which the post-socialist 
countries began to develop towards fully-fledged market economies. There may also be some 
problems in the very concept of income. When we are comparing settled economies with 
economies in transition we may especially easily run into great problems. In some countries 
monetary resources are more or less completely registered, whereas in some other countries 
registers are of poor quality. A qualified guess is that e.g., the Nordic databases are more 
comprehensive that those for the transitional economies. In many transitional economies nu-
merous other resources than money play an important role in the coping strategies of citizens. 
Moreover, we can assume that a substantial deal of monetary resources are channeled through 
non-official routes, especially so in the most wealthy strata of society. Therefore, comparisons 
presented later on must be read and interpreted very cautiously. Another qualified guess may be 
that the differences in register-keeping and registering incomes affect e.g., the level of poverty 
more but not profile (who the poor are) of poverty to such an extent. This being said, we can get 
at least some indicative results on the functioning of social policy in different countries. 
 
 
3. Economic situation in Transitional and in Western countries 
 
Big transformations have big consequences and quite often positive transformations may also 
have strong negative side-effects. At an economic level, previous economic structures and 
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previous divisions of labor in production and international trade may be essentially changed 
causing transitional problems until new structures and institutional arrangements for economic 
recovery are created and are properly working. At a societal level, important social bonds, 
functioning social fabrics – either attached to social security or other aspect of human life or 
relations to economic institutions – may be destroyed and it will take decades until the de-
struction is recovered from and proper social institutions are in place which allow society to 
function. 
 This seems to be precisely the case in the collapse of the communist regime. The 
shift of the political regime initiated a social avalanche that swept the old away and at least in 
the short run the change in economic rule led to great economic problems. The first experiences 
of the sweetness of capitalism that so many under socialism had dreamed of appeared to be very 
sour.  
 In all transitional countries the GDP level fell in the wake of the regime shift. 
However, there are substantial differences between the countries. The Polish economy adapted 
to the new situation most rapidly and Poland is the only post-socialist country where the GDP 
level was higher in 1995 than in 1990. In fact the Polish economic growth during the 1990s has 
been impressive and only in Ireland and Norway has the GDP per capita grown more rapidly. 
Consequently, the Polish GDP level has not deteriorated either in comparison to the richest 
country (Luxembourg) or to the international median. There is however, no improvement ei-
ther. All other transitional economies have lost both their relative and absolute positions and the 
gap between the richest and the poorest countries has increased from 1990 to 1995, as indicated 
by the dispersion coefficients displayed in Table 1.  
 The regime shift hit the Baltic states, Ukraine and Russia more severely than the 
Central European socialist countries. In Ukraine the GDP fell between 1990 to 1995 by as much 
as 52%, in Latvia, Russia, Lithuania, and Estonia the corresponding figures were 46%, 38%, 
37% and 32% respectively. Consequently, these countries also lost proportionally to the in-
ternational median: in 1990 the Ukrainian GDP level was 26% of the median whereas five years 
later it was as low as 12%. In comparison to Luxembourg the Ukrainian level fell from 15% in 
1990 to 7% in 1995. 
 In most poverty research the poverty line is set to 50% of the national median. Here 
in our international comparison we can tentatively apply the same procedure and define all 
those nations as poor whose GDP level remains below 50% of the cross-national median. This 
heuristic device shows that all other post-socialist countries except the Czech Republic could be 
classified as poor.  
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The economic decline has been less severe and the recovery more rapid in those 
post-socialist countries that were more loosely interwoven in the Soviet economy. Those 
countries that were formally part of the Soviet Union, especially the Baltic states and Ukraine, 
faced the deepest dives in their economic development. However, there is some light at the 
other end of the tunnel. In the mid-1990s most of the transitional economies were doing much 
better than in the early 1990s. Only in Russia and Ukraine the GDP continued to fall from 1995 
to 1997. In all other transitional countries included in our study the GDP growth was positive 
varying from  6% in  the  Slovak  Republic  to 2.2% in Latvia. (IMF 1997, 27). Also the 
Ukrainian situation  seems a  bit  better  and the pace of the decline is decreasing: in 1995 
the decline was -12.0%, in 1996 -10.0% and in 1997 -3.0%. (IMF 1997, 27). Interestingly 
enough, despite the rapid relative growth rates in some transition economies for example, 
Poland in comparison to Luxembourg, the absolute differences in wealth between these coun-
tries have continued to expand. 
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Table 1.  Real GDP per capita (US$PPP) indicators in Post-Communist and Western 
Countries 1990-1995. 
 
 
               Year          
 Relation to median      Change  
Country  1995 1990 1995
 1990 90-95,%  
LUXEMBOURG 34004 32971 1.76 1.78    3.1 
USA  26977 25297 1.40 1.37    6.6 
SWITZERLAND 24881 25904 1.29 1.40   -3.9 
NORWAY  22427 19357 1.16 1.05  15.9 
DENMARK  21983 20268 1.14 1.09    8.5 
JAPAN  21930 20860 1.14 1.13    5.1 
CANADA  21916 21585 1.14 1.17    1.5 
BELGIUM  21548 20566 1.12 1.11    4.8 
AUSTRIA  21322 20122 1.10 1.09    6.0 
FRANCE  21176 20492 1.10 1.11    3.3 
GERMANY  20370 19800 1.06 1.07    2.9 
ITALY  20174 19191 1.05 1.04    5.1 
NETHERLANDS 19876 18681 1.03 1.01    6.4 
AUSTRALIA  19632 17772 1.02   .96  10.5 
UK  19302 18518 1.00 1.00    4.2 
SWEDEN  19297 19788 1.00 1.07   -2.5 
FINLAND  18547 19668   .96 1.06   -5.7 
IRELAND  17590 14271   .91   .77  23.3 
NEW ZEALAND 17267 15855   .89   .86    8.9 
SPAIN  14789 13943   .77   .75    6.1 
PORTUGAL  12674 12074   .66   .65    5.0 
GREECE  11636 11112   .60   .60    4.7 
CZECH REP.    9775 11369   .51   .61 -14.0 
SLOVAKIA    7320   8681   .38   .47 -15.7 
HUNGARY    6793   7148   .35  .39   -5.0    
POLAND    5442   4988   .28  .27    9.1    
RUSSIA    4531   7277   .23  .39 -37.7 
ESTONIA    4062   5929   .21  .32 -31.5 
LITHUANIA    3843   6129   .20  .33 -37.3 
LATVIA    3273   6043   .17  .33 -45.8 
UKRAINE    2361   4897   .12  .26 -51.8 
Range  31643 28074 1.64 1.52  75.0 
Mean  16023 15824 - -   -3.6 
Median  19297 18518 - -    4.2 
Coefficient of variation      .51      .45 - - -          
Source: Data for all countries is derived from UNDP 1998; *German pre-1995 data is derived 
from IMF 1997, 148. 
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4. Institutional set-ups 
 
The starting point of this section is to place some post-socialist countries (e.g., the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine) in a wider EU 
perspective and to analyze to what extent social policy programs in these countries are different 
or similar when compared to the present EU member states. Thus, we want to study the 
institutional set ups of social policy, i.e., in which ways social security programs are 
constructed in different countries. What are the institutional differences and similarities 
between the nations in the east and west? 
 
4.1. Institutional set-ups in pensions 
 
All people are getting older. Therefore, in all societies there have been and are social 
institutions that try to counter the problems of elderly people. These social institutions vary 
greatly in time and in place. The institutional variation of the present schemes (for 
developmental patterns in time, see Palme 1990) is depicted in Table 2. The schemes are 
differentiated according to the form of financing (contributory vs. 
non-contributory/tax-financed schemes), the form of benefit delivery (means-testing, flat-rate 
and income-related), and the form of insurance (public pension, private pensions or mandatory 
savings). As a rule, fully-fledged pension programs are carried through the public sector (as 
e.g., in Sweden, Germany, Estonia), but in some cases employment related schemes are 
organized through the private sector by private insurance companies that are responsible for 
carrying the fully legislated pension programs (e.g. in France and Australia). In some countries 
the whole pension security is totally channeled through the private sector savings. Table 2 
includes only those schemes that are mandatory by law, i.e., all collectively bargained 
earnings-related supplementary pensions (e.g., such huge collective/occupational pension 
schemes as in Sweden and in the Netherlands) are left out of the inspection. 
 According to Table 2 it is possible to discern various groups of countries. In Estonia 
and the Netherlands pension security consists solely of basic pensions that are paid on a flat-rate 
basis. These pensions are financed through pension insurance contributions. In the “Nordic 
model“ of pension policy contributory pensions guarantee flat-rate basic amounts that are 
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supplemented by income-related pensions. In addition to the “traditional“ Nordic countries, the 
Nordic model is fortified by Luxembourg, Lithuania, and Poland. In the U.K. and Latvia there 
also is a means-tested non-contributory part supporting the worst-off pensioners.  
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Table 2. Institutional arrangements of pension schemes in various countries in 1997. 
COUNTRY CONTRIBUTORY NON-CONTRIBUTORY MANDATORY 
PRIVATE 
PENSIONS 
MANADATORY 
SAVINGS 
 FLAT 
RATE 
EARNINGS-
RELATED 
MEANS- 
TESTED 
UNIVERSAL 
FLAT-RATE 
 PUBLIC PRIVATE 
ESTONIA X
3
       
NETHERLANDS X       
FINLAND X X      
LUXEMBOURG X X      
NORWAY X X      
POLAND X X      
SWEDEN X 
X 
     
LITHUANIA X X      
LATVIA X X X     
UK  X X X     
DENMARK X  X X    
GERMANY  X      
GREECE  X      
HUNGARY  X      
PORTUGAL  X      
SPAIN  X      
UKRAINE  X      
BELGIUM  X X     
CZECH REP.  X X     
SLOVAKIA  X X     
USA  X X     
ITALY  X X     
CANADA  X X X    
FRANCE  X X  X   
AUSTRALIA   X  X   
ARGENTINA  X     X 
CHILE  X     X 
COLUMBIA  X     X 
INDONESIA      X  
MALAYSIA      X  
SINGAPORE      X  
(source: U.S. Department of Social Security Administration 1997) 
 
                                                 
3
 In Denmark and Estonia work-merit pensions are not related to the claimant’s previous income but to the number 
of years worked.   
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The “Central-European“ path consists of contributory and income-related pensions that are 
supplemented by social assistance-type amounts if the contributory pensions are nil or very 
low. The most typical representatives of this group are Germany and the Southern European 
countries. Of the transitional economies Hungary and Ukraine  belong to this work-merit 
based club of nations. There is also another, “extended“ variant of the above-mentioned 
Central-European path: In some countries (Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, and Italy, and 
also in Canada and in the U.S.) employment-related pension are supplemented by means-tested 
pension programs. 
 South-East Asian countries on one hand and the South American nations on the 
other form their own distinct groups of pension policy. Mandatory savings in public institutions 
are typical for such countries as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, whereas mandatory private 
savings supplement earnings-related pension schemes are dominant in South America.  
 In sum, pension programs in post-socialist countries do not follow a single pattern. 
Instead they have chosen different routes: the Baltic States, and perhaps Poland, too, belong to 
the “Nordic model“ which tries to combine basic security and work-merit components of the 
pension security, whereas Ukraine, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary are more closer to 
the “Central-European“ model with an emphasis on work-merit pensions, possibly 
supplemented by means-tested benefits targeted to those with very small or no 
employment-related pensions.  
 Pension schemes in different countries may be very similar in the institutional 
set-ups or in the construction of their pension programs but the generosity of the programs may 
be very different, e.g., two countries may both guarantee basic non-contributory flat-rate 
benefits to every elderly citizen (as in the Netherlands and Estonia) but the benefit level may be 
very different. One way to try to make benefits levels comparable over time and across nations 
is to relate social benefits to the average income level. This has been done in Figure 1 (data for 
the OECD countries is derived from the SCIP data base; estimates for pensions in post-socialist 
countries are calculated from Statistical Yearbook of Lithuania 1994-1995, 37 and 106; 
Statistical Handbook of Hungary 1995, 53 and 77; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic 
1996, 266, and 598-599).  The x-axis displays the actual take-up ratio or the ratio of pension 
receivers to the number of persons over the normal pension age, whereas the vertical y-axis 
depicts the level of basic pension as a proportion of the average net wage. 
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Figure 1. The replacement level (net basic pension/average net wage, %) and take-up ratio 
(pensioners/persons above the pension age, %) of basic pension in 1995 in selected 
countries. 
 
As suggested in Table 2, pensions are universally provided in Estonia, the Nordic countries, in 
the U.K. and the Netherlands. Therefore, the take-up ratio for these countries is 100% but the 
countries differ essentially when it comes to the level of benefits. Basic pension security is very 
high (50% or more) in the Netherlands and in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. In Canada, 
Belgium and Finland pensions correspond to 40% of the average wage. Estonian pensions are 
also universally delivered but the pension level is low in comparison to other countries. In 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Lithuania the basic security is higher than in Estonia but the 
take-up ratio is somewhat lower. 
 
 
PENSIONERS/PEOPLE OVER PENSION AGE, %
11010090807060
P
E
N
S
IO
N
/A
V
E
R
A
G
E
 W
A
G
E
, 
%
60
50
40
30
20
10
HUNG
USA
CZE
AUST
LIT
CAN
EST
UK
BEL
FIN
NOR
SWE
DEN
NL
  
 
27 
 
Table 3. Target level in employment-related pensions and years required to obtain full benefit. 
 
Country Working years required for 
full pension 
The target level of pensions (% 
of previous income) 
Australia Depends on superannuation program  
Austria 45 Max. 80 
Belgium 40 60 
Czech Republic 25 65 (1995) 
Denmark 40 A flat-rate benefit, about 5% of 
average wage 
Estonia Not specified About 37% with 40 years in em-
ployment 
Finland 40 60 
France 37.5 50 
Germany 45 66 
Greece Not specified 30-70%, varying inversely with 
income 
Hungary 42 75 
Italy 40 55 
Netherlands No legislated employment-related pensions; a developed occupa-
tional pension system 
Norway 40 55 
Poland 25 25 
Portugal 40 Max. 80% 
Slovakia 26 66  
Spain 35 100 
Sweden Old system: 30 
New system: 40 
Old system: 65 
New system: 60 
UK 20 About 30 
Ukraine 25 55 
USA 40 50 
(source: U.S. Department of Social Security Administration 1997) 
 
In addition to basic pensions, there are supplementary earnings-related pensions that are fully 
legislated in many countries. The pension amount in these supplementary schemes is deter-
mined on the basis of the years worked and income received (Table 3). In most countries the 
length of the work career entitling the claimant to full benefit is about 40 years. In the 
post-socialist countries there seems to be a tendency to guarantee full employment-related 
pensions in a shorter period of time, especially so in Ukraine. However, there are strong pres-
sures on these countries to bring the eligibility conditions closer to the Western nations. 
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4.2. Institutional set-ups in family support 
 
In addition to elderly people, children are the most vulnerable group in all societies. Despite the 
fact that a child’s need for shelter is a universal phenomenon, there are many institutional 
solutions to this universal issue. In industrialized societies the direct financial support for 
families with children has been mainly instituted in two different ways: there are maternity 
leaves supporting the mother and the baby and there are various income transfer schemes called 
child or family allowances guaranteeing some extra support for child-rearing families. In this 
section we briefly inspect what the level of maternity benefits and child allowances is and for 
how long time they are payable. In Figure 2 a number of countries are rank-ordered according 
to the benefit levels paid from the maternity insurance systems. In addition to benefit levels 
(gross benefit/gross wage) the figure also depicts the duration (in weeks) of the benefit period. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Maternity allowances in selected countries in 1997; benefits/previous wage and 
duration of the benefit period in weeks. 
 
The variation in benefits is substantial. In the majority of countries the benefits correspond to 
the previous income, i.e., the replacement level is 100%, while the benefits can be as low as 
30% of previous income in the U.K. for example. With the exception of the Czech Republic, all 
the transitional countries guarantee benefits that exceed the international mean (84%). 
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 The average duration of benefits is 24 weeks. Again the average hides substantial 
cross-national differences: in Germany the benefits period is as short as 14 weeks. In most of 
the Central-European and post-communist countries benefits are payable for 16 weeks. In 
Estonia the benefit period is two weeks longer (18 weeks). The four Scandinavian countries 
have extended the benefit period to one year or very close to it. 
 In principle we can separate two main groups of countries. In the first one, typical 
for Central Europe, benefit levels are high but the period which the benefits are payable for is 
short as exemplified by Germany and Luxembourg. In the other group of countries benefits 
may be lower but they are payable for a longer period of time as in the Nordic countries. In their 
maternity benefit systems transitional countries are much closer to the Central European pattern 
than the Nordic model. Contrary to all the other countries, in the United States there exists no 
statutory maternity allowance system at all. 
 Maternity allowances are one aspect of support to families with children. In most 
countries there also exists a system of child allowances that are payable for children under a 
certain age limit (Table 4). The most frequently used age limits are 18 years of age – applied in 
nine countries – and the age limit of 16 that is in use in eight countries, whereas the limit of 17 
years is applied only in one country and the lowest age limit, 15 years, is used in the Czech 
Republic, Portugal and Latvia. In many countries higher age limits are applied for students.   
 In the majority of countries the child allowance system is universal, i.e., the benefits 
are payable automatically to everyone under the specified certain age limit. In a few countries 
(the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Ukraine) benefits are means-tested and targeted to the 
most needy ones. In some Central and Southern European countries allowances are available 
only for those families whose heads are participating in paid labor. 
 To facilitate international comparisons we have calculated benefits for a family 
with two children, each child entitled to allowances. Allowances are then related to the average 
wage paid in respective countries. As indicated in Table 4 there is a huge variation in 
compensation levels of allowances. Benefit levels vary from 0,3% in Greece to 16% in Norway. 
Benefits are over 10% of the average wage in Norway, France, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, 
and Italy. At the other end of the continuum we find the Anglo-American countries with low 
benefit levels which indicates that families in these countries may be at greater risk of poverty. 
(The hypothesis will get qualified support later in this paper when we inspect closer 
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distributional consequences of social insurance programs in various countries.) The 
post-socialist countries are close to the international mean (8.2%). 
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Table 4.  Institutional structure of child allowances and benefit levels (benefits/average 
wage, %) for a family with two children, 1997. 
 
COUNTRY AGE LIMIT UNIVERS
AL 
MEANS
-TESTE
D 
EMPLOY
MENT-R
ELATED 
BENFITS 
/APW, 
% 
Australia 16 (students 18) X   3.2 
Belgium 18 (students 25)   X 11 
Canada 18    6 
Czech Rep. 15 (students 26)   X 8.8 
Denmark 17 X   8.3 
Estonia 16 (students 19) X   8.3 
Finland 16 X   11 
France 18 (students 20) X   14.4 
Germany 18 (students 27) X   9.6 
Greece 18 (students 22)   X 0.3 
Hungary 16 (students 20) X   6 
Italy 18   X 10.1 
Latvia 15 (students 20) X   7.8 
Lithuania   X  No data 
Luxembourg 18 (students 27) X   11 
Netherlands 18 (students 25) X   7.5 
Norway 16 X   16 
Poland 16 (students 20) X   6 
Portugal 15 (students 25)   X 7 
Spain 18   X 3.8 
Sweden 16 (students 20) X   7.5 
UK 16 (students 19) X   6.6 
Ukraine 16 (students 18)  X  9.6 
(source: U.S. Department of Social Security Administration 1997) 
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4.3. Institutional set-ups for sickness insurance 
 
Early forms of sickness insurance were based on voluntary arrangements covering only a 
limited number of people. Gradually, when the state began to financially support these funds or 
instituted an obligatory scheme, the coverage rate began to rise more rapidly. In his study of the 
development of sickness insurance in 18 OECD countries Kangas (1998) found that after the 
second world war the average coverage rate increased from 45 in 1950 to 76 in 1995. However, 
these averages conceal a huge variation between nations. The four Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) form a group with universal coverage of the labor 
force. Indeed, at least as regards the scope of sickness insurance, it seems to be justified to speak of 
a very distinctive Scandinavian cluster. In the rest of the OECD countries, the average coverage 
rates vary from 52 percent in Japan to 91 percent in Canada (SCIP). Unfortunately comparative 
figures for the economies in transition are available only for Hungary and the Czech Republic 
which come close to the Scandinavian block with their coverage rates of 95% and 89%, 
respectively (Statistical Handbook of Hungary 1995, 46; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech 
Republic 1996, 270, 596). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Replacement level of sickness allowances and duration of benefit period in 
   selected countries in 1997. 
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 Since our data on the replacement level and the duration of benefit periods is more 
extensive we mainly concentrate on those indicators of sickness insurance (Figure 3). Countries 
are ordered according to gross replacement rate at the average income level (source: U.S. 
Department of Social Security Administration 1997). The duration of the benefit period is 
expressed in weeks which the benefits can be collected for. If the benefit period is unlimited, as in 
Sweden and Belgium, the upper duration is artificially set at 180 weeks. In the other end of the 
continuum we find Estonia and Lithuania with their benefits period of 16 weeks.  
 The average replacement rate for countries included in Figure 3 is 66%. Two 
countries (Luxembourg and Norway) offer lavish allowances corresponding to 100% of 
previous income, whereas in the U.K. the benefit level remains below 40% of gross income. 
Some of the transitional countries (Lithuania, Estonia and Poland) guarantee compensations 
that clearly exceed the international average, whereas benefits in the other transitional countries 
are close to that. All in all the “transitional pattern“ in sickness insurance consists of relatively 
high benefits combined with a limited period of time for which the benefits are payable. 
 
4.4. Institutional set-ups in unemployment insurance 
 
As in the case of sickness insurance we lack comparable data on coverage of unemployment 
insurance. Therefore, we must restrict our comparison to the gross benefits levels and duration 
of benefit period (Figure 4). In Figure 4 the duration is set to 180 weeks for those countries that 
do not apply any time limit for benefits purposes. The mean for the countries included in the 
inspection is 71 weeks with the above-mentioned maximum of 180 weeks in Belgium, 
Denmark and Australia and minimum of 10 weeks in Estonia. In all transitional economies the 
duration of unemployment insurance lags behind the international mean, most notably so in 
Estonia. 
 In comparison to sickness insurance, replacement rates for unemployment insurance 
are much lower (66% and 55%, respectively) indicating stronger legitimacy for sickness 
benefits (see Väisänen 1991). In Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden the replacement level is 
close to 80% of previous wage. Of the transitional countries, Ukraine and Hungary guarantee 
unemployment compensations corresponding to 70% of income, which is clearly above the 
international mean. In the other post-socialist countries benefits are lower than the median. In 
Estonia the compensation level is only 10% of the previous wage.  
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Figure 4. Replacement level of unemployment allowances and duration of benefit period in 
selected countries in 1997. 
  
 A serious problem with the comparisons presented above is that the figure does not 
say anything about the coverage of the schemes: who is entitled to benefits, how wide is the 
coverage of the schemes. In most settled economies unemployment insurance works like 
insurance. A claimant pays either social security contributions or membership fees to an 
unemployment fund and gets a formal right to benefit. In most transitional economies 
unemployment insurance is not formally established, the eligibility criteria are unclear, and the 
coverage of schemes are very limited. Despite the fact that the programs appear at first glance to 
be of good quality (as expemplified by the Ukrainian case) they actually cover only a tiny part 
of the labor force and may lack any practical importance 
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also pay for those benefits: the better the benefits, the higher the tax rate. In principle there are 
three main options for collecting revenues: general taxes, employees’ social security 
contributions, and employers’ social security contributions. Most social insurance programs are 
financed through social security contributions and since we were mainly interested in the social 
insurance programs we will take a closer look at those contributions. (Table 5). 
 
Table 5.  Gross tax burden (% OF GDP), personal income tax for single worker (% of wage 
ate the average wage level) and social security contribution rates (employees: % of 
wage; employers: % of pay-roll), 1997. 
 
 
COUNTRY 
TAXES AND SOCIAL  
SECURITY 
CONTRIBUTIONS/GDP 
(%) 1994 
PERSONAL 
INCOME TAX  
RATE 
SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS 
   INSURED 
PERSON 
EMPLOYER TOTAL 
Australia 29.9 22.7 1 0 1 
Belgium 46.6 27.4 13 25 38 
Canada 36.1 22.2 6 8 14 
Czech Rep 47.3 10.0 13 35 48 
Denmark 51.6 36.0 0 2 2 
Estonia ? 25.0 0 33 33 
Finland 47.3 29.5 12 15 27 
France 44.1 8.9 15 35 50 
Germany 39.3 21.0 20 21 41 
Greece 42.5 1.9 12 24 36 
Hungary 41.0 18.1 12 45 57 
Italy 41.7 18.1 11 43 54 
Latvia ? ? 1 37 38 
Lithuania ? ? 1 23 24 
Luxembourg 45.0 13.4 15 13 28 
Netherlands 45.5 5.8 45 11 56 
Norway 41.2 21.9 8 14 22 
Poland 43.2 18.0 0 48 48 
Portugal 33.0 7.1 11 27 38 
Spain 35.8 13.5 6 32 38 
Sweden 51.0 28.8 6 30 36 
Ukraine About 45 ? 1 37 38 
United Kingdom 34.1 17.4 14 20 34 
United  States 27.6 18.2 8 10 18 
Sources: OECD 1996 and 1997; Ukraine: a personal correspondence with Ms. Maria Linovitska, EU 
Tacis office, Kyiv
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International comparisons (e.g., OECD 1997) reveal huge variations in the aggregate tax levels 
between nations. Total tax revenues exceed 50% of the GDP in Denmark, whereas taxes are as 
low as 19% in Mexico (not displayed in the Table). In addition to Denmark, total tax burden is 
heavy in Sweden, Finland, the Czech Republic, Belgium and the Netherlands, whereas the most 
Anglo-American countries have considerably lower tax rates. Countries in transition are 
medium (Hungary and Poland) to high (Czech Republic) tax nations.   
 As such the total tax burden does not tell that much about the distribution of taxes: 
How they are collected and how they are divided to direct taxes imposed on income and social 
security contributions. In some countries there is heavy reliance on direct taxes. High direct 
taxes are held as a trademark of the Scandinavian welfare state and indeed, this seems to be true. 
In all the Nordic countries the personal tax rate at the average income level is over 20%, in 
Denmark as high as 36%, in Finland and Sweden about 30%, and in Norway 22%. Also in 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Estonia (a single tax rate of 25%), and Germany the tax rates 
exceed 20%. Unfortunately we have no data on income taxes for Ukraine, Lithuania, and 
Latvia. Poland (18.0%) and the Czech Republic are the only post-communist countries included 
in OECD (1997) tax statistics. Direct taxes are high in the former (18.0%) and low in the latter 
(10.0%) country. In a number of countries direct taxes are very low, like in Greece (1.9%),  
Korea (1.9), Mexico (4.8%) and the Netherlands (5.8%). The Dutch case is very interesting: the 
total tax burden expressed as a percentage of the GDP is very high but the direct tax rate is very 
low – something that suggests high social security contributions (see also Figure 5). 
 The average contribution rate for the insured is 10% but the variation is huge. In 
Denmark and Australia employees do not pay any social security contributions –revenues 
needed to finance social security in these countries are collected through taxes – whereas the 
Dutch insured must pay as much as 45% of their income. In Estonia, Poland, Ukraine, and 
Lithuania the insured fees are negligible, whereas in Hungary, Latvia, and Czech Republic they 
slightly exceed the international average.  
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Figure 5.  Employees’ social security contributions (% of wage) and employers’ social 
security contributions (% of pay-roll) 
 
On average, employers’ fees correspond to 25% of the pay-roll, but also here there is a 
substantial variation from zero in Australia to almost 50% in Poland. Interestingly enough in all 
transitional economies employers are rather heavily burdened by social security fees which 
seems to be a historical legacy from the socialist era when the employer was responsible to 
organize social policy and also pay all costs for social insurance programs (cf. Piirainen 1998). 
If we exclude the extreme Dutch, Australian, Danish, and New Zealand cases, a slight trade of 
between the employers’ and employees’ financial burdens emerges from Figure 5. 
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6.  Effectivity of social security programs 
 
In his turn-of-the-century study on poverty in York, Seebohm Rowntree (1901) observed that 
poverty is linked to age and family formation in a cyclical fashion. The first poverty cycle a 
person experienced was “childhood“, when his/her parents had many dependents to feed and 
when the earnings of one person was not enough to meet the needs of many. Poverty eased 
when the young person left home and began to earn her/his own living. Economically, the 
situation became worse again when she/he got married and had children of her/his own. This 
family phase continued until the children grew up, began to contribute to the family income, 
and, then, one by one left home. An economically easier period thus started also for the parents, 
what could be termed as the 'empty nest phase'. This stage lasted until old-age brought on a 
lower capacity for work. Because of inadequate pension systems at the turn of the century, for 
most people leaving the labor force in the “old-age phase“ meant a transition to more or less 
persistent poverty.  
 Earlier comparative studies based on cross-sectional data (e.g. Hedström & Ringen 
1987) have observed that age differences in poverty has evened out in many countries for which 
LIS data exist. Strictly speaking the age-based studies do not precisely correspond to 
Rowntree’s idea of life-cycles. The issue has been dealt with e.g., by  Kangas & Palme (1998) 
who utilized possibilities offered by the LIS-data base and constructed life-cycles on the basis 
of age and the number of children in families. Unfortunately we do not have access to such data 
for all the transitional countries and therefore we are obliged to use age groups as proxies for 
life-cycles. The impacts of the type of household will be studied a little bit later. 
 For space considerations in most articles on poverty only one indicator has been 
used. For the same space limitations we are also here obliged to be satisfied with one poverty 
line. In order to avoid problems connected with the use of one single poverty rate (be it 40%, 
50% or 60% or whatever else) we first calculated poverty rates according to the 40%, 50%, and 
60% poverty lines. Thereafter the three separate poverty measures were merged into a single 
index by counting averages for them (Table 6).  
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Table 6.  Poverty rates (mean for 40%, 50%, and 60% poverty lines) according to age 
groups. 
 
 
COUNTRY -25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+  
AUSTRALIA 20.6 13.6 11.4 7.5 12.9 14.4 
CANADA 28.9 13.3 11.1 8.5 11.1 3.3 
USA 35.2 23.4 17.3 11.0  14.0  15.2 
UK 26.4 17.2 15.6 8.4   7.4 8.2 
FINLAND 18.0  3.2 3.4 3.9 4.3 5.8 
GERMANY 34.6 12.4 9.4 3.9 5.5 5.1 
SWEDEN 29.3 4.5 3.9 3.1 2.3 3.3 
NL 19.5 6.9 5.5 4.2 4.8 2.5 
POLAND 11.4 13.7 14.4 12.4 9.2 6.8 
CZECH REP. 7.7 3.1 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.0 
HUNGARY 16.6 10.0 12.3 12.1 8.7   5.1 
SLOVAKIA 8.7 3.2 2.1  1.9 1.4 1.2 
SPAIN 14.0 10.1 10.7 11.5 10.1 8.3 
ESTONIA 11.5 8.4 9.5 6.5 5.7 5.2 
Mean 20.2 10.3 9.1 6.9       7.0 6.1 
Std.dev. 9.3  5.9 5.1 7.0       6.6  5.2  
  
  
The overall picture depicted by Table 4 is that the traditional poverty cycle attached to age has 
disappeared in most countries. The mean for all countries almost linearly decreases from 20.2% 
for the youngest age group to 6.1% for the elderly. However, the general picture hides impor-
tant cross-national differences. In the settled Western economies the youngest age groups are 
the most exposed to poverty, especially so in the U.S, Germany and Sweden
4
. This is mainly 
because the entrance of the youngsters to the labor market is prolonged due to the expansion of 
higher education and students are almost by definition poor in terms of income. 
 In transitional economies the situation is different. In none of the post-socialist 
countries does the poverty rate of those below 25 years of age exceed the international mean 
(20,2%). The main explanation is that in transitional economies youngsters have income from 
work as well as other factor incomes more than in Western countries. Moreover, some analyses 
of the relative winners and losers in the socio-economic transformation suggests that the 
youngest age groups have benefited most  from the transformation (Zagorski 1998). Surpri-
singly enough, neither are the elderly in post-socialist countries exposed to poverty. Their 
                                                 
4 In the Swedish case, we have a measurement error related to the fact that the data is organized according to the 
tax record. In these records all persons above 18 form households of their own even if they live with their parents. 
This leads to somewhat misleadingly high levels of poverty reported for Sweden. 
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poverty rates are very low e.g., compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries (with the exception of 
Canada) that display a U-curve in their age related poverty rates. 
 Not only are there differences between nations in their actual poverty rates but also 
the effectivity of the income transfer schemes vary greatly from country to country and between 
age groups. Table 7 shows how effectively social policies in different countries or groups of 
countries have been able to aid the groups at risk of poverty. The poverty alleviation effect, R, is 
simply pre-transfer poverty rate minus post-transfer poverty rate divided by pre-transfer po-
verty rate and multiplied by 100. The higher the value of R in Table 7, the larger the proportion 
of the population that has been lifted above the poverty line by income transfers: a value of 100 
means that all pre-transfer poor have been assisted and a value 0 indicates that none have risen 
above the poverty line. 
 
Table 7.  The role of income transfer systems in poverty reduction (poverty reduction 
coefficient, R, average for 40%, 50% and 60% poverty lines). 
 
COUNTRY -25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Mean 
AUSTRALIA 29.0 33.9 39.0 48.5 54.3 79.5 47.4 
CANADA 30.8 30.1 36.8 42.2 55.7 95.3 48.5 
USA 13.4 4.7 8.6 18.6 42.2 76.6 27.4 
UK 36.7 9.9 17.1 48.8 79.6 89.6 46.9 
FINLAND 50.6 79.8 73.7 64.3 89.3 93.6 75.2 
GERMANY 28.8 29.5 39.5 50.8 72.6 92.5 52.3 
SWEDEN 31.1 56.6 75.2 69.4 89.6 96.2 69.7 
NL 50.2 20.9 41.6 67.5 86.8 94.9 60.3 
POLAND 51.4 25.6 21.3 33.3 71.7 87.3 48.4 
CZECH REP 58.8 83.0 85.7 80.2 96.5 98.3 83.8 
HUNGARY 38.0 45.3 32.5 33.0 67.5 90.0 51.1 
SLOVAKIA 57.7 71.7 83.7 79.3 93.3 96.8 80.4 
SPAIN 29.4 16.2 11.5 17.4 51.3 82.2 34.7 
ESTONIA 32.6 33.1 11.6 26.7 84.3 93.0 46.9 
Mean 38.5 38.6 41.3 48.6 73.9 90.4 55.2 
Std.dev. 13.2 25.3 27.6 21.2 17.4 6.7 - 
 
 
The general story in Table 7 is that in all countries the effectiveness of the income transfers 
improves when moving from the young to the old. In all countries elderly people are the most 
vulnerable and most in need of transfers and in most cases they will be very effectively helped: 
the mean for all the countries is as high as 90.4% (compared to 38.5% for the youngest age 
bracket) and the variation among nations is very low compared to variation in the younger age 
brackets which indicates that social security programs aiming to help the elderly are more 
homogenous than social protection for young. If we inspect overall reduction coefficients for 
each country we can see that the former Czechoslovakia performs pretty well followed by 
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Finland and Sweden. The United States and Spain display the lowest overall poverty reduction 
rates. 
 Not only are there remarkable differences in the coefficient of poverty reduction but 
there also is a huge variation in the initial level, i.e., in pre-transfer poverty from which social 
transfers try to help people. As a rule in all age brackets pre-transfer poverty is lower in 
post-communist nations than in the West. For example, among the elderly pre-transfer poverty 
according to the 50% poverty line is below 60% in all post-communist countries whereas it is as 
high as 91% in Finland, 86% in Sweden, 85% in the Netherlands, 77% in the United Kingdom, 
and 64% in the United States (calculated from the LIS). The results indicate that in settled 
economies with stable social policy programs people rely more on social security transfers, 
whereas in the transitional period they also try to seek other means to secure their livelihood. In 
uncertainty it is not clever to put all your eggs in the same basket. 
 
Table 8.  Poverty according to the type of household (average for the 40%, 50%, and 
50% poverty lines). 
 
COUNTRY 1A 2A 1ACH 2A2CH 2A3CH 
AUSTRALIA 13.0 8.3 33.7 8.6 20.4 
CANADA 11.1 4.9 35.4 8.7 19.7 
USA 16.3  7.0 49.0 10.6  26.1 
UK 7.7 5.7 31.6 12.1 27.5 
FINLAND 10.6 2.7  4.4 2.2 6.5 
GERMANY 8.4 3.5 39.8 6.5 17.0 
SWEDEN 12.6 1.8 4.7 3.1 7.4 
NL 5.7 3.0 24.6 4.1 11.0 
POLAND 3.2 4.9 15.5 8.3 26.6 
CZECH REP. 1.6 0.6 9.4 1.6 4.0 
HUNGARY 4.4 6.6 11.4 10.0 22.2 
SLOVAKIA 2.4 0.9 6.8  1.9 4.6 
SPAIN 6.2 6.7 16.3 6.9 21.7 
ESTONIA 7.8 5.4 14.0 10.1 14.2 
Mean 7.9 4.4 21.2 6.8 16.4 
Std.dev. 4.4 2.4 14.4 3.6 8.4 
1A = household of one person; 2A = household of two persons; 1ACH = single-parent 
household; 2A2CH parents with one or two children; 2A3CH = parents with three or more 
children 
 
 
 The inspection above in Tables 6-7 was based on age brackets. An alternative and a 
complementary picture can be obtained by calculating poverty rates according to family types 
as has been done in Table 8. Again we can distinguish special patterns between nations or 
groups of nations. In the West (with the exception of the Netherlands) households consisting of 
one member are more exposed to poverty than in the East. In the Anglo-American countries all 
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kinds of households with children experiences more problems than in the Nordic countries and 
the Czech and Slovak Republics. Also in Germany and in the Netherlands single-parenthood 
considerably increases the probability of being poor, whereas the Finnish and Swedish single 
parents fare well comparatively (poverty rate less than 5%). In other household types with 
children the Scandinavian cluster is fortified by the Czech and Slovak Republics, while Hun-
gary, Poland, and Estonia have more in common with the Anglo-American block. 
 As in the case of poverty in different age groups it is useful to see to what extent the 
results on poverty among different family types presented in Table 8 are affected by social 
security transfers. This kind of inspection will give us a snapshot of the efficiency of family 
policy programs in different countries. As can be seen in Table 9 the effectiveness varies 
greatly between countries and within countries between different family types. Family policies 
seem to work most effectively on one hand in Finland and Sweden and in the former 
Czechoslovakia on the other. Precisely in the same way as in the case of age-specific poverty 
rates the most ineffective support systems fort families can be found in the Anglo-American 
countries and Spain. Poland, Hungary, and Estonia are located somewhere in between these 
two extremes.  
Table 9.  The role of income transfer systems in poverty reduction (poverty reduction 
coefficient, R, average for 40%, 50% and 60% poverty lines). 
 
COUNTRY 1A 2A 1ACH  2A2CH 2A3CH 
AUSTRALIA 70.6 67.7 43.1 64.5 30.5 
CANADA 69.6 80.3 21.5 39.0 27.8 
USA 60.4 74.7 17.7 65.1 46.7 
UK 86.0 83.4 49.9  7.5 13.8 
FINLAND 77.3 91.0 86.6 77.2 76.3 
GERMANY 70.9 84.3 15.7 43.7 42.6 
SWEDEN 75.1 95.3 88.0 66.4 81.7 
NL 88.4 89.8 56.9 41.1 15.5 
POLAND 50.9 71.5 31.5  2.1  4.7 
CZECH REP. 90.7 96.0 66.5 82.4 85.5 
HUNGARY 83.8 64.8 55.9 26.1 50.5 
SLOVAKIA 64.1 92.9 71.9 77.4 85.5 
SPAIN 46.3 68.3 42.7  2.2 - 
ESTONIA 93.0 89.8 61.3 42.4 45.3 
Mean 73.4 82.1 50.7 45.5 42.3 
St.dev. 14.5 10.9 23.6 28.0 31.7 
Explanations of the headings see Table 8. 
7. Transitional countries in a comparative perspective 
 
The aim of the present paper was to compare social policy programs and their consequences in 
terms of poverty and poverty reduction in Western countries and in post-socialist countries. To 
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place the post-socialist countries in the prevailing welfare state typologies is a bit of a ha-
zardous task. Neither the Western nations no the post-communist countries form a single ho-
mogenous group.  
There is a large variation when it comes to the institutional set-ups of social policy 
programs. In their pensions schemes the Baltic states have much in common with the Scandi-
navian pension model with basic pensions possibly supplemented by earnings-related pensions. 
In Ukraine, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland the pension security follows the 
Central-European pattern more closely with an emphasis on earnings-related schemes.  
In the Nordic countries maternity allowances follow their own distinct pattern: 
moderate benefits that are payable for a long period in time, whereas the Central European 
pattern, attached to the post-socialist countries, is built on high income replacement rates 
combined with shorter benefit periods. The same also goes for the sickness insurance programs 
in the transitional countries.   
 The financial structure of the post-socialist social policy does not follow a single 
pattern. In some countries the tax rate is very high, as in Poland and the Czech Republic but 
relative low in Estonia. However, in one dimension the transitional countries are pretty similar. 
As a legacy from the socialist period employers are rather heavily burdened by social security 
fees.  
 In our analyses we also paid some preliminary attention to poverty levels according 
to age groups and family types. The post-socialist countries seem to perform pretty well in this 
comparison. Especially in the Czech and the Slovak Republics relative poverty is very low, 
even surprisingly low. The same goes to some extent Estonia, too. Together with Finland and 
Sweden these post-socialist countries form a class of their own. The results are supported by 
some national studies analyzing poverty in Estonia and the Czech Republic more deeply 
(Kutsar, Trumm & Oja 1998; Vecernick 1996).     
 So far, so good. Why then, should we be worried about the poor situation in the 
transition economies? Their social security programs seem to work very well or at least satis-
factorily, locating in between the Scandinavian and American extremes. However, the is pic-
ture perhaps not that sunny. First, it is probable that the income register data is more sparse in 
economies in transition. It means that income differences between the rich and the poor are 
much wider than that displayed by the official statistics and consequently, relative poverty will 
be much higher, too. 
 Overall inspection of the economic development in different countries indicated 
that differences in the absolute living-standard/economic well-being have increased between 
the Western world and economies in transition. In 1990 the income level in the transitional 
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economies corresponded to 35% of the median for the 31 nations studied. Five years later the 
corresponding ratio was only 24%. Thus, there is the problem of absolute and relative mea-
surement of poverty (see e.g., Kangas & Ritakallio 1998). The problems arose immediately 
when we related the average income level in the settled economies and in the transition 
economies. According to Table 1, e.g., the Estonian real GDP per capita is US$ 4 062, whereas 
if is as much as US$ 26 977 in the United States. Furthermore, the overall relative poverty rates 
in Poland and Hungary are a bit lower than in the United States but the median income from 
which the national poverty lines are derived in those two post-socialist countries is only about 
one tenth of the U.S. median (US$ 1700, and US$ 14 000, respectively). The American poor 
would be rich in those countries. The problem revolves around relative and absolute poverty. In 
the rich western countries poverty is to a greater extent relative, whereas in the transition 
economies its character is more absolute. 
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Anita Haataja 
 
 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL 
EXCLUSION
5
 
 
 
1. Starting point: rising employment levels and decline  
in social exclusion 
 
 
Unemployment has become one of the most serious social and economic prob-
lems in Europe. In 1997, every tenth member of the EU labour force was unemployed; nearly 
half of these were long-term unemployed. Nearly four out of ten Europeans of working age 
were unemployed or otherwise outside the employment; 149 million people (60,5 percent) were 
employed (SEC (1998) 1668). Europe has thus been plagued by high unemployment and low 
employment rates, as well as slow growth in the number of the employed in comparison with 
other OECD countries. 
The EU has in the 1990s taken steps towards more integrated economic and 
monetary policies, but also towards greater co-operation in the field of employment policy. The 
Luxembourg summit (1997) adopted the first common set of aims in labour market policy for 
1997. The targets set for 1999 will be monitored during the Finnish presidency of the Union, 
and a third set of guide lines in employment policy will be adopted then. With the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997), greater social integration and prevention of social exclusion were added to 
the aims of employment policy. 
As the content of employment policy has expanded from reducing unemployment 
to increasing employment, the target group of policies has widened. Women’s position in 
particular, and more precisely problems faced by women on the labour market have become 
more visible
6
. This has contributed towards an increased interest in different social policy 
                                                 
5 A slightly revised version of this essay will be published in European Societes 
Vol. 1, issue 2 in 1999 (Routledge). The empirical results that this article 
is based on are laid out in more detail in the author’s PhD thesis (Haataja 1998). 
6 As with the earlier guidelines, the 1999 employment guidelines consist of four 
main pillars, one of which is concerned with the equal opportunities of men and 
women in the labour market. The fourth pillar defines also the so-called 
mainstreaming principle of gender equality which is to be incorporated in 
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models as well as income transfer and tax systems (Rubery and Fagan 1998; COM (1998) 574). 
Interest has, however, focused on how different arrangements encourage working, not on how 
they prevent social exclusion. 
Social exclusion is a multidimensional phenomenon that is not easy to measure. It 
is not necessarily linked to low incomes (Kangas and Ritakallio 1996). Extended unemploy-
ment leads easily to exclusion from the labour market, but not necessarily to social exclusion if 
the level of income remains sufficient and social networks are maintained. However, the fact 
remains that the poor have more limited chances of fulfilling their individual and social wishes, 
and prolonged lack of economic resources can lead to social exclusion. Social exclusion and 
poverty often lead to exclusion from societal participation. If the population is increasingly 
divided with respect to its income and possibilities to influence society, there is a risk of a 
polarised society where the solidarity of the well-off towards the less well-off diminishes 
(Andersen 1996). 
The fulfilment of the first EU employment guidelines is assessed through four 
indicators of developments in unemployment, and four indicators of the employment situation. 
The employment situation is also investigated from a macroeconomic perspective. However, 
the impact of changes in employment and unemployment on income distribution and social 
exclusion is not studied (SEC (1998) 1668). One of the reasons for this is the fact that updated 
statistics on incomes and wages are lagging behind statistics on employment. An additional 
problem is the lack of comparable data
7
. On the other hand, the points of comparison for the 
developments in employment in the EU have been taken from outside Europe. In particular, the 
high employment rate in the United States (74 percent) in comparison with that in Europe (60,5 
percent in 1997) has been taken up as a challenge. 
International comparisons have established that demographic changes have only a 
marginal impact on poverty. Changes in poverty are most strongly influenced by differences in 
economic growth and in the distribution of the fruits of growth (Smeeding 1997). In other 
words, the manner in which the state interferes with the income distribution on the markets is an 
                                                                                                                                                        
measures concerning the other three pillars, too. 
7 For instance, the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) data has been used 
for only one extensive study that investigates the connections between un-
employment and standards of living (Vogel 1997). One of the strengths of this 
study is that it illustrates the many and significant differences in the 
demographic and socio-economic structures of the European countries. These 
structural differences may also influence income differences between unemployed 
and employed households, but these connections have not yet been studied. 
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important explanatory variable behind poverty (see Korpi 1980). Unemployment has as its 
immediate consequence ‘income poverty’ because earnings on the labour market decrease. On 
the other hand, unemployment indirectly reduces ‘income poverty’ because it leads to an in-
crease in income transfers that are used to eliminate poverty (Mäkinen in this book – page 191). 
The role of income transfers in combating poverty depends on the extent of income transfers 
and the principles of redistribution, in short on the social policy model. For instance, the posi-
tion of the unemployed does not need to be weak even if the unemployment security system is 
small as long as other forms of social policy such as economic and employment policies prevent 
unemployment and long-term unemployment effectively (see for instance Evans 1996; Esp-
ing-Andersen 1996). 
The connections between unemployment and the threat of social exclusion can be 
estimated by establishing how common or deep poverty is among the employed and the un-
employed. This is the first aim of this article. The article also seeks to establish possible dif-
ferences between social policy models in this respect (see Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and 
Palme 1997; Mäkinen in this publication). The fact that poverty is equally common or rare 
among the unemployed and the employed can be due to many factors. Small differences may be 
due to income transfers that effectively combat poverty even in the absence of income from 
work. On the other hand, small differences can also be due to high poverty risks not only among 
the unemployed but also among the employed whose income from work is insufficient
8
. The 
second aim of this article is to assess the extent to which income transfers prevent poverty in 
different social policy models. 
The article is structured as follows. Chapter two will outline the data and the countries that 
have been chosen as representatives of social policy models. This chapter will also describe the 
definition of poverty used here, the research methods, and other definitions. Chapter three 
contains the research results. The first section of this chapter focuses on the connections be-
tween poverty and unemployment or employment. The role of income transfers in preventing 
poverty in different social policy models will be investigated next. The incomes of the em-
ployed and the unemployed will also be compared with the average household incomes. The 
last chapter presents the conclusions and discusses the importance of developing indicators of 
income changes for the evaluation of employment policies. 
                                                 
8  Other possible reasons are short duration of unemployment spells, fast 
re-entry into the labour market and family structures. If unemployment is more 
common among men and the family relies heavily on the man’s income, the poverty 
risk can be higher than in dual-earner families. 
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2. The data and definitions used in the study 
 
2.1 The data and research focus 
 
Obtaining comparable data from all EU countries would be very helpful for the purposes of 
contemporary discussions on employment policies. As this is impossible due to incomplete 
data, countries from outside Europe have been included, too. There is a further reason for in-
cluding these countries. European states have been claimed to suffer from ‘eurosclerosis’ that 
involves high unemployment and high public expenditure. In order to ‘cure’ this disease, it has 
been suggested that Europeans should look for good examples elsewhere, for instance in the 
USA. 
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS 1996) is the best available source for the 
purposes of this study, although it, too, suffers from certain problems and limitations
9
. In ad-
dition to the fact that not all EU member states are included in LIS research, the unemployed 
can be identified as a sufficiently comparable group only in a few countries and it is even rarer 
to find such data for several time cross-sections
10
. The LIS data are gathered so slowly that by 
the time they are ready, they have no relevance for day-to-day politics. However, this data does 
offer an opportunity to assess past developments and to produce evaluations and background 
information for future strategies. 
The Finnish case will be studied in the light of household surveys (1976-85) and 
income distribution statistics (1990-95) in order to gain a longer perspective
11
. The Finnish 
model of social policy changed in the 1980s’ social insurance reform into so-called encom-
passing social policy model for the working age population. In this reform, the untaxed un-
                                                 
9 Despite lissification, the harmonisation of variables, the LIS data suffers 
from many features that limit comparability. Some of these problems will be 
confronted in this study, too. On the other hand, the content of all variables 
does not need to be completely identical as we are interested in the general 
developmental trends within the countries and the differences between these 
trends. The exact absolute differences between the countries at a certain point 
of time are of secondary importance from the point of view of this study. 
10 For instance, in Spain there is data on the unemployed only for 1990; in the 
Netherlands and Belgium the unemployed can be identified only on the basis of 
unemployment insurance information; in Italy the unemployed could be identified 
only on the basis of insurances in 1991; there is no unemployment data at all 
for Austria and Luxembourg; for France there is unemployment insurance data only 
for 1981. 
11 At the time of writing, LIS data was available for Finland only for 1987 and 
1991. The definitions of income used in the Finnish time series are not fully 
commensurate with the LIS variables. These differences are, however, not of 
practical importance for this study (see Uusitalo 1989, 95-96; Ritakallio 1994, 
91). 
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employment and sickness daily benefits that were previously linked to income ceilings were 
linked fully to earnings and also became taxable (Haataja 1989). After less than ten years the 
encompassing model that included both universal and earnings-related benefits was put to a 
difficult test during the recession of the early 1990s. 
 
THE UNEMPLOYED AND THE EMPLOYED 
 
Differentiating between the unemployed and the employed is not straightforward within one 
country, let alone in an international comparison. As unemployment often has many different 
definitions even within one country, we can assume that the definitions that are used in inter-
national comparisons vary even more. For instance, hidden unemployment, the chances of 
finding work, of gaining entitlement to unemployment benefits and of registering as unem-
ployed vary considerably between countries (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991; Rubery and 
Fagan 1998). 
The possibility to identify and distinguish between households that have ex-
perienced unemployment and other households has had a decisive impact on what countries 
could be included in the final analysis in this study. Households that have been affected by 
unemployment (‘unemployed households’) were defined as follows: those households where at 
least one member has received unemployment benefits during the period under study. Various 
conditions that have been imposed on recipients of unemployment benefits, waiting days, 
duration and the nature of benefits mean that the ‘receiving benefits’ definition covers only a 
small proportion of the unemployed (narrow definition). This definition excludes for instance 
those long-term unemployed persons who have become dependent on means-tested social 
assistance, because in LIS data all means-tested benefits have been added together in the same 
variable. Those unemployed persons not in receipt of benefits could be identified if the country 
data contained a variable describing the unemployment spells of the reference person or his/her 
partner. The broad definition of unemployment was constructed by combining these two, 
namely the households that had experienced unemployment and those that had been in receipt 
of benefits. 
Only those working age households where the reference person was between the 
ages of 25 and 64 were defined as ‘unemployed’ or ‘employed’12. These age limits were in-
                                                 
12 Please note that ’the employed’ refers both to those who are in paid employment 
and to those who receive their income from other sources than paid work or 
unemployment benefits, for instance pensioners, housewives, and those who live 
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tended to increase the comparability of the countries as the rights to unemployment benefits and 
other definitions of unemployment vary even more among young persons than among those of 
working age. 
 
SOCIAL POLICY MODELS AND REPRESENTATIVE 
COUNTRIES 
 
One useful way of comparing the connections between policies and end results is by picking 
countries that can be classified into different social policy models (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
The countries chosen for this study represent the three main models and their combination, the 
so-called encompassing model (Korpi and Palme 1997). The main models are systems that 
function on the basis of means-testing, flat-rate and earnings-related benefits. Means-testing 
directs social security to the worst-off, the universal principle gives a flat-rate benefit to all and 
the earnings-replacement principle compensates for the loss of income in proportion to the 
earlier level of earnings and the contributions paid. No single principle encapsulates the entire 
social security system in any one country, but in most countries one of the principles is pre-
dominant. In the encompassing model, benefit systems incorporate two or even three of the 
above-mentioned principles. 
The Nordic countries represent the encompassing social policy model. Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark were chosen as representatives of this model for the purposes of this 
study. However, in all Nordic countries the unemployed could be defined only narrowly on the 
basis of benefit recipiency. This definition also sought to include the long-term unemployed  
because in the encompassing model the basic unemployment security system, too, functions in 
one way or another. In Finland, the unemployment benefit system encompasses even those who 
lack previous employment history and those who do not have a voluntary unemployment in-
surance. In Sweden, the basic unemployment security (the KAS system) presupposes previous 
employment history which means that the new labour market entrants are not included in the 
comparison. Earnings-related benefits are in both countries of limited duration, but there is no 
time limit to withdrawing basic security benefits. Defining the unemployed in Denmark is most 
problematic as some unemployed person opt for social assistance. The level of earnings-related 
benefits is highest in Denmark among the Nordic countries, but the earnings ceiling is low, in 
other words the system favours the low-waged. The duration of earnings-related benefits is 
                                                                                                                                                        
on other benefits. 
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longer in Denmark than in the other Nordic countries (SZW 1995). All Nordic countries are 
also characterised by the fact that both the unemployed and the employed are entitled for in-
stance to the universal family benefits. 
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In the other countries the unemployed could be identified both on the basis of 
benefit recipiency and unemployment spells. Germany is included as the only representative of 
the corporatist earned benefits-principle and Australia as the only case of means-tested, tar-
geted social security (“wage-earners’ welfare state“, see Castles 1996). England, the USA and 
Canada represent the so-called liberal basic security model. The social policy systems of these 
countries differ in important respects. England has traditionally had a social insurance system 
based on flat-rate benefits, with increasing elements of means-testing. The USA has an unem-
ployment security system characterised by low benefits of short duration and there are few 
benefits for persons of working age other than means-tested social assistance. In Canada, the 
level of unemployment benefits is higher than in the USA, and there is also a number of family 
benefits for persons of working age (Myles 1996). 
The primary sources of national data, the periods for which data were obtained, 
definitions of family and the unemployment benefit systems are briefly described in appendices 
1 and 2. 
 
2.2 Definitions and methods 
 
Poverty is here defined in accordance with the so-called relative income principle  (Townsend 
1993; Kangas and Ritakallio 1996). A households are defined as poor if its disposable income is 
less than half (50 percent) of the median household disposable income in any given country, 
and at any given time. Relative poverty rates, the share of households below the poverty line, 
give us an idea of how many households subsist on less than half of the income that an average 
household has at its disposal. The 50 percent poverty line is, of course, randomly chosen be-
cause income distribution varies greatly between different countries and changes over time 
(Haataja 1998, 82 and 184). Earlier studies have noted that despite variations in the poverty line 
between 40 and 60 percent of median income, the order of the countries in terms of poverty 
rates does not change much (Mitchell 1991; Atkinson et al 1995; Ritakallio 1994). This study 
does not aim to estimate poverty in itself but to study the relative poverty of unemployed and 
employed households and changes in poverty rates within countries over time. 
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The study unit is a household. The final poverty rate is calculated on the basis of 
disposable income per household consumption unit. The consumption unit is the so-called 
OECD unit. The effectiveness of income transfers in reducing poverty is calculated as a percent 
of the poverty rates that are calculated for each stage of income formation13. The effectiveness 
of the entire income transfer institution in reducing poverty is calculated on the basis of poverty 
rates of market income and disposable income. The poverty line and the poverty rate are es-
tablished on the basis of disposable income at every stage of income formation as follows: 
 Market income (poverty before the impact of income transfers) 
+ Income transfers without means-tested benefits (poverty before the impact of taxes and 
means-testing) 
+ Means-tested income transfers (poverty rates at gross income, poverty before the impact of 
taxes)14 
- Taxes and other tax-like payments 
= Disposable income (poverty after income transfers and taxes i.e. final poverty rate) 
Unemployment benefits are not the only income transfer that influences the in-
come of unemployed households. In some countries family benefits for instance can have a 
significant impact on the incomes of working age families, whether they experience unem-
ployment or not. 
                                                 
13 100 * (Poverty rate % (income 1) – Poverty rate % (income 2) / Poverty rate 
% (income 1) 
14 In the case of Finland, only the most common income transfers based on 
means-testing and directed at the working age population (housing benefit and 
income support) are counted as means-tested income transfers. In all other 
countries, means-tested income transfers are the ready summary variable of all 
means-tested income in the LIS data. 
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3. Results 
 
3.1 Unemployment and long-term unemployment in the  
countries included in this comparison 
 
In Denmark, Germany and England unemployment was in the 1980s close to the EU average. 
In Finland and Sweden unemployment was first clearly below the average, but the increase in 
unemployment in the early 1990s was most dramatic in these countries. In Sweden the unem-
ployment rate remained below the EU average, whereas the Finnish rate grew to be one of the 
highest in the EU. Unemployment rates diverged more from each other in the European than in 
the other countries. 
Long-term unemployment has been high throughout the period under study in Denmark, 
Germany and England and outside Europe in Australia. In contrast, in the USA and Canada the 
share of the long-term unemployed has been lowest. In Finland and Sweden long-term unem-
ployment was low in the 1980s but increased in the 1990s especially in Finland to a very high 
level. The changes both in unemployment rate at large and in long-term unemployed are greater 
in Finland than in any other country included in the comparison. With respect to changes in 
unemployment, countries can be roughly divided into three groups between 1980 and 1995 
(OECD Employment Outlook and Economic Outlook yearbooks): 
 
- Countries where unemployment and long-term unemployment have increased strongly 
(Finland and Sweden) 
- Countries where unemployment has increased (or remained stable at the average rate) and 
long-term unemployment is high (Germany, Denmark, England and Australia) 
- Countries where unemployment has remained low or at an average rate, and where 
long-term unemployment continues to be low (the USA and Canada) 
 
If unemployment and long-term unemployment lead to increased poverty, we would expect 
increased levels of poverty among the unemployed in Finland and Sweden in the 1990s. High 
long-term unemployment in Denmark and Germany on one hand, and in England and Australia 
on the other hand give rise to the expectation that the differences in the poverty rates of the 
employed and unemployed would be great in all these countries. In contrast, the low levels of 
unemployment and long-term unemployment in the USA and Canada would seem to imply that 
the differences in poverty rates among the unemployed and other poor households would be 
small. On the other hand, the low levels and short duration of unemployment benefits in the 
USA also give rise to the expectation that the poverty risk among the unemployed would be 
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greater than among other households of working age. 
 
3.2 Unemployment as a poverty risk 
 
Unemployment threatens to lead to social exclusion if unemployed households experience 
poverty more often than other working age households. The countries included in the com-
parison fall into two groups in accordance with how poverty increased in unemployed house-
holds in comparison with employed households. In one group, poverty rates among the un-
employed and other working age households did not differ much, whereas in the other group 
unemployment created an obvious poverty risk. Furthermore, countries differed over time with 
respect to the increase or lack of change in the poverty rates of the unemployed and the em-
ployed. The countries fell into two groups also on the basis of how unemployment and 
long-term unemployment were connected to poverty among the unemployed. 
The research results have been presented in five-pointed diagrams that illustrate 
both the threats of poverty and the end results (Figure 1). Threats are the overall unemployment 
rate in a country, the share of the long-term unemployed and the share of households identified 
as unemployed households of all working age households. Information on the first two was 
derived from OECD statistics, and information on the latter was obtained from the research 
materials
15
. The end results are the relative poverty rates of the unemployed and the employed 
households. Every point in the diagram represents a socially undesirable phenomenon, namely 
unemployment or poverty. The smaller the unemployment and poverty rates, the closer to the 
origin the points and the smaller the diagrams. Where the diagrams are large, unemployment 
and poverty rates are high. 
                                                 
15 The fact that unemployment or the share of the long-term unemployed are low, 
but the share of unemployed households of working age households is high, reveals 
how different ways of measuring it give a different picture of how common 
unemployment is. Official unemployment rates are cross-sections of the situation 
in any given month. In contrast, the share of the unemployed households of all 
working age households illustrates the share of all those who have experienced 
unemployment in the course of a year in relation to all others. The differences 
are due to the fact that in the course of a year some unemployed persons find 
work, others become unemployed for the first time and only some have been 
unemployed for the whole year. In the LIS data, the exceptions are England and 
Germany where the periods of measurement are one week and one month respectively.   
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Sources: For the overall unemployment rates: OECD Economic Outlook 1996; for the share of the long-term 
unemployed: OECD Employment Outlook yearbooks; for the share of unemployed households of 
working age households: the research data. 
 
Figure 1.The unemployment rates, the share of working age unemployed households of all 
working age households and the relative poverty rates of the unemployed and the 
employed  from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s in the countries included in this 
comparison. 
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In the Nordic countries, the dimensions representing the poverty rates of both the unemployed 
and the employed are close to the origin. Poverty is low among the unemployed as well as 
among the employed and there are no considerable differences between poverty rates, although 
unemployment as a poverty risk increased particularly in Finland. In Finland, the threats of 
exclusion, the overall unemployment rate and the share of the long-term unemployed grew to 
be among the largest in the EU, but the relative poverty rate remained stable. 37 percent of 
working age households experienced unemployment in Finland in 1995 and poverty rates 
among both the unemployed and the employed were below 5 percentage. 
In Denmark, the unemployment rate and the share of households affected by 
unemployment declined somewhat between 1987 and 1992, but unemployment remained high 
by all definitions. The share of the long-term unemployed increased, too, without an increase in 
poverty among the unemployed. In Sweden, unemployment was low, but increasing, in the 
early 1990s. The slight growth in unemployment was evident primarily in an increase in the 
share of those working age households where unemployment had been experienced in the 
course of a year. 
In Canada, long-term unemployment and the share of unemployed households 
have increased, but the poverty rates have remained nearly unchanged, as in the Nordic coun-
tries. However, both the unemployment rate and the poverty rate among all persons of working 
age were clearly higher than in the Nordic countries. 
The diagrams for Germany, that represents the earned benefits principle, and for 
England where the flat-rate principle is predominant, resemble each other most at the first 
glance. First, the share of the long-term unemployed is high in both countries, as is the share of 
the unemployed households and the average unemployment rate. Furthermore, in both coun-
tries the poverty rates among the unemployed are clearly higher than among the employed, in 
other words unemployment constitutes an obvious poverty risk. 
The share of the households that had experienced unemployment grew in both 
countries, but the growth was greater in Germany than in England. The share of the long-term 
unemployed in England varied from one year to the next, whereas the share remained at a 
relatively high level in Germany. The fact that the share of the unemployed households was in 
both countries low in comparison with the official unemployment rates is due to the short 
research intervals (in England one week, in Germany one month). The fact that the poverty rate 
among the unemployed in Germany remained stable may be due to the lack of changes in 
long-term unemployment. Correspondingly the fact that the poverty risk increased among the 
unemployed in England may be linked to the increase in long-term unemployment in the 1990s. 
It has not been possible to analyse these connections in greater detail within the scope of this 
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study. England and Germany differ also with respect to the lower poverty rates among the 
employed in Germany, in other words the poverty risk among the employed is somewhat lower 
in Germany than in England (see Employment in Europe 1994, 140-142). 
In Australia that represents the means-testing principle, both the risks and the end 
results resemble those in England: the poverty rates are considerably higher among the unem-
ployed than among the employed, and the difference in these poverty rates is increasing. In 
Australia, too, the share of the long-term unemployed is fairly large. However, in contrast to 
England, this share diminished over the period under study. It seems therefore that in the 
Australian case the increase in poverty among the unemployed is not directly linked to 
long-term unemployment. 
Unemployment is a great and growing poverty risk in the USA, as it is in England 
and Australia. There are, however, marked differences between the situation in the latter two 
countries and the USA. On one hand unemployment and long-term unemployment rate in the 
USA are among the lowest in the countries compared here, despite the slight increase in 
long-term unemployment in the USA in the early 1990s. The poverty rate among the unem-
ployed is highest in the USA, as is the poverty rate of the employed. 
 
The case of the USA illustrates that low unemployment rate and high employment rate do not 
necessarily constitute an effective protection against poverty among working age people. 
Successful management of unemployment does not automatically imply successful elimination 
of the threat of social exclusion. The central tool of eliminating poverty among the unemployed 
is the level and nature of social security. The next chapter discusses in more detail the impact of 
income transfers on reducing poverty in different social policy models. 
 
3.3 The effectiveness of income transfers in reducing poverty 
 
The shorter the duration of unemployment and the greater the market incomes of other 
household members, the smaller the income transfers that are needed to prevent poverty. 
Long-term  unemployment,  however,  also  increases  market  income  poverty (Table 
1). The  
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market income poverty rate among the unemployed households before income transfers was on 
average 35 percent, and 50 percent more common than among other working age households in 
the countries compared here in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Finland, long-term unem-
ployment had become considerably more common by the mid-1990s and market income pov-
erty was higher than on average. In contrast, in the USA and Canada long-term unemployment 
has been relatively low and poverty among the unemployed, measured on the basis of market 
income, has been lower than on average. 
 
Table 1.  Poverty rates among working age households measured on the basis of market income and 
the share of the long-term unemployed of the unemployed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
 Unemployed Employed Difference %-points Long-term unemployed, %  
3) 
Finland 95  1) 
Sweden 92  2) 
Denmark 92  
2) 
  37.4               19.5    
  37.4               16.1 
  23.1               18.2 
          18.0 
          21.3 
           4.8 
       35.9 
        8.3 
        26.9 
Germany 94   38.9               12.7            26.3         44.4 
England 95 
Canada 94 
USA 94 
32.1  22.4 
28.4  15.8 
29.4               16.7 
            9.7 
            12.6 
            12.8 
         45.4 
         15.2 
          12.2 
Australia 94   49.7               16.2             33.5           36.3 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e 
  34.5               17.2             17.4            28.1 
1) Source: Income distribution statistics 1995, the unemployment rate calculated according to the 
narrow definition. 
2) The unemployment rate calculated according to the narrow definition, 3) Source: OECD Em-
ployment Outlook, July 1996. 
 
Income transfers reduced poverty before means-tested income transfers on average by 44 percent (Table 2). 
Means-tested transfers reduced poverty by further 17 percentage points and taxation in turn 
increased poverty by six percentage points. The poverty reduction effect of the entire income 
transfer institution was in all countries compared 55 percent on average. However, there were 
considerable differences both between countries belonging to the same social policy model and 
between the social policy models. For instance, income transfers reduced the original poverty 
rate among the Finnish and Swedish unemployed by more than 90 percent, whereas the poverty 
reducing impact of income transfers in the USA was overall only 14 percent. 
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Table 2.  The poverty reducing impact of income transfers: reduction in 
poverty at different stages of income formation, the total 
impact and the final poverty rate (%) in working age 
unemployed households in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
 Income      
transfers 
+Means- 
testing 
+Taxation = Total impact 
F
i
n
a
l
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
r
a
t
e 
Finland 95  1) 2) 
Sweden 92  2) 
Denmark 9  2) 
82.7 
87.9 
68.6 
12.7 
9.6 
22.7 
-3.2 
-2.5 
-4.5 
92.1 
95.0 
86.8 
2.9 
1.9 
3.0 
Germany 94 39.4 30.9 -10.6 59.7 15.7 
England 95 
USA 94 
Canada 94 
12.7 
18.3 
39.1 
42.4 
7.5 
12.8 
- 8.7 
-12.0 
-3.8 
46.4 
13.8 
48.1 
17.2 
25.4 
14.8 
Australia 94 54.3 4.6 -0.9 58.0 20.8 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e 
43.6 17.3 -5.7 55.2 10.1 
1) Source: Income distribution statistics 1995 
2) The figure for the unemployed calculated according to the narrow definition. 
 
 
Longitudinal study of individual countries shows that the logic of income transfers has re-
mained relatively stable (Figures 2 and 3). Countries belonging to the same social policy model 
share certain similarities. In the Nordic countries, the so-called primary income transfers that do 
not include means-tested benefits reduce poverty most effectively. Means-tested income 
transfers influence primarily the poverty rates among the unemployed but have only a slight 
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impact on the poverty rates among other households of working age (Denmark is the only 
exception in this respect). 
In Germany where earnings-related benefits characterise the system, every stage 
of income transfers reduces poverty among the unemployed significantly. Despite this, poverty 
among the unemployed remains widespread. Social insurance benefits have a visible effect on 
the poverty rate among the employed which, as in the Nordic countries, remains low. Measured 
against market incomes, poverty among the employed in Germany is slightly lower than in the 
Nordic countries: in the Nordic encompassing model, also the employed are entitled to many 
social security benefits. 
Interpreting the results for Australia is problematic due to the nature of the data. It 
is namely unexpected that in a country representing the means-testing principle, means-tested 
income transfers do not appear to have reduced poverty. This is due to the fact that the summary 
variable representing means-tested income transfers is used for the first time in 1989, in other 
words means-tested benefits were previously included in social insurance benefits. 
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Figure 2.  Poverty rates at different stages of income formation in the Nordic countries 
and in Germany in the long run. Relative poverty rates have been calculated 
on the basis of the median disposable income (50%).  1) 
 
1) The figure for the unemployed has been calculated on the basis of the broad definition in the 
case of Germany, and on the basis of the narrow definition for the Nordic countries. 
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Figure 3.  Poverty rates at different stages of income formation in England, Australia, 
the USA and Canada in the long run: the relative poverty rates have been 
calculated on the basis of the median disposable income (50%).  1) 
 
1) The figures for the unemployed have been obtained by using the broad definition. The 
exceptions are year 1981 for Australia, and years 1979 and 1986 for England. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
1986 1991 1994
USA: The unemployed
0
10
20
30
40
50
1986 1991 1994
Market income
Prior to means
testing
Gross income
Disposable
income
USA:  The employed
0
10
20
30
40
50
1986 1991 1995
England: The unemployed
0
10
20
30
40
50
1986 1991 1995
Market income
Prior to means
testing
Gross income
Disposable
income
England:  The employed
0
10
20
30
40
50
1987 1991 1994
Canada:  The unemployed
0
10
20
30
40
50
1987 1991 1994
Market income
Prior to means
testing
Gross income
Disposable
income
Canada:  The employed
0
10
20
30
40
50
1985 1989 1994
Australia:  The unemployed
0
10
20
30
40
50
1985 1989 1994
Market income
Prior to means
testing
Gross income
Disposable
income
Australia:  The employed
  
 
66 
The impact of the English basic security model diverges from the situation in 
other countries of the liberal model. Every stage of income formation reduces poverty. 
Means-tested benefits have a bigger impact in England than in most other countries, and the 
importance of means-testing in reducing poverty among the unemployed has increased. Al-
though income transfers reduce market income poverty among the unemployed in England and 
Australia, their poverty remains at a considerably higher level than that of employed working 
age households.  
The poverty reducing influence of the American and Canadian income transfer 
institutions has remained stable over a long period of time. Income transfers reduce poverty 
only slightly. The Canadian model is more accommodating of the unemployed than the US 
model. Previous studies have established that the 50 percent poverty line is relatively high in 
relation to the level of American social security benefits that are mostly targeted at the poor 
(Bishop et al 1996). Benefits targeted at the poor, however, increase the disposable income of 
those below the poverty line although they fail to reduce the poverty rate. 
As the USA is one of richest countries in the world on the basis of its GDP, we 
need to establish whether the American poor are poor in comparison with poor people in other 
countries. Timothy Smeeding (1997) has compared the purchasing power of disposable income 
in 14 countries so that household incomes have been made comparable with the help of pur-
chasing power parity. The results indicate that the poorest decile of the population in the USA 
was also in absolute terms poorer than the poorest decile in Finland and in 12 other developed 
OECD countries. High average GDP per capita does not necessarily mean a high standard of 
living to as large a part of the population as possible. 
 
3.4 Income levels among the unemployed 
 
 
On the basis of the low poverty rates in the Nordic countries one could assume 
that the income level among the unemployed does not diverge much from the income level of 
the total population. Correspondingly, we may assume that high poverty rates are a sign of 
lower than average income. However, this is not necessarily the case. The average income of 
the unemployed may be sufficient to lift them above, but very close to, the poverty line. 
The average adjusted income levels of the unemployed and the employed are 
compared here with the income levels of all households. Both the average disposable incomes 
and the median incomes have been compared. As the results are fairly similar, only the results 
based on median income are presented here. The pillars in Figure 5 illustrate how much (in  
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percentage points) the median incomes of unemployed and employed households 
diverge from the median income of all households. The median income of all households is 
represented by the value 100 in all countries.  
 
Figure 4.  The 
diver-
ver-
gence 
of the 
me-
dian 
in-
comes 
(as 
per-
cent-
age 
points
) of 
unem-
em-
ploye
d and 
em-
ploye
d households from the median incomes of all households (=100) during the last year 
of the period under study. 
 
The median incomes of working age employed households are in all countries higher than the average 
median income of all households. This result is to be expected as the incomes of the young and 
the old are usually lower than those of working age employed households and hence lower the 
median income of all households. The median incomes of the unemployed are correspondingly 
usually lower than those of all households on average. Exceptions are formed only by Sweden 
and Denmark towards the end of the period under study. In Sweden, the median income of the 
unemployed is roughly the same as the median income of all households. The reason for this 
may be that long-term unemployment had increased only slightly by 1992. 
In Denmark, the income level among the unemployed is even higher than the 
average income. The reason for this may be the divergence of the ‘Danish model’ from the 
general Nordic model with respect to unemployment benefits and the differences in the struc-
ture of unemployment (Andersen 1996). The income-replacement levels in earnings-related 
benefits are high and favour those on lower incomes due to the low income ceilings. The du-
ration of earnings-related benefits is also longer than in the other Nordic countries (seven 
years). Long-term unemployment has been more common among Danish women than among 
Danish men. The Danish unemployment security system hence offers a fairly good compen-
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sation for women’s low wages (often due to part-time employment) and the income level of 
families does not sink much as a consequence of unemployment if the spouse is full-time em-
ployed. May be that is one reason why according to a study the Danish long-term unemployed 
(often married women) rarely feel that they are economically or socially excluded (mt., 19-23). 
For instance, in Finland long-term unemployment is more common among single men, which 
results a different risk and form for social exclusion (Haataja 1997). 
In Finland, the poverty rate among the unemployed is one of the lowest in the 
countries compared here, but the median income of the unemployed was already in 1995 clearly 
below the median income of all households. In 1995, unemployment rarely meant income level 
below the poverty line, but more and more often it meant low incomes in relation to the em-
ployed households and all households. The relative levels of median incomes among the em-
ployed and unemployed were roughly same in England and Canada as in Finland. The lowest 
relative median incomes were found among the unemployed households in Germany, Australia 
and the USA. In these countries the poverty rates of the unemployed were also higher than 
average. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Poverty and the risk of exclusion associated with it have become more common in the 1980s 
and in the early 1990s. There are, however, differences in the extent of this development among 
the working age households in countries representing different social policy models. In some 
social policy models unemployment is an obvious poverty risk that pushes working age 
households below the poverty line. In other social policy models poverty among the unem-
ployed does not differ markedly from poverty among other households of working age. The 
poverty risk of working age households does not seem to be directly connected to the unem-
ployment rate or the share of long-term unemployment. 
Countries representing four different social policy models can be classified in the 
light of empirical comparisons into three groups with respect to the poverty risk among the 
employed households (Table 3). In the first group, the position of the unemployed has not 
differed greatly from the position of other households of working age and the situation showed 
no signs of changing. The Nordic countries and Canada (representative of the liberal model) 
belong to this group. However, Canada differed from the Nordic countries with respect to the 
higher poverty rate among all people of working age. These countries can be characterised as 
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belonging to social policy models that uphold stable homogenisation. 
 
Table 3.  The poverty rates of unemployed households in comparison with other working age 
households and the development of the poverty rate from the early 1980s until the 
early 1990s. 
 
 
 
Poverty rate among the unem-
ployed has increased 
Difference in comparison with 
the working age employed 
Great 
Difference in comparison 
with the working age 
employed  
Small (under 5 %-points) 
 # Australia 85-94 
# England 86-95 
¤ USA 86-94 
 
Poverty rate among the unem-
ployed has remained unchanged 
of decreased 
 
# Germany 84-94 
* Finland 76-95 
* Sweden 75-92 
#  Denmark 87-92 
¤  Canada 87-94  
Explanations of symbols: 
*  Countries where unemployment and long-term unemployment increased from a low to an 
average or higher than average level during the period under study. 
#  Unemployment rate was close to the EU average or followed the trend, but long-term unemployment remained 
high throughout the period studied. 
¤  Low or average unemployment rate and small share of the long-term unemployed. 
 
Among the Nordic countries, Finland and Sweden are examples of how social policy has been 
fairly successful in preventing relative poverty despite extensive changes in the economy and 
the unemployment rate. The poverty rates among the unemployed and employed have remained 
practically unchanged from the early 1980s until the mid-1990s despite increases in unem-
ployment. The USA represents the other extreme. Here, unemployment was among the lowest 
in the countries compared, but poverty rates among both the unemployed and the employed 
were the highest. Nearly 15 percent of the employed remained below the poverty line. 
England and the USA, as well as Australia of the targeted model form the group 
of countries where unemployment constitutes a great and growing poverty risk. The threat of 
polarisation among households of working age increased. In these countries income transfers 
either had a negligible impact (the USA) or a great, but insufficient impact on the poverty rate 
(Australia and England). 
Germany stood out as the only representative of the model that emphasises 
earnings-related benefits. The situation prevailing in Germany can be characterised as stable 
polarisation because unemployment was there a great poverty risk but the difference between 
the unemployed and others was not growing. Income transfers clearly reduced poverty in 
Germany, but not as effectively as in the Nordic model. There is another important difference 
between the Nordic countries and Germany that may explain the great poverty risk among the 
unemployed households. The single earner (male breadwinner) family model is more common 
in Germany than in the Nordic countries. When the only breadwinner of the family becomes 
unemployed and loses earnings-related benefits, the spouse’s income does not help to lift in-
come above the poverty line. The significance of women’s employment and income in reducing 
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poverty in different countries deserves further empirical study. 
It has been argued that economic internationalisation limits the opportunities of 
nations to control their own economy. However, countries with similar historical backgrounds 
and economic conditions have made different strategic decisions regarding the appropriate 
national economic policies. Good examples of this are Australia and New Zealand in the early 
1990s (Castles 1996). High and persistent unemployment leads to waste of social capital and 
narrows the economic basis of the welfare state. On the other hand, low unemployment can not 
be regarded as wholly positive if it is reached through a labour market situation where income 
from work is not sufficient to exist above the poverty line and hence does not diminish the risk 
of social exclusion. 
Minimal social security and highly uneven income distribution are not cheap, 
either. Poverty tends to accumulate and to bring forth more poverty. There is less social mo-
bility in countries where income differentials are great than in countries with more even income 
distribution (Kangas 1998). Low social expenditure can lead to increased expenditure else-
where and may in the end be as expensive as high expenditure aimed at preventing poverty. 
Extensive poverty can for instance increase crime. In the USA, 70 percent more is spent on 
private security services than on public police work (Rifkin 1997). One of the traditional 
freedom rights, namely physical security, is increasingly dependent on the individual’s ability 
to finance it. Prisons in the USA contain so many men of working age that the US unem-
ployment rate would increase if this labour reserve was included in the calculations (Buchele 
and Christiansen 1996). 
The results of this study indicate that unemployment and employment should be 
analysed from many different perspectives. High unemployment rates do not necessarily bring 
about a high risk of social exclusion if the social policy and employment models prevent pov-
erty. Low unemployment rates do not guarantee that the employed are well off. The aims of 
economic and employment policy have become increasingly similar with the progress of 
European integration, but the decisions regarding income distribution are still made at the 
national level. Developing commensurate indicators is a great challenge for those wanting to 
monitor the employment targets and strategies in the EU.  Before agreement can be reached 
over these matters at the international level, it is important to study the connections between 
employment, unemployment and changes in incomes at the national level. Who finds em-
ployment, and who fails to do so? How are the unemployed coping? How are the employed 
coping?  How is men’s income from work developing?  What about women’s incomes? And 
the incomes of the young and the elderly? How are income distribution and household incomes 
changing? 
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APPENDIX 1. Sources and units used in the income study. 
 
Country LIS-Data Source Original 
time 
period 
1) 
Family 
stucture  
( D5) 
Unit 
 
SW75 The Level of Living Survey Year All Tax Unit  
SW81 The Income Distribution Survey Year All Tax Unit 
SW87 The Income Distribution Survey Year All Tax Unit 
SW92 The Income Distribution Survey Year All Tax Unit 
 
DK87 The Income Distribution Survey Year All Tax Unit 
DK92 The Income Distribution Survey Year All Tax Unit 
GE81 The German Transfer Survey Month  1 or 2 Household  
GE84 The German Socio-Economic Panel Study Month  1 or 2 Household  
GE89 The German Socio-Economic Panel Study Month  All Household  
GE94 The German Socio-Economic Panel Study Month  All Household  
UK79 The Family Expenditure Survey Week 1 or 2 Family 
UK86 The Family Expenditure Survey Week All Household 
UK91 The Family Expenditure Survey Week All Household 
UK95 The Family Expenditure Survey Week All Household 
US79 The March Current Population Survey Year 1 or 2 Household 
US86 The March Current Population Survey Year 1 or 2 Household 
US91 The March Current Population Survey Year 1 or 2 Household 
US94 The March Current Population Survey Year 1 or 2 Household 
CN81 The Survey of Consumer Finances Year All Family 
CN87 The Survey of Consumer Finances Year 1 or 2 Household 
CN91 The Survey of Consumer Finances Year 1 or 2 Household 
CN94 The Survey of Consumer Finances Year 1 or 2 Household 
AS81 The Australian Income and Housing Survey Year 1 or 2 Household 
AS85 The Australian Income and Housing Survey Year 1 or 2 Household 
AS89 The Australian Income and Housing Survey Year 1 or 2 Household 
AS94 The Australian Income and Housing Survey Yar 1 or 2 Household 
 
1) All incomes in LIS data are annual incomes although the original period over which information is 
gathered is shorter in some countries. 
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APPENDIX 2. Overview of the unemployment security models of the countries included 
in the comparison. 
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Finland, 1934, 
1984, 1994 
 
 
Sweden, before the 
1994 reforms 
 
Denmark 
  
 
 
Voluntary, 
insurance and basic 
security 
 
Voluntary, insurance 
and basic security 
 
Voluntary insurance or 
social assistance 
 
Insurance approx. 60%, 
no earnings ceiling, 
basic security 
means-tested flat-rate 
benefit 
 
Approx. 85%, with an 
earnings ceiling 
 
90%, low earnings 
ceiling 
 
Insurance: 1 year and 
11 months, no upper 
time limit on basic se-
curity 
 
 
1 year and 2 months 
 
 
Insurance: maximum of 
7 years 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
ti
st 
 
Germany, 1927, 1969 
 
Corporatist, compul-
sory insurance and 
unemployment benefit 
 
Approx. 60-67% of net 
earnings, assistance 
53-57% of net earnings 
 
Insurance: ½ - 2 years 
and 8 months and ac-
cording to employment 
history, no time limit on 
social assistance 
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L
i
b
e
r
a
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England, 1911, 
(1995) 
 
 
Canada, 1940, 1971 
 
 
 
USA, 1935 
 
 
 
Basic security, social 
insurance and social 
assistance 
 
Basic security, 
social assistance 
 
 
Basic security, 
compulsory insurance 
 
 
Flat-rate benefit, level 
dependent on the num-
ber of dependants  
 
50%, with an earnings 
ceiling 
 
 
Approx. 50%, varies 
between the states 
 
 
Insurance: 52 weeks 
(1/2 year) 
 
 
Maximum 50 weeks, 
employment history, 
unemployment rate in 
the area 
Maximum 26 weeks, 
varies between the 
states 
T
a
r
g
et
e
d 
 
Australia, 1944, 
1992 
 
 
 
Targeted, 
unemployment benefit 
 
 
Means-tested systems, 
family circumstances 
and age influence level 
of benefits 
 
 
No time limit 
 
Sources: Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1997 
Unemployment Benefits and Social Assistance in Seven European Countries, A Comparative Study, 
No.10. Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Haag 1995.  
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Tiina Mäkinen 
 
Structural Pressures, Social Policy and Poverty  
in 15 OECD Countries 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Comparative welfare state research has been flourishing for a couple of decades, but the picture 
it has produced of the welfare state remain unclear. There have been many contradictory 
findings and conflicting results. One reason for this lack of clarity is the way the welfare state 
has been defined - the theoretical background is unsatisfactory. Another reason lies in the 
outcomes that studies seek to measure: social expenditures, social rights, poverty and income 
equality. 
We can divide the earlier comparative welfare state studies into different 
‘generations’ on the basis how these factors have been dealt with (Esping-Andersen 1989, 
18-20). Studies belonging to the first generation can be divided into two different categories 
according to what are seen as the crucial determinants of the welfare state expansion. Some 
studies stress the importance of structural changes, whereas the others underline the importance 
of political factors. 
Studies emphasising the role of major structural changes are often labelled as the 
structural-functionalist approach, where the development of the welfare state is seen as a 
functional - more or less automatic - response to the changes brought about by industrialisation. 
Technological development, urbanisation and industrialisation change social structures and 
create new needs and problems. Solutions to these problems are necessary for the smooth 
functioning of society. The state takes over the responsibility for organising social security, 
health services, education and so on. (Wilensky & Lebeaux 1965; Wilensky 1975.) The 
structural-functionalist approach is not a homogeneous school but different variations, for 
instance the Durkheimian and the Marxist versions, can be distinguished (for a detailed survey, 
see Gough 1979; Mishra 1981).  
Despite differences in emphasis, all early structural-functionalist approaches 
share the assumption that political processes are strictly determined by structural constraints: 
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politics hardly matters. However, in some first generation studies, the welfare state is examined 
from the viewpoint of political factors (see Stephens 1979; Castles 1982; Hicks & Swank 1984; 
Korpi 1980; Shalev 1983; Huber, Ragin & Stephens 1993). The strength of these studies is that 
they point out the importance of one necessary precondition of the welfare state: political de-
cision-making. For example, if pension expenditure grows due to the increased number of the 
aged, this growth is silently accepted by the political decision-making process. Political ex-
planations have also been criticised. It is said that political theories tend to subjectify the 
making of the welfare state and do not give enough credit to economic and other structural 
factors that make politics possible but also constrain them. (Gough 1979; Mishra 1981; Uusi-
talo 1984.) 
The first generation of comparative studies assumed that the level of social ex-
penditure reflects a state’s commitment to welfare. By ranking welfare states according to 
spending, they assumed that all spending counts equally. When countries were ranked ac-
cording to their social expenditure levels, it was implicitly assumed that higher spending levels 
lead to more comprehensive social protection. Countries have been classified as welfare leaders 
and laggards. According to critics, the expenditure approach suffers from ‘the bigger the better’ 
syndrome. (Mitchell 1991, 168; Korpi 1980, 197, 220; Shalev 1983, 324-325; Therborn 1987.) 
Regardless of the criticism, results from the first comparative studies can be 
considered pathbreaking (see for instance Wilensky 1975). Using social expenditure share of 
GDP as an indicator of welfare state effort can be defended by arguing that this measure was the 
most easily available - or the only available - quantitative indicator of state intervention in the 
field of income redistribution (Castles & Mitchell 1991). This welfare effort indicator has 
proved to be valid in comparisons of countries with a very wide range of socio-economic de-
velopment. 
In the second generation of comparative welfare state studies, the focus has 
moved from the black box of expenditure towards the contents of the welfare state. These 
studies have - instead of costs - focused on the instruments and means that produce welfare. The 
second generation studies have produced a number of different welfare state typologies, which 
have classified welfare states according to the level of benefits, eligibility criteria, universal or 
residual character of social policy, gender equality and commitment to full-employment, and so 
on (Castles 1989; Korpi 1989; Palme 1990; Kangas 1991; Wennemo 1994; Korpi & Palme 
1998).  
Probably one of the most quoted typology of the 1990s was developed by Esp-
ing-Andersen (1990). Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regimes are construed as ideal types 
whose ‘pure’, empirical representatives are hard to find. The new idea in Esping-Andersen’s 
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classification was the combination of the means of obtaining welfare (the degree of 
‘de-commodification’) and the ends achieved (income distribution, labour market behaviour). 
In general there seems to be a gradual shift to examining the results which the different regimes 
have produced in terms of poverty rates, social rights and income equality (Korpi & Palme 
1998; Kangas & Palme 1998). 
In other words, the third generation welfare state studies have gradually realised 
that the core of the welfare state is its outcome – measured for instance by poverty rates and 
income inequality - not the welfare effort per se. This approach summarises the earlier gen-
eration’s viewpoints, but the main interest is focused on the results than can be obtained with 
certain expenditure levels and eligibility rules. In short, these studies offer a more compre-
hensive picture of how the welfare state functions. 
 
Dividing comparative welfare state studies into different generations helps us to understand that 
conflicting findings are to some extent dependent on the choices made by a researcher. When 
we know what has been measured and whether the measurement is valid, we are able to analyse 
more profoundly these - often contradictory - results (Castles 1988; Kangas 1991). Therefore 
one aim of this article is to examine the linkages between welfare effort, welfare instruments 
and welfare outcomes. However, a few words of warning are needed. Earlier studies have 
shown that there is no automatical connection between means and ends. To crystallise this point 
Castles (1994) uses the old English adage: ‘There are more ways than one to skin a cat!’. This 
means that policy outcomes are almost invariably more similar than they seem, because there 
are different routes to the same goal (Øverbye 1998). 
One can argue that the above mentioned theories originated in fordist society. 
This period in history was characterised by sufficient resources and an increase in the general 
welfare as a result of dividing these resources. This Golden Age of the welfare state seems to be 
over and we live in the post-fordist society where increasing needs are combined with meagre 
resources. In the post-fordist society, social expenditure still increase but this growth does not 
automatically lead to improved welfare and lower poverty rates as it did in the fordist society. 
This can be explained by the fact that the number of needy people is still increasing. Rising 
long-term unemployment increases social expenditure, but at the same time it also decreases tax 
revenues. In addition to long-term unemployment, another demographic burden – ageing 
population -will be crucial when we think about the future of the welfare state. 
The aim of this article is to examine how structural changes affect poverty and 
income transfers. These structural changes are operationalised as changes taking place in the 
economy, the labour market and the demographic patterns from the 1980’s until the mid-1990s 
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across OECD-countries. Structural changes will also cause changes in needs and we do well to 
remember this when we analyse particular country-specific welfare results. The greater the 
percentage of the aged, the unemployed, single parents, and children dependent on any of these 
categories, the greater the inputs a government needs to make in order to obtain a high level of 
post-transfer, post-tax equality (Gilbert & Moon 1988, 326-340; Castles & Mitchell 1992, 4). 
The effect of economic changes on social policy has been a contested terrain. 
Some studies have pointed out that when the economy is booming it is easier to find extra 
resources which increase social expenditure’s share of the GDP (see Cutright 1965; Wilensky 
1975; Alber 1982; Garrett & Mitchell 1995). The other viewpoint is that during recession, 
social expenditure’s share of the GDP will grow automatically regardless of social security 
cuts. For example, Finland’s situation in the 1990’s is a clear indication of this. When unem-
ployment in Finland grew to - and beyond - European levels, the share of public expenditure 
jumped significantly above the OECD-Europe levels despite cuts in social security (OECD 
1997a). The economic problems that have confronted the welfare state are usually identified in 
terms of unemployment. Welfare state crisis is considered more or less as an unemployment 
crisis (Huber & Ray 1997). Therefore, it is appropriate to study the effects of unemployment. 
In addition to economic problems, demographic burdens are also seen as decisive 
for the future of the welfare state. The combination of low fertility and longer life expectancy 
will engender burdensome dependency ratios. The problem of ageing population is said to 
depend mainly on birth rates. It is often feared that female employment will jeopardise fertility, 
and thus aggravate the ageing crisis. However, the welfare state makes a crucial difference 
because female employment combined with relatively high levels of fertility is possible if 
social services and generous provisions for leave are available. The relevant services and pa-
rental leaves are available in Scandinavia, but not in most of continental Europe. To the extent 
that women’s economic independence is a defining element of post-industrial society, the 
contemporary family needs the welfare state in order to harmonise work and family objectives; 
but the welfare state also needs children for the sake of its own future. (Esping-Andersen 1996.) 
The demographic burden can be divided into two parts: the ageing population puts pressure on 
pension policy, and children and women make demands on family policy. This pressure is in 
the subsequent analyses measured as the proportion of the elderly (those who are 65 years and 
over) and the proportion of the children (those who are under 15 years). This article is struc-
tured as follows. It starts with an analysis of development of poverty and income transfers in 
early 1980s and mid-1990s. This is followed by an analysis of some economic and demo-
graphic factors, and their effects on poverty and income transfers. The article will conclude 
with a summary of the central research results and a more general discussion of the issues.  
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2. DATA AND COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE 
COMPARISON 
 
The availability of new datasets has in many ways improved the practice of comparative 
cross-national welfare state research. One of the new datasets is the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) -database (see Atkinson et al. 1995; Smeeding et al. 1990; Mitchell 1991.) Poverty rates 
used here are derived from LIS-data and determined by using the relative income method. This 
measure counts as poor those whose net income is below 50 percent of the national median 
income. Only monetary income is analysed here because LIS-data does not contain information 
on benefits-in-kind. Disposable (after tax and income transfers) income is used as the income 
concept. Income levels of households with different structures and sizes have been made 
comparable by dividing income by the OECD equivalence value of the household. However, 
the individual is the research unit of this study. Data on social security transfers has been ob-
tained from OECD Historical Statistics. Data on the other structural variables has also been 
collected from OECD publications. One of the main problems in comparative welfare state 
research has been that there are only very few comparable cases available (e.g. the 
OECD-countries). This usually leads to a situation where there are more variables than cases. In 
this article is used so-called pooled regression analysis as a methodological solution to this 
problem. Data from different cross-sections is combined into one big dataset. As a consequence 
of this the number of cases increases, allowing us to conduct multivariate analyses not possible 
in single cross-section data. 
The countries compared in this article have been selected to represent different 
welfare state models which traditionally have been classified on the basis of factors such as the 
relative roles of family, the state and the market as a producers of welfare (Titmuss 1974; 
Esping-Andersen 1990). This article makes use of Korpi’s and Palme’s (1998) classification of 
welfare state models to clarify the central characteristics of individual welfare states. Since that 
typology deviates from the ‘traditional’ Esping-Andersian typology a few words of explanation 
are needed. 
The first welfare state model examined is the ‘basic security model’ in which the 
eligibility for social benefits is based either on contributions or on citizenship - meaning in this 
connection the period of residence in a particular country. The benefits are universal and flat 
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rate meaning that they are given to everybody at the same rate regardless of their earnings and 
work career. It is possible to raise the level of benefits for the better-off citizens through vol-
untary insurance. For instance Canada, the UK and the USA are in this article defined as basic 
security welfare states. This classification is made despite the fact that basic income support 
systems are nowadays different in the USA and the UK. It is thus assumed that welfare state 
models have remained stable over the period under study.  
Korpi’s and Palme’s second welfare state model is the ‘targeted’ model. Targeted 
programs are based on means-testing and giving flat rate or fairly similar benefits to those 
below the poverty line. One representative of the targeted model is Australia, where targeting 
has come to be focused on excluding high-income earners rather than on including only the 
poor. Targeted model can be said to follow the Robin Hood strategy of taking from the rich and 
giving to the poor. The better-off citizens are furthermore able to secure their standard of living 
with private insurance. As a consequence of targeting the social security expenditure stay 
modest compared with the other welfare state models.  
In the ‘corporatist’ model the programs are directed to the economically active 
part of the population, i. e. this model excludes housewives and other categories outside the 
labour force as well as high-income earners. The corporatist model can be said to be based on 
the desert principle, which means that by taking part in paid work a citizen gradually earns his 
own social benefits and rights. From the members of the active labour force only those whose 
earnings remain below a certain income ceiling are eligible for benefits. Benefits are 
earnings-related. Institutions providing corporatist income security have typically been 
governed by bi- or tri-partite boards with representation from employers, employees and the 
state. Eligibility criteria for benefits are firmly connected to work; the longer the citizen has 
participated in the labour market, the better benefits he is entitled to. In this model social 
insurance programs can be seen as segmented; different occupation groups get different kinds 
of social security. However, the wealthy citizens can improve their social security by taking 
recourse to private solutions. The corporatist model can be said to follow the Matthew Principle 
of giving more to those who already have high incomes. The corporatist model includes in this 
article Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  
The Mediterranean model is added to here Korpi’s and Palme’s original division 
of welfare state models because Mediterranean countries are seen to have characteristics that 
call for a separate model. The Catholic Church and other religious associations play an im-
portant role in financing welfare. In the Mediterranean countries, dependence is primarily an 
intergenerational matter with children remaining economically dependent on their parents 
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longer than is usual in most Northern European countries (Bimbi 1997). Italy and Spain are 
here used as representatives of the Mediterranean model.  
Last but not least is the ‘encompassing’ welfare state model. This model is 
characterised by the universal coverage and the high level of the benefits. The target group of 
social policy is not only the poor but also the middle class and the high-income earners. In 
addition to basic security this model gives earnings-related benefits to the economically active 
part of the population. The purpose of this system is to decrease demand for private insurance 
and to encompass all citizens and bring them together within the same social insurance insti-
tutions. However, the encompassing model has its own weaknesses and the main one is the high 
cost of the model. To function properly this model requires a high level of taxation and high 
social security payments. This is possible only during high employment. On the basis of early 
research it can be argued that income inequality is small and poverty rates are also low in the 
countries belonging to the encompassing model, (Uusitalo 1989; Mitchell 1991; Atkinson et al. 
1995; Ritakallio 1994). Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are here representatives of the 
encompassing model.  
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3. Poverty 
 
The development of poverty is examined in table 1. This table indicates that in the early 1980’s 
poverty was most common in the USA. Italy and Spain also had comparatively high poverty 
rates. The lowest poverty rates were found in the Netherlands and Norway. In Finland poverty 
was as big a problem as in the UK. If we compare the outcomes of different welfare state 
models we notice that the highest poverty rates were found at the beginning of 1980s in the 
countries of the Mediterranean model and the lowest rates in the countries of the encompassing 
model.  
 
Table 1. Poverty rates in the early 1980s and mid-1990s 
 Poverty rate 
(50 % md) 
in 1980, % 
Poverty rate 
(50 % md) 
in 1995 % 
Change, 
%-points 
Basic security    
Canada 81/94 11.3 10.6   -0.7 
UK 79/95   6.7 17.3 +10.6 
USA 79/94 15.2 18.6   +3.4 
Mean 11.1 15.5   +4.4 
Targeted    
Australia 
81/94 
  9.3   8.0   -1.3 
Corporatist    
Belgium 85/92   6.3   6.9   +0.6 
France 79/89   8.1 13.0   +4.9 
Germany 
81/94 
  4.5   8.1   +3.6 
Luxembourg 
85/94 
  5.0   4.2   -0.8 
Netherlands 
83/91 
  4.0   4.7   +0.7 
Mean   5.6   7.4   +1.8 
    
Mediterra-
nean 
   
Italy 85/95 12.1 15.8   +3.7 
Spain 80/90 13.5 10.9   -2.6 
Mean 12.8 13.4   +0.6 
Encompass-
ing 
   
Denmark 
87/92 
  6.6 ..5.9   -0.7 
Finland 81/95
1 
  6.7   2.4   -4.3 
Norway 79/95   4.0   4.2   +0.2 
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Sweden 81/92   4.7   5.2 +0.5 
Mean   5.5   4.4 -1.1 
All 15 coun-
tries: 
   
x    7.9   9.2   1.2 
S   3.6   5.1   3.6 
CV   0.5   0.6    3.0 
Source: LIS  
1
 Results from year 1981 are based on the Finnish Household Budget Survey and from 1995 
on the Finnish Income Distribution Survey. Therefore results for Finland are not 
perfectly comparable to other  
results based on LIS data. 
 
As a common trend it can be said that poverty increased slightly during the examined period – 
except in the countries belonging to the encompassing welfare state model. If we look at indi-
vidual countries we notice that the greatest increase in poverty occurred in the UK (+11 
%-points), but also in France the poor citizens’ share of the population increased by more than 
the average change in poverty rates. It is interesting to note that poverty increased in the USA, 
where the development of employment during the period examined was more favourable than 
in Europe. One explanation for this is that the share of single mothers has increased in the USA. 
Moreover, the lowest wages have decreased further. Many full-time employees have fallen 
below the poverty line and as a consequence of this the working poor form a new class in 
American society. (see Wilson 1994, 49-65.) Poverty decreased during the period examined in 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and Spain. Table 1 indicates that the de-
crease was sharpest in Finland. On the basis of table 1 it can be argued that the development of 
poverty is not necessarily parallel in the countries grouped in the same welfare state model. 
Instead of analysing the welfare state models, it would be more fruitful, in the light of the 
research results, to examine the features that are characteristic of the individual countries. 
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4. Social Security Transfers 
 
How are the changes in poverty rates connected to the development of social security transfers? 
Table 2 shows that the share of social security transfers of the GDP increased most in Finland. 
Also in Canada, which belongs to the basic security welfare state model, the share of income 
transfers share rose by more than the average. In the case of Canada this can be explained by the 
fact that social expenditure increased due to improvements in pensions, but in the Finnish case 
the drastic increase in unemployment was the main reason for increased expenditure.  
 
Table 2. Social security transfers of GDP (%) in the early 1980s and 
mid-1990s 
 Social security  
transfers of GDP 
(%)  
in 1980 
Social security  
transfers of GDP 
(%)  
in 1995 
Change, 
%-points 
Basic Security    
Canada 81/94   9.9 15.3   +5.4 
UK 79/95 11.1 15.4   +4.3 
USA 79/94 10.0 12.8   +2.8 
Mean 10.3 14.5   +4.2 
 
Targeted    
Australia 81/94 
 
  8.5 11.3    +2.8 
Corporatist    
Belgium 85/92 21.7 24.1 +2.4 
France 79/89 22.7 21.1 -1.6 
Germany 81/89 17.2 18.2 +1.0 
Luxembourg 
85/94 
22.0  N.A.    N.A. 
Netherlands 
83/91 
28.8 26.0 -2.8 
Mean 22.5 22.4 -0.3 
 
Mediterranean    
Italy 85/95 17.4 18.9 +1.5 
Spain 80/90 14.2 15.9 +1.7 
Mean 
 
15.8 17.4 +1.6 
Encompassing    
Denmark 87/92 16.2 19.6 +3.4 
Finland 81/95   8.8 23.7 +14.9 
Norway 79/95 15.5 15.8 +0.3 
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Sweden 81/92 18.4 23.4 +5.0 
Mean 14.7 20.6 +5.9 
 
All 15 coun-
tries: 
   
x  16.1 18.5 2.9 
S   5.9   4.9 4.1 
CV   0.4   0.3 1.4 
Source: OECD 1988: 1997a 
N.A=not applicable 
 
 
Table 3 combines information from two previous tables. This table shows that in countries 
where poverty decreased during the period under study, the share of income transfers of the 
GDP also increased. The most obvious example of this is Finland. The Swedish experience was 
the reverse: in Sweden the increasing transfers did not lead to a decrease in poverty. The 
situation was similar in the UK, where poverty increased rapidly with the increase in the in-
come transfers. In France and in the Netherlands, the share of social security transfers of the 
GDP decreased, but poverty increased, too. On the basis of table 3 we can argue that the de-
velopment in the countries examined here does not wholly correspond to the expectations we 
have of the different welfare state models.  
 
Table 3. Development of poverty and income transfers 
 
  
Decrease of Poverty 
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Finland 
Spain 
Norway  
Sweden  
UK 
USA 
Source: LIS; OECD 1988; 1997a. 
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We will now turn to examining the effectiveness of the social security schemes in 1980-1995. 
Table 4 indicates that in the beginning of the 1980’s the income transfer schemes worked most 
effectively in the Netherlands, where income transfers removed 85 % of the poverty that existed 
before income transfers. Also in Germany and in Sweden income transfers played an important 
role. Income transfers had the least impact in the USA. In Canada and Spain they also played a 
minor role. Table 4 shows that the effectiveness of income transfers schemes varied also inside 
the different welfare state models and that the effect of the individual models remained trivial in 
this relation. However, it is worth remembering that welfare state effectiveness measure (re-
duction coefficient) contains information on the size of the total bulk of income transfers and 
taxation in each country.  
 
Table 4. The effects of social security schemes on poverty in the early 1980’s 
 Poverty rate  
(50 % md) 
before 
income transfers, 
% 
Poverty rate  
(50 % md) 
after  
income transfers, 
% 
Absolute  
reduction,  
%-points 
Reduction  
coefficient
1)
  
Basic Security     
Canada 81 21.5 11.3 10.2 47.0 
UK 79  24.8   6.7 18.1 73.0 
USA 79 24.1 15.2   8.9 37.0 
Mean 23.5 11.1 12.4 52.3 
 
Targeted 
    
Australia 81 21.2   9.3 11.9 56.0 
 
Corporatist 
    
Belgium 85 29.5   6.3 23.2 79.0 
France 79 30.7   8.1 22.6 74.0 
Germany 81 22.5   4.5 18.0 80.0 
Luxembourg 85 22.9   5.0 17.9 78.0 
Netherlands 83 27.3   4.0 23.3 85.0 
Mean 26.6   5.6 21.0 79.2 
 
Mediterranean     
Italy 85 26.2 12.1 14.1 54.0 
Spain 80 25.8 13.5 12.3 48.0 
Mean 26.0 12.8 13.2 51.0 
 
Encompassing 
    
Denmark 87 28.8   6.6 22.2 77.0 
Finland 81 22.1   6.7 15.4 70.0 
Norway 79 17.5   4.0 13.5 77.0 
Sweden 81 27.4   4.7 22.7 83.0 
Mean 24.0   5.5 18.5 76.8 
 
All 15 coun-     
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tries: 
x  24.8   7.9 17.0 67.9 
S   3.6   3.6   5.0 15.2 
CV   0.1   0.5   0.3   0.2 
Source: LIS 
1) 
poverty rate before transfers - poverty rate after transfers / poverty rate before transfers  *  
100 
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Table 5 shows that in the mid-1990’s income transfers were most effective in Finland, where 
income transfers removed 92 % of the factor income poverty. If we examine the situation of the 
individual countries inside different welfare state models, some interesting exceptions can be 
found in table 5. For example, in the USA the income transfers scheme operated much more 
ineffectively than in Canada and in the UK which belong to the same welfare state model. The 
situation was somewhat different in the Netherlands where the income transfers scheme oper-
ated considerably more effectively than in France and Germany. As the subject of examination 
is welfare state models, we noticed that the importance of income transfers was small in the 
countries of basic security and the Mediterranean welfare state model. On the basis of table 5 it 
can be said that the development is not necessarily similar in the countries belonging into same 
welfare state model. However, on the basis of this table one can state that in the mid-1990’s 
there was a clear connection between social security transfers and poverty; post-transfers 
poverty stayed low in countries where social security transfers played important role, and vice 
versa. 
 
Table 5. The effect of social security schemes on poverty in the 
mid-1990’s 
 Poverty rate 
(50 % md) 
before  
income transfers, 
% 
Poverty rate 
(50 % md) 
after  
income transfers, 
% 
Absolute 
reduction,  
%-points 
Reduction co-
efficient 
Basic Security     
Canada 94 26.2 10.6 16.1 60.0 
UK 95 39.9 17.3 22.6 57.0 
USA 94 28.1 18.6   9.5 34.0 
Mean 31.6 15.5 16.1 50.3 
Targeted     
Australia 94 21.5   8.0 13.5 63.0 
Corporatist     
Belgium 92 33.6 6.9 26.7 80.0 
France 89 37.1 13.0 24.1 65.0 
Germany 94 32.1   8.1 24.0 75.0 
Netherlands 91 28.6   4.7 23.9 84.0 
Luxembourg 94 23.0   4.2 18.8 82.0 
Mean 30.9 7.4 23.5 77.2 
Mediterranean     
Spain 90 27.0 10.9 16.1 60.0 
Italy 95 31.1 15.8 15.3 49.0 
Mean 29.1 13.4 15.7 54.5 
Encompassing     
Denmark 92 32.3   5.9 26.4 82.0 
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Finland 95 30.4   2.4 28.0 92.0 
Norway 95 27.0   4.2 22.8 84.0 
Sweden 92 34.9   5.2 29.7 85.0 
Mean 31.2   4.4 26.7 85.8 
All 15 coun-
tries: 
    
x  30.2   9.0 21.2 70.1 
S   5.0   5.1   5.9 16.2 
CV   0.2   0.6   0.3   0.2 
Source: LIS 
 
However, the effect of social security schemes on poverty is not that straightforward if we 
examine the aged as a separate group. Table 6 illustrates the situation in the case of the aged 
population. This table contains some interesting results. First, we notice that in Canada the 
poverty rate after income transfers is lower than in the UK and the USA. The relative income 
position of older Canadian households has improved dramatically because old age benefits 
have become carefully targeted on the low-income elderly. This has led to a considerable de-
cline in poverty among the elderly (Banting 1997; Card & Freeman 1993).  
Table 6 shows that pre-transfer poverty is surprisingly high in Belgium, Finland, 
the Netherlands and Sweden. A common denominator in these countries is the very generous 
pension replacement rates. This has contributed to the situation where many future pensioners 
do not save for old age because they anticipate adequate public pensions. For the same reason, 
their pre-transfer income stays very low because they do not work during old age.  
 
Table 6. The effects of social security schemes on poverty in the case of over 65-year olds in 
the mid-1990’s 
 Poverty rate 
(50 % md) 
before  
income transfers, 
% 
Poverty rate 
(50 % md) 
after  
income transfers, 
% 
Absolute 
reduction,  
%-points 
Reduction co-
efficient 
Basic Security     
Canada 94 71.0   4.7 66.3 93.0 
UK 95 77.2 17.3 59.9 78.0 
USA 94 65.1 16.7 48.4 74.0 
Mean 71.1 12.9 58.2 81.7 
Targeted     
Australia 94 63.0 10.1 52.9 84.0 
Corporatist     
Belgium 92 87.8   9.0 78.8 90.0 
France 89 85.4   8.4 77.0 90.0 
Germany 94 86.3   4.9 81.4 94.0 
Luxembourg 94 71.0   2.1 69.0 97.0 
Netherlands 91 90.7   2.5 88.2 97.0 
Mean 84.2   5.4 78.9 93.6 
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Mediterranean     
Italy 95 68.9   8.5 60.4 88.0 
Spain 90 70.5   8.5 62.0 88.0 
Mean 69.7   8.5 61.2 88.0 
Encompassing     
Denmark 92 84.7   4.8 79.9 94.0 
Finland 95 86.6   0.4 86.2 100.0 
Norway 95 79.1   1.2 77.9 98.0 
Sweden 92 88.8   2.1 86.7 98.0 
Mean 84.8   2.1 82.7 97.5 
All 15 coun-
tries: 
    
x  78.4   6.7 71.7 90.9 
S   9.4   5.2 12.8   7.6 
CV   0.1   0.8   0.2   0.1 
Source: LIS 
In table 6 we also find countries – such as the USA and Australia – where pre-transfer poverty is 
not very high. Personal savings and work reduce pre-transfer poverty among the aged Ameri-
cans and Australians. Another – more methodological - explanation of this result is that pen-
sions from non-public pension schemes are registered in LIS-data not as income transfers but as 
factor income. This will reduce the pre-transfer poverty in countries where public pensions are 
not very generous. Other interesting finding is that the elderly appear to be in a very favourable 
position in comparison with the rest of the population. This finding can be explained by the 
effectiveness of pension policy. However, this result is partly connected to the methodological 
choices made by the author. It is known that the majority of those aged 64 and over live either 
alone or with their spouse. In other words, the average size of the households where they live is 
considerably smaller than the national average. If the equivalence scales used in the analysis 
imply low household economies of scales – as the OECD scales do – then the elderly seem to be 
relatively well-off compared to younger population groups. So it would be interesting to ana-
lyse whether other sets of equivalence scales instead of the OECD scale will result in com-
pletely different results. 
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5. Economic and Demographic Factors 
 
From poverty and social security transfers we go on to examine the development of some 
economic and demographic factors. First, we analyse the development of unemployment. 
When we study individual countries we notice that unemployment has risen rapidly in Finland 
(+ 11.0 %-points) and in Spain (+5.0 %-points), whereas in Luxembourg and in the USA the 
growth has been much more modest (+0.3 %-points) (OECD 1988; 1997a). This can be ex-
plained by the fact that especially in the USA labour markets are less regulated and therefore 
more flexible. The large service sector has employed low-wage workers which has led to  a  
deterioration  in the economic  position of these less skilled workers. (Blank 1995,  1-21; 
Esping-Andersen 1996.) This is also obvious when we examine the poverty rate in the USA. 
Despite low unemployment the US poverty rate was the highest among the OECD-countries 
and it increased further during the 1980’s. In contrast, unemployment decreased in the Neth-
erlands (-6.0 %-points) and in Belgium (-4.0 %-points). Both countries succeeded in bringing 
down the mass-unemployment of the early 1980s. As one decisive tool, active labour market 
policy has been used in the Netherlands. In conclusion one can state that every welfare state 
model includes countries of low and high unemployment. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that 
unemployment plagues only the countries belonging to a certain welfare state model.  
From the development of unemployment we can move on to examine the other 
economic changes. In 1960-1995, the average rate of economic growth was most rapid in Spain 
(4.1 %), but also in Australia, Canada, Luxembourg and Norway the real annual GDP growth 
was more than the average (3.2 %). The results of this study indicate that using social security 
transfers as an indicator of the welfare effort is very sensitive to changes in GDP. A good 
example of this is the situation in Finland in 1991: GDP decreased - compared to the previous 
year - 7 %-points while the GDP-share of social security transfers simultaneously increased 
rapidly (OECD 1997a).  
Two demographic changes typical for the Western societies have taken place in 
the countries compared here: elderly people’s share of the population has increased, while 
children’s share has decreased. Over 64-year-olds’share of the population increased during the 
1980’s in all other countries included in this comparison except in France. The growth was 
most rapid in Italy (+2.9 %-points), but also in Spain (+2.7 %-points) and Canada (+2.3 
%-points) the share of old people increased rapidly. In the mid-1990’s the share of the aged was 
the highest in Sweden (17.7 %) and Norway (16.0 %). The lowest rates can be found in Aus-
tralia (11.8 %) and Canada (11.9 %) (OECD 1997b). 
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The development of children’s share of the population was the reverse. The under 
15-year-olds’ share of the population decreased in all the countries compared here. The de-
crease was most rapid in Spain (-6.0 %-points), but also in the UK (-5.8 %-points) the decrease 
was notable (OECD 1997b). In the mid-1990’s children’s share of the population was the 
greatest in the USA (21.9 %), but also in Australia (21.5 %) and Canada (20.4 %) the share of 
under 15-year-olds was more than the average. Children’s share of the population was the 
lowest (15.3 %) in Italy. In the countries of the Mediterranean welfare state model families with 
many children have always been in a central position, but results considering Italy and Spain 
indicate the meaning of family has been changed.  
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6. Main Results of the Analysis 
 
Analyses presented above were based on bivariate inspection of relationships between two 
variables. While being illuminative, the relations found in bivariate analysis may be spurious, i. 
e. they may be caused by other factors. In order to check to what extent the bivariate correla-
tions will change we employ a multivariate approach and control for the effects of additional 
variables.  
One of the main problems in comparative welfare state research is that there are 
only very few comparable cases available (e.g. the OECD-countries). This usually leads to a 
situation where there are more variables than cases. So-called pooled regression analysis is used 
as a methodological solution to this problem. This involves combining data from different 
cross-sections into one big dataset. As a consequence of this the number of cases increases, 
allowing us to conduct multivariate analyses not possible in single cross-section data. (see 
Hicks 1994, 169-188; Pampel & Williamson 1989.)  
That is the reason why in table 7 is used pooled data. Table 7 contains information 
of 15 countries from five different cross-sections: 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995. For this 
reason N is 75. The main aim of table 7 is to display the connection – both direct and indirect - 
between structural factors, income transfers and poverty. The coefficients are obtained from 
path analysis (see Loehlin 1987; de Vaus 1991, 225-230). The path model consists of 2 equa-
tions which were estimated simultaneously. Social security transfers are a function of below 15 
years population (%), aged 65 and older population (%), real GDP growth per capita and un-
employment rate. Poverty rate is a function of the four previous independent variables and 
social security transfers. 
 
Table 7. Path analysis with pooled data 
 Social  
security 
transfers  
(direct effect) 
Poverty 
rate  
(direct ef-
fect) 
Poverty rate  
(indirect 
effect) 
-15 population (%) -.29 
(-2.01) 
- .13 
(1.82) 
+65 population (%) .27 
(1.87) 
-.11 
(-1.06) 
-.12 
(-1.71) 
Real GDP per capita  
(year to year percentages 
changes, %) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Standardised unemployment 
rate (%) 
.20 
(1.97) 
.51 
(5.34) 
-.09 
(-1.79) 
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Social security transfers of GDP 
(%) 
 -.46 
(-4.23) 
 
    
R
2
 .33 .41  
N=75 
(T-values within parenthesis) 
- = not significantly different from zero; other parameters statistically significant at p<.05 
level. 
2 
 = .021 (1 d.f.) 
AGFI = 1.00 
GFI = 1.00 
First, we can examine the effect of demographic variables on income transfers. Results indicate that 
children’s share of the population is connected to a decrease in social security transfers. In the 
case of older population, the results are the opposite. This can be explained by the fact that 
when social protection systems emerged in the OECD countries, the first element to be intro-
duced as a matter of priority was in most cases income support arrangements for the elderly. 
Similarly, the development of a stable, adequate and well-functioning system of retirement 
income has been a priority for social programme reform in Eastern European countries that are 
moving from command to market economy (Kalisch et al. 1998). Thus, social policy has in 
many countries primarily consisted of pension policy and the lion’s share of transfers is usually 
directed to the old people. As a consequence of this, the elderly are relatively well-off. In 
contrast to pension policy, the development of family policy has been modest (see Palme 1990; 
Wennemo 1994; Kangas & Palme 1998.) These findings indicate - not surprisingly - that the 
greater the share of the aged in the population, the greater the social security transfers.  
The variable, which described the economic development of 15 countries, turn 
out not to be significantly different from zero. A high unemployment rate seems to increase the 
share of social security transfers of the GDP. This is explained by the fact that mass unem-
ployment puts pressures on social security.  
Next, we can examine how demographic variables affect poverty. Table 7 indi-
cates that the direct effect of under 15-year-olds’ share of the population is not significantly 
different from zero. When we analyse the indirect effect of this independent variable we notice 
that children’s share of the population seems to be connected to an increase in poverty. In the 
case of people aged 65 and older, it seems that both the direct and indirect effect is negative. 
This can be explained by the fact that good pension schemes diminish the immediate poverty 
risk of the aged. As a result the pensions and income transfers, the well-being of the elderly 
increases and consequently the overall poverty rate will fall. In many countries the development 
of family policy is just beginning and poverty is still a threat to some groups such as single 
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parents and families with children. Nowadays the poverty risk of families with many children is 
greater than the poverty risk of the aged households. (see O’Higgins 1988; Forssén 1998.) 
One explanation for the low level of family benefits compared to pensions is that 
pensions are in most countries index-bound, whereas family policy benefits are not. Therefore 
pensions follow general income development automatically, whereas the improvement of 
family allowances is dependent on political decision-making which makes it possible to reduce 
expenditure without making any political decisions. This is a convenient way of reducing 
public spending during difficult times. (Wennemo 1994.) 
The variable which describes economic development did not prove to be sig-
nificantly different from zero. When it comes to unemployment we see from table 7 that its 
effect on poverty is not that straightforward. The direct impact of unemployment seems to be an 
increase in poverty, but the indirect effect is a slightly reduction in poverty. This indirect effect 
can be explained by the fact that unemployment increases income transfers, which on their side 
alleviate poverty. However, it can be argued that unemployment is connected to an heavy 
increase in poverty. It is obvious that in the future unemployment will be a more important 
determinant of poverty. Table 7 indicates also that income transfers are strongly connected to 
decrease in poverty.  
Table 7 illustrates why the different generations of welfare state studies result in 
such divergent results. If we examine social expenditure - which is a typical approach for the 
first generation’s studies - structural factors (unemployment, demographic factors) seem to 
have the connections presented in Wilensky’s (1975) study. When instead of expenditure we 
examine the welfare outcomes (poverty) - which is in the core of the third generation’s studies - 
the connection is not so clear. For example, unemployment, on the one hand, increases poverty 
and, on the other hand, leads to an increase in social expenditure, which relieves poverty. The 
overall effect of unemployment has been mixed. Thus, one explanation for the contradictory 
findings is that the studies belonging to the different generations of welfare state studies have 
examined different phases of the process illustrated in figure 7. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, 15 OECD welfare states are examined from the 
point of view of the so-called third generation studies. Third generation research focuses on 
means, costs, outcomes and their interaction. The results show that in Australia, Canada, 
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Denmark, Finland and Spain, the growth of income transfers has reduced poverty. The situation 
was not so favourable in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the USA, 
where increases in income transfers were connected to an increase in poverty. Reduction in 
income transfers led to an increase in poverty in every country examined. As a common trend it 
can be said that from the early 1980’s until the mid-1990s poverty increased slightly regardless 
of the development of income transfers.  
If we are more interested in the outcomes of different welfare state models we 
have to analyse separately the situations before and after income transfers. When we focus on 
analyse the factory income poverty it is obvious that targeted and Mediterranean model produce 
the lowest poverty rates before income transfers. When we move to analyse the effect of in-
come transfers then the encompassing model is going to be the most effective what comes to 
ability to reduce poverty, and thus achieves the lowest poverty rates. However, the outcomes of 
this article show that the situation before and after income transfers are not necessarily similar 
in the countries belonging into same welfare state model. 
The second aim of the article is to examine the effect of different structural factors 
on poverty and income transfers. The results indicate that, of the two demographic variables 
studied, children’s share in the population is connected to a decrease in social security transfers. 
In the case of older population groups, the results are the opposite. When it comes to poverty, 
the results indicate that the indirect effect of children’s share in a population is an increase in 
poverty. In the case of aged population, both the direct and indirect effects are negative. The 
greater the proportion of the aged in the population, the lower the poverty rates. This can be 
explained by the fact that social policy has in many countries consisted primarily of pension 
policy, and the investments in the aged are now beginning to bear fruit. Good pension schemes 
diminish the immediate poverty risk of old people. The combined effect of pensions and in-
come transfers is increased well-being of the elderly; the overall poverty rate will consequently 
fall. In future the aged will have an increased impact on how society’s resources are distributed.  
In addition to demographic factors, the effects of changes in the GDP and un-
employment were analysed. GDP growth did not prove to be a statistically significant variable 
in this study. The results show that unemployment rate is connected to growth in income 
transfers, but its effect on poverty is not straightforward. The direct effect of unemployment is 
an increase in poverty; however, if income transfers are taken into account, the (indirect) effect 
of unemployment is a decrease in poverty.  
Unemployment is also in a crucial position when we think about the welfare 
state’s future. In addition to its impact on the national level, unemployment also has some ill 
effects on the international level. The numbers of the working poor will increase and the growth 
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of long-term unemployment will also narrow the differences between welfare state models. 
This means that poverty and inequality will become a more widespread problem - also in the 
Scandinavian welfare states. Much will also depend on how the unemployment crisis can be 
solved. There are several ways to deal with the high unemployment rates. Some of them have a 
real effect on the numbers of the unemployed (e.g. active labour market policy). However, there 
are also methods that do not alleviate the basic problem, but merely change its nature. One 
example of this is when the unemployed receives, instead of unemployment benefits - as a 
consequence of early retirement - pension or disability pay. Unemployment rates will be lower, 
but the basic problem does not disappear. Such measures may even increase the total sum of 
income transfers.  
Finally, welfare states are today in a more equal position. The socio-economic 
changes in Western European countries are presenting different welfare states with increasingly 
similar challenges and problems. While there is no evidence that welfare states are gravitating 
towards a single model, there are some signs of convergence. As Lazar and Stoyko (1998, 8) 
put it: countries A and B may be as far apart today in terms of the generosity of their social 
security systems as they were two or three decades ago, but they are both moving towards more 
flexible, less redistributive and leaner systems than the previous ones. Weather this prophesy of 
convergence is true or not remains to be answered by the future studies. 
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KAARINA NURMI 
 
CHANGES IN WOMEN’S AND MEN’S 
LABOUR MARKET POSITIONS IN THE EU 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Proliferation of education (’education expansion’) is one of the most striking in-
ternational developments of the past couple of decades. Entry into the labour market has been 
postponed due to longer periods in education, and the young generations are better educated 
than the older ones. As a result, the labour market position of the poorly educated persons is 
now more vulnerable than before.  
Women in particular have participated in this phenomenon. The educational level 
of women has traditionally been lower than that of men, but women are everywhere making 
good this gap. In some EU countries the situation has indeed been reversed: young women are 
on average better educated than men of the same age. The level of education and labour market 
position are connected in three ways. With higher levels of education, the likelihood of em-
ployment increases, the risk of unemployment decreases and the income level rises. The cor-
relation between the level of education and employment is considerably stronger among 
women than among men. (OECD, Education at a Glance 1995-1998; Nurmi 1998a.) 
The second characteristic shared by labour markets in different countries is the 
problem of unemployment. The 1980s were already characterised by high unemployment in 
comparison with the previous decades, and by the growth in long-term unemployment both in 
relative and absolute terms (OECD, Employment Outlook 1991, 38-39). As a result of the 
unexpectedly long and deep recession of the early 1990s, unemployment reached record-high 
levels and long-term unemployment became more common. In the Nordic countries, too, where 
employment has until the 1990s’ recession been high, unemployment increased dramatically, 
reaching the proportions of unprecedented mass unemployment in Finland.  
The third common trend is the proliferation of atypical work. Part-time and 
fixed-term (short-term/ temporary) contracts are central tools in striving for increased flexibil-
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ity and efficiency of labour markets. Discussions concerning the pros and cons of labour market 
flexibility were fuelled by the 1990s’ recession, although the 1980s had already seen debates 
over the increase in the frequency and diversity of atypical work. The causes and consequences 
of the remarkable increase in atypical forms of employment have also been a subject of debate.  
The fourth development witnessed in different countries, and in many ways one 
of the most revolutionary social changes of our time is the dramatic increase in labour market 
participation among the mothers of young children. The significance of paid labour for women 
has changed significantly. Marriage and the birth of children are less and less frequently rea-
sons for women’s permanent or long-term exit from the labour market. 
Women’s participation in wage labour has indeed been considered one of the 
most important indicators of the realisation of equality between sexes (Schmidt 1993) because 
wage labour is in many ways linked to the well-being and independence of an individual.  
The independence gained through paid labour is of primary importance. In most 
countries, the right to social insurance benefits arises through participation in wage labour, 
whereas those outside paid labour have to resort to social assistance. This division is prob-
lematic because rights gained through paid labour are usually considered ‘earned’ rights and 
therefore politically legitimate. Means-testing is not applied, the benefit constitutes an indi-
vidual right, and the level of ‘earned’ benefits is usually higher. In contrast, social assistance is 
characterised by stigmatising means-testing and low level of benefits, and they are usually 
intended to cover family, rather than individual needs. (Sainsbury 1996, 129.) 
However, the labour market participation rates of men and women are an insuf-
ficient measurement of their labour market positions, because the forms and conditions of 
participation in paid labour differ between men and women in ways that make women’s labour 
market position weaker than men’s. Part-time and temporary work, interruptions in career 
paths, lower status and low wages are typical of women’s labour markets. Women also bear the 
brunt of the responsibility for housework even when in employment, which makes their labour 
market position problematic by creating the so-called double-burden phenomenon. (Nurmi 
1998a.) 
Part-time and temporary work are the main types of atypical employment. 
Atypical work is commonly associated with weaker labour market position. The extent to 
which this is the case depends largely on the social policies of a country as a whole. From the 
point of view of the well-being of an individual it is also crucial whether part-time or temporary 
work is voluntary or involuntary, in other words, whether flexibility serves primarily the needs 
of the employer or the worker. 
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On the one hand, part-time work has its advantages. It can function as a bridge to 
the labour market. Furthermore, part-time employment can help to combine work and family 
life and leave space for fulfilling other personal aspirations and needs. Here, again, the crucial 
factor is whether part-time employment is voluntary, or dictated by the lack of alternatives. On 
the other hand, part-time work can weaken the labour market position of the worker. Part-time 
work does not commonly bring about economic independence and does not usually comprise 
so-called good jobs (high wage, good career prospects, high status, plenty of job-related 
training). In many countries there is indeed  high concentration of part-time workers among 
the lower paid. (Rubery and Fagan 1998, 64.). 
Part-time work as a woman-friendly alternative (as it leaves more time for the 
family) is a double-edged sword from the point of view of equality between the sexes as it in 
practice reinforces the traditional model of the family. In this way the segregation of the sexes 
that brings about inequality is strengthened both at home and in the labour market. (Bulletin on 
Women and Employment in the EU 1995 (7), 1; Rubery and Fagan 1998, 64.) 
Atypical work creates inequality in the labour markets as it does not fulfil the 
conditions set in most countries for gaining the rights to social security. Such conditions are for 
instance minimum level of earnings, minimum number of hours worked, or minimum duration 
of employment. Atypical work is more common among women than men, and as a conse-
quence the above conditions discriminate against women in particular by excluding them 
completely from benefits or by entitling them to lower benefits due to the lower wages earned 
and shorter hours worked by them. (EC, Social Protection in Europe 1995, 141; Rubery and 
Fagan 1998; Sainsbury 1996, 145-146.) 
The significance of paid work cannot, of course, be restricted to the economic 
benefits. Work has an important impact on the mental well-being, relationships, and the pos-
sibilities for self-fulfilment and development of an individual (Nurmi 1995). O’Connor (1993, 
6) points out that involuntary economic dependence not only prevents individual autonomy but 
also political participation and therefore the ability to influence policies. Actual policies in turn 
have a crucial impact on the distribution of welfare between people in general and men and 
women in particular. 
 
THE AIMS OF THE ARTICLE AND THE DATA USED 
The aim of this article is to sketch, with the help of statistics supplied by OECD and Eurostat, an 
overview of the changes that have taken place in the labour markets of the EU countries during 
the last three decades. The investigation will focus on three labour market developments that 
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are often argued to be parallel, namely the increase in women’s labour market participation, the 
rise of atypical employment, and the increase in unemployment. 
The gender dimension has been integrated into this study. The gender perspective 
is based on for instance the fact that promoting equal opportunities for men and women is, 
alongside combating unemployment, one of the main aims of the European Union (Rubery and 
Fagan 1998). Locating the problems related to inequality between the sexes calls for an analysis 
that focuses on men and women separately. 
The increase in wage labour among women is investigated through women’s 
share of the labour force. The claim that atypical work has increased dramatically is approached 
through study of part-time and temporary employment. The fall in employment is measured 
through unemployment rates and the share of long-term unemployment. The changes that have 
taken place are described both through country comparisons and from the gender perspective. 
The main questions addressed are: 1. To what extent are the countries studied here different or 
similar? 2. What are the labour market positions of women and men, and how have they 
changed during the period under study?  
The article then describes the phenomena in question and changes in them. It is 
not possible to engage in  detailed analysis of causes and consequences in this article. The 
entirety of social policies in existence in any single country (the availability of social services, 
the tax system, family policies, wage policies, education policies, and so on) has a complex 
impact both on people’s labour market behaviour and on various social rights connected to the 
different labour market positions (Rubery, Smith, Fagan and Grimshaw 1998). Social policies, 
cultural inheritance and attitudes determine the factual and attitudinal obstacles, incentives and 
possibilities for labour market participation, and influence the nature of the gender contract in 
the private and public spheres. 
It is well-known that international comparisons are ridden by a plethora of 
problems which we need to take into account in assessing the results and conclusions drawn 
from them. Although commensurability has been striven for long and hard, many factors con-
tinue to weaken it. For instance, the way questions are phrased, the statistical methods and 
times at which measurements are taken vary not only between countries but also in the same 
country over time. Analysing long-term developments is also complicated by the lack of 
comprehensive time series for all countries. (van Bastelaer, Lemaître and Marianna 1997; 
OECD, Employment Outlook 1987, 1993, 1995, 1996.) 
Both small differences within the same country over time and between different 
countries can then be the result of methods and measurements used rather than the result of 
actual differences between countries and changes in cases. Larger increases and decreases can 
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also be due to changes in statistical methods. (van Bastelaer, Lemaître and Marianna 1997; 
OECD, Employment Outlook 1987, 1993, 1995, 1996.) 
However, the need of international comparisons is evident and these comparisons 
are worthwhile despite the problems outlined above. By utilising the most comparable statistics 
available – those from OECD and Eurostat – we can create a sufficiently reliable overview of 
the changes in labour markets and the relative positions of the sexes in this process. 
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2. LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION 
 
2.1 THE NARROWING GAP BETWEEN MEN’S AND 
WOMEN’S SHARE OF THE LABOUR FORCE 
 
Participation in wage labour is measured by the labour force participation rate. This indicates 
what percentage of the population is either employed or unemployed. The slight increase in 
employment in Europe between 1983 and 1992 was due to an increase in women’ participation 
in the labour force. However, the increase in employment has in many countries come about 
through part-time employment, and in some cases through very marginal part-time employment 
(small number of hours worked weekly). (Rubery and Fagan 1998, 38; Eurostat, Social Portrait 
of Europe 1998, 119 .) In observing labour market participation rates, it is therefore important 
to bear in mind that the figure includes both part-time and full-time work that are not equally 
divided between the sexes. Part-time employment will be discussed below. 
Comparing the frequency of labour market participation is made problematic also 
by the fact that in some countries those on long leaves (maternity, parental and study leaves, 
sabbaticals, long-term illness) are counted as labour force participants, whereas in other 
countries they are not. For instance, in Sweden those on parental leave are considered 
employed, in Finland those on care leave that follows parental leave are not. (Rubery and Fagan 
1998, 35.)  
The increase in women’s labour market participation rates during the past three 
decades (in relation to the entire population of working age) and in particular in the entry into 
paid labour of the mothers of small children is illustrated by figures 1 (for 15-65-year-olds) and 
2 (for 25-34-year-olds). The age group that comprises the 25-34-year-olds has been chosen to 
represent the parents of small children. Age is, of course, not a certain indicator of the family 
situation, but people’s life cycles in relation to establishing a family and caring for small 
children are to some extent linked to age. The 25-34-year-olds can thus be seen to represent 
fairly well the parents of small children. 
On the basis of the figures, the argument concerning the radical increase in 
women’s labour market participation in general, and the increase in wage labour among the 
mothers of small children in particular, is shown to be internationally applicable and accurate. 
The difference between the sexes was in all EU countries considerably greater thirty years ago 
than now. The increasingly similar level of labour market participation among women and men 
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is due on one hand to an increase in women’s paid labour, and on the other hand to a decrease in 
men’s wage labour that has resulted from the development of early retirement systems (EC, 
Employment in Europe 1995, 9-11). Fewer and fewer young women are therefore following the 
traditional path of withdrawing from the labour market permanently or for a long period in 
order to care for the home and children. 
The figures indicate also that although women’s wage labour has increased in all 
the countries included in the comparison over the past couple of decades and although labour 
market positions have in this way become increasingly similar, there are still significant 
differences between the countries. The difference between the sexes is in international 
comparison exceptionally small in the Scandinavian countries. The other extreme is 
represented by Greece, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain and Ireland, where women’s labour market 
participation rate is still under 50 percent of the entire female population of working age, and 
the participation rates are lower among young women, too, than in the other countries. The 
relatively low participation rates in Greece, Italy and Spain result from social norms as well as 
from the patchy statistics on women working in family-owned businesses (Rubery and Fagan 
1998). 
Small children still reduce the economic activity of mothers. Unlike elsewhere in 
Europe, small children reduce the labour force participation rates of mothers only slightly in the 
Nordic countries, in France, Austria, Belgium and Portugal. Only once there are three or more 
children in the family, does the employment among mothers start to fall. With the exception of 
Portugal, the high labour force participation rates of mothers in these countries are facilitated 
through a combination of public child care provision, parental leave schemes, reduced hours 
and part-time employment. (Rubery and Fagan, 1998, 43; Fagan and Rubery 1999, 13.) 
According to Fagan and Rubery it is possible to distinguish five different models 
of maternal employment which dominate in the different member states: high, full-time 
involvement (e.g. Portugal, Finland, former east Germany); high involvement with extended 
leave plus other working- time adjustments (e.g. Denmark, Sweden, Austria, France, Belgium); 
reduced involvement and short part-time hours (e.g. Netherlands, the UK, former West 
Germany); reduced but full-time involvement (e.g. Italy, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg); low 
full-time involvement for all women (e.g. Greece). (Fagan and Rubery 1999, 15.) 
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Source:  OECD, Labour Force Statistics; OECD, Employment Outlook 1998, 192-193.  
 
Figure 1.  Labour force participation rates (15-64/74-year-olds) of men and women  
in the EU countries in 1970 and 1997 (data for 1970 not available for all countries 
studied here). 
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Source:   OECD, Labour Force Statistics (ITA=25-29). 
 
Figure 2. Labour force participation rates (25-34-year-olds) of men and women in the EU 
countries in 1970 and 1996 (data for 1970 not available for all countries studied here). 
 
If the frequency of women’s participation in wage labour is examined in a welfare 
matrix (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1992, 1996a and b; Ferrera 1996; Leibfried 1993; Siaroff 
1994), the welfare state regime acts as a fairly strong determinant, albeit with exceptions. 
Women’s labour force participation is most common in the Nordic countries (the social 
democratic model), second most common in the Anglo-Saxon countries (the liberal welfare 
model), followed by the Central European countries (conservative-corporatist model). 
Women’s labour force participation is lowest in the countries belonging to the Southern 
European welfare model (Spain, Ireland, Italy, Greece). Portugal forms an exception here. 
(Nurmi 1998a and b.) 
In all welfare models the employment levels among the mothers of small children 
(25-34-year-olds) and the mothers of school-age children (35-44-year-olds) increased very 
dramatically until the mid-1980s after which the increase became less steep. The recession is 
visible in the downward trends in some countries, but not in all. Generally speaking it seems 
that the recession of the early 1990s – on the basis of information available until 1996 – did not 
have an internationally uniform impact on employment levels among women. 
Hence the 1990s recession – contrary to expectations – did not force women en 
masse or permanently back home from the labour market. This is the case even in those 
countries (Finland, Sweden and Denmark) where women’s labour market shares declined for 
several consecutive years. (Nurmi 1998b.) 
  Changes in labour force participation rates can vary between age groups even 
within one country. For instance, the labour force participation rate of 25-34-year-old women 
declined for several consecutive years during the recession only in Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark. In the other countries compared here, the increase continued on an earlier path or less 
steeply. 
 
2.2 Increasingly uniform life patters of women 
 
Comparing labour market participation in different age groups reinforces the argument of the 
changed importance of wage labour among women. Wage labour and care work at home have 
traditionally alternated in women’s lives in accordance with the demands of family and child 
care. In 1970, this traditional pattern is evident in all countries and is all welfare state models. 
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School is followed by entry into the labour force, and at this stage women’s labour market 
participation is high. The participation rate sinks among the 25-34-year-olds as women get 
married and stay at home to look after small children. The curve goes up again as the mothers of 
older children return to the labour market and sinks again as retirement reduces participation 
rates. (Nurmi 1998a and b.) 
There are, however, significant differences in this so-called M-curve between the 
different welfare state models. The decline in the rates among the mothers of young children 
was significantly lower in the Nordic countries than in the other countries in 1970. The shape of 
the curves also varied between the welfare state models, indicating the extent to which, and at 
what stage, women returned to the labour market. (Nurmi 1998a and b.) 
The curves for 1996 are in all countries higher than those for 1970. This reflects 
the fact that women’s labour market participation has increased in all countries and in all 
welfare state models with the exception of the two oldest age groups. In many countries, the 
curve indicating labour market participation has also changed its shape. (Nurmi 1998b.) The 
overview shows that by 1996, the significance of paid labour for women has radically changed 
in all countries. The M-curve has disappeared or is about to disappear. The change has been 
most drastic for women in the Central and Southern European countries. (Nurmi 1998a and b.)  
The exceptionally high levels of labour market participation among women in the 
Nordic countries has been explained by the double bind between women and the state: the 
public sector has provided women with jobs, and the high coverage of public care services for 
the elderly and for children has enabled women to undertake paid employment. Other social 
structures and systems, such as separate taxation of spouses, good provisions for maternity and 
parental leave and flexible possibilities for temporary exit from the labour market have 
encouraged women to enter the labour market. Parallel to advancing equality in general, the 
Nordic welfare model has also promoted equality between the sexes in a more determined 
fashion than the other models. It has been possible for women to combine work and family life. 
(Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1996, 26; Siaroff 1994.) 
Low levels of labour market participation have been argued to result from the 
social structures (tax and income transfer systems, underdeveloped social services, attitudinal 
climate) in Central and Southern Europe which have not encouraged women’s labour market 
participation or indeed have made it more difficult (Anttonen and Sipilä 1994, 1996; Gornick, 
Meyers and Ross 1996; Gustafsson 1994; Kamerman and Kahn 1981; Siaroff 1994). 
High levels of female labour force participation have been reached without 
expanded employment in the public sector, too. In the USA, women have been employed first 
and foremost in the large private services sector, in Portugal both in agriculture and in industry  
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(EC, Bulletin on Women and Employment in the EU 1996 (9), 2). That Portuguese women 
maintain a high level of employment when mothers despite then absence of public policy to 
support this arrangement indicates the important effect of other economic and political factors 
on the way in which women are involved in the waged economy (Fagan and Rubery 1999, 14). 
In Portugal, a large share of the workforce is in the agricultural sector, with women often 
working 'from home' on a self-employed basis connected with family farms, which may help 
the co-ordination of employment with family life (Rubery and Fagan 1998, 14). 
The relatively high female labour force participation rates in countries of the 
liberal welfare state model have been explained by both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Women are 
‘pushed’ onto the labour market by the lack of family benefits and the low levels or absence of 
public social security. The ‘pull’ factor has been the relatively gender equal labour markets 
(Siaroff 1994, 90-98). Women’s participation in the labour market is, however, made more 
difficult by the lack of affordable, public child care services. (Gustafsson 1994; 
Esping-Andersen 1996, 67-72.) 
All in all, public policies, that is to say the different ways in which welfare state 
models function, do have an impact, but only a limited one. Women enter the labour market 
with the support of the structures that encourage their labour force participation, or despite 
policies that make it more difficult to enter the labour market. The explanatory power of 
encouraging or discouraging structures is partly inconsistent. There are also notable differences 
between countries that have been grouped in the same welfare state model both in female labour 
force participation rates and in the structures that encourage labour market entry. (Nurmi 
1998a.) 
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3. PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT 
 
3.1 Definitions 
 
Labour force participation rates include both full-time and part-time employment. The share of 
part-time employment plays a central role in comparisons of labour market positions and the 
changes that have taken place in labour market positions. There are, however, numerous 
problems associated with the international comparisons of part-time employment. 
First, part-time employment is defined in relation to full-time employment: the 
hours in part-time employment are considerably shorter than in normal full-time employment. 
‘Normal full-time employment’ in turn is regulated in ways that differ between industries, 
occupations and countries. Diversity is also increased by the fact that in some countries the 
respondent him/herself decides whether s/he is in full-time or part-time employment; in some 
countries hour thresholds are employed to draw the line between full-time and part-time 
employment (the most common thresholds being 30 or 35 hours per week). The general 
practice in the EU is that the part-time/full-time delineation is based on respondent's own 
classification. Part-time work is also a very heterogeneous category as it varies from a couple of 
hours per week to almost the number of hours worked per week by those in full-time 
employment. (van Bastelaer, Lemaître and Marianna 1997, 5-12; OECD, Employment Outlook 
1995, 211.)  
For instance in Denmark and in the Netherlands over a quarter and in Finland and 
the UK a quarter of part-time employment consists of so-called marginal part-time employment 
where the weekly number of hours worked is 1-10 hours (Eurostat, Labour Force Survey 1996). 
The position of these workers is on the whole weaker (lower wages, worse working conditions) 
than the position of  part-time employees working longer hours (Rubery and Fagan 1998, 35).  
Differences between countries are also brought about by differences in the 
questions posed, for instance in some countries the respondents are asked whether they usually 
work part-time or full time whereas in others they are asked to state the actual weekly hours 
worked when they fill in the questionnaire. Surveys are not carried out at the same time of the 
year in all countries which also weakens commensurability. Establishing reliable trends is made 
difficult by the lack of long time series from all the countries as well as by the fact that 
statistical methods change over time within countries, too. ‘Ups’ and ‘downs’ in curves can 
therefore result from changing methods of data gathering and statistical analysis. (van 
Bastelaer, Lemaître and Marianna 1997, 5-12; OECD, Employment Outlook 1995, 211.) 
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The problems of comparison are illustrated by the data from 1996 (Employment 
Outlook 1997, 177-78) where the application of the 30 hour threshold instead of the national 
criteria changes the share of part-time employment significantly in many countries (both 
upwards and downwards). The greatest difference emerges in the case of Sweden: the share of 
part-time employment declined from 23,6 percent to 14,8 percent. Among women, the share 
dropped from 39 percent to 23,5 percent and among men, from 9,3 percent to 6,7 percent. In the 
Netherlands, too (for women, from 66,1% to 55,4% and for men, from 16,1% to 11,3%), the 
drop is remarkable for both sexes. In contrast, in Denmark the drop is considerable only in the 
case of women (for women, from 34,5% to 24,2% and for men, from 10,8% to 10,2%). The 
change in the definition of part-time employment brings about the biggest increase in the share 
of part-time employment in Greece (for women, from 8,4% to 13,7% and for men, from 2,8% to 
4,7%) and in Italy (for women, from 12,7% to 20,9% and for men, from 3,1% to 4,7%). In its 
1998 Employment Outlook, the OECD has adopted the threshold of 30 hours per week. 
This article relies primarily on the OECD figures based on national definitions 
because these are available for a longer period of time. In the case of Finland this means that 
part-time employment is defined on the basis of the 30 weekly hours-criteria. According to 
Statistics Finland (the Central Statistical Bureau), it is not possible to produce material for 1997 
that would be comparable with the time series used in this article. 
The reason for this is that there were changes in labour market research in 1997 
that increased both the levels of full-time and part-time employment. On the basis of the data 
for 1997, 128 000 women and 74 000 men were regularly engaged in employment for less than 
30 hours per week. In the 1996 data, the corresponding figures are 112 000 women and 63 000 
men. According to previous labour market research, there were 109 000 women and 59 000 
men in part-time employment in 1996 (Statistics Finland). It therefore seems that the share of 
part-time workers has increased since 1996 both among men and among women. 
The share of the part-timers increases when we allow the respondent him/herself 
to decide whether s/he works the standard hours in the trade or profession (full-time) or less 
than the standard hours (part-time employment). When this method is applied, there is no 
definite number of weekly hours that is used to define part-time employment. Using this 
method, the number of part-time employed women in 1997 was 157 000 and part-time 
employed men 80 000. According to Statistics Finland, it is not possible to obtain 
corresponding figures retrospectively. 
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3.2 Is part-time employment increasing everywhere? 
 
In the light of the development of part-time employment between 1973 and 1996 (Figure 3) the 
argument that part-time has increased continuously and strongly in the 1980s and in particular 
in the 1990s is not supported by all the country cases studied here, although it does correctly 
describe the situation in many countries. 
 
 
Source:  OECD, Employment Outlook, various years. 
 
Figure 3.  Part-time employment as a proportion of total employment (women and 
men), 1973-1996 (national definitions).  
 
 
There is a clear upward trend in the Nordic countries in the early 1980; after this the share of 
part-time employment remained relatively stable until the early 1990s when it increased 
slightly. After the end of the deepest recession, the share has decreased slightly. 
The general trend in Central Europe has been upward. Between 1979 and 1996, 
the share of part-time employment has increased significantly in the Netherlands, Ireland, the 
UK, Belgium, Austria and France. The data for Spain (which exists only for the 1990s) shows a 
steady increase in part-time employment. 
All in all, the share of part-time employment in total employment varies 
significantly between the EU countries. Part-time employment is exceptionally common in the 
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Netherlands where one third of all employment is part-time. A relatively high share – less than 
a quarter – obtains also in the UK and in the Nordic countries (with the exception of Finland). 
The share of part-time employees is exceptionally low (under 10 percent) in the Southern 
member states of the EU as well as in Finland and Luxembourg. 
 
Women’s part-time employment 
Part-time employment is one of the most important indicators of the differential labour market 
positions of men and women. In all countries, 70-90 percent of part-time work is done by 
women (Figure 4). In most EU countries, part-time work is first and foremost a solution for 
(married) women with children; these women are more likely to be in part-time employment 
than women without a family of their own (EC, Social Protection in Europe 1995, 141; Fagan 
and Rubery 1999, 14-15). The entry of women into the labour market, and in particular of those 
women with family responsibilities, has in some countries taken place through part-time 
employment. However, part-time employment does not in all cases explain the high female 
labour force participation rates. (Nurmi 1998a; Rubery and Fagan 1998, 64.) 
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Source:  OECD, Employment Outlook, various years. 
 
Figure 4.  Women’s share in part-time employment 1973-1996 (national definitions). 
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It has been assumed that structural changes in labour markets in general, and the 1990s 
recession in particular heightened the ‘female’ character of part-time employment. Contrary to 
these estimates, women’s share of part-time employment (as measured on the basis of the 
national definitions) declined somewhat in the 1980s and in the 1990s in a number of EU 
countries, for instance in the Nordic countries and the UK. All in all, there has been no 
remarkable new, gendered division of labour in one direction or another. Part-time employment 
continues to characterise the labour market position of women. 
 
Prevalence of part-time employment among women and men 
Part-time work is therefore as a rule undertaken by women in all the countries studied here. In 
contrast, the share of part-time employment in the total female employment varies considerably 
both between countries and within welfare state models. Part-time employment is exceptionally 
common among Dutch women of whose paid employment nearly 70 percent consists of 
part-time work (Figure 5). In the EU, part-time employment is also common among Swedish, 
Danish, British and German women. Female part-time employment is lowest in Greece (8,4%). 
In Finland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Luxembourg, too, the share of part-time employment is 
relatively low, under 20 percent. 
 
Source:  OECD, Employment Outlook, various years 
 
Figure 5.  Part-time employment as a share of female employment 1973-1996  
 (national definitions). 
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The proportion of part-time work of all labour performed by women has steadily increased 
between 1979 and 1996 in Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Austria. In the 
remaining countries this share has either declined (Sweden, Denmark), remained more or less 
stable or vacillated somewhat. Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Austria and France have had an 
upward trend in the 1990s. 
The share of part-time employment in men’s employment remains in most EU 
countries below 5 percent and this share has grown only modestly during the past couple of 
decades. In the Netherlands, men’s as well as women’s part-time employment is exceptionally 
common: 15 percent of male employment is part-time. In the Nordic countries – with the 
exception of Finland – the share is approximately 10 percent. 
 
Change in the gender division 
Comparison of 1979 and 1996 indicates that the division between the sexes (the share of 
part-time employment of women’s/men’s employment) has grown significantly smaller in 
Sweden and Denmark, and somewhat smaller in Greece and Finland. The situation has 
remained unchanged in Luxembourg and the UK. The difference has grown in the other EU 
countries. In Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Austria and Ireland the difference between men 
and women was considerably bigger in 1996 than in 1979.  
However, as we saw above, the change in the definition of part-time employment 
from the national definition to the 30-hour criteria brought about significant increases or 
decreases in the share of part-time employment in some countries. 
In addition to the predominantly ‘female’ character of part-time employment, 
international comparisons reveal that part-time employment is concentrated in traditionally 
female-dominated occupations and in particular in services (Eurostat, Labour Force Survey 
1997; Rubery and Fagan 1998, 52-64) and the public sector, although with significant variation 
between cases. Finland forms an exception to the general pattern as part-time employment has 
been more common in the private than in the public sector (Julkunen and Nätti 1994, 129; 
Labour force statistics 1995). 
 
3.3 Explaining the differences between countries 
The differences in part-time employment between the country cases explored here are brought 
about by a multitude of causes that are intertwined in diverse and complex ways. Changes in the 
demand and supply of labour and institutional differences have been highlighted as central 
explanatory factors. Research on gender equality has stressed the importance of institutional 
factors. Actual social policies, such as tax, income transfer and social service systems act as 
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incentives and obstacles. The availability of affordable child care services has been identified as 
a particularly important factor. (Nurmi 1998a, 92-94.) 
Attitudes, such as cultural expectations regarding the correct, suitable and 
desirable behaviour influence the choices made by individuals. Differences between countries 
have also been argued to result from the control mechanisms of paid employment: the forms of 
control and the degree of strictness guide the behaviour of the labour market participants. (EC, 
Social protection in Europe 1995, 141; Nurmi 1998a, 92-94; Rubery and Fagan 1998, 64-66.) 
All in all, no single variable appears to provide a general and consistent account of the 
differences between countries. 
 
 
Voluntary or reluctant  
It is essential from the point of view of an individual’s well-being whether s/he engages in 
part-time employment on the basis of his/her own choice or as a result of the restrictions 
imposed by the labour market. Eurostat labour force survey casts some light on this questions as 
it investigated the reasons behind opting for part-time employment. The alternatives given were 
1) undergoing school education/training, 2) own illness/disability, 3) could not find full-time 
job, 4) did not want full-time job, 5) other reasons and 6) no reason. (Eurostat, Labour Force 
Survey, various years.) 
Taking the EU as a whole, the most important reason for part-time employment 
(58,8%) in 1997 was  the unwillingness to take up a full-time job. This was the case much 
more frequently among female part-timers than male part-timers (Figure 6a-b). The second 
most common (19,7%) reason for part-time employment was the failure to find full-time 
employment (Figure 7a-b). Education was the reason for part-time employment only for 10 
percent of the respondents. The differences between the sexes is clear here, too: 23 percent of 
men and 6 percent of women were in part-time employment because of education. Other 
reasons for part-time employment were given by 7-8 percent of men and women. Two percent 
of women and five percent of men were in part-time employment due to illness or disability. 
There are important differences between the countries in all cases. (Eurostat, Labour Force 
Survey 1997, 138.)  
Part-time employment can be considered employee-friendly and voluntary 
flexibility when it is taken up as a preferred alternative to full-time employment. However, we 
need more information on why part-time employment is considered more desirable. There are 
many possible reasons. For women, the reason is often the difficulty of combining full-time 
work and family life. In this case, part-time employment appears to fit women’s needs, but the 
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decision to opt for part-time employment can to a great extent be dictated by practicalities (such 
as the lack of affordable child care services) and cultural norms. The social security system can 
also favour part-time employment at the cost of full-time work by compensating for the 
economic losses incurred by part-time work. 
Part-time employment is involuntary when the employee has not managed to find 
full-time employment which would have been the preferred alternative. Interpreted in this 
sense, the voluntary nature of part-time employment is presented in figure 6a-b and the 
reluctance to work part-time in figure 7a-b. 
Women engage voluntarily in part-time employment considerably more 
frequently than men. In 1997, 35 percent of male part-timers and 65 percent of female 
part-timers did not want full-time employment. In Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Austria and 
Finland the difference between the sexes is small, but in the remaining countries it is 
significant. Voluntary part-time employment is somewhat more common among men than 
among women only in Portugal and Austria. 
The figure indicates that the degree to which part-time employment is voluntary 
varies significantly between countries. In Spain, Belgium and Portugal, part-time work is rarely 
undertaken because it is preferred over full-time employment. The opposite situation prevails 
among the part-time employed women of the UK, the Netherlands and Germany who as a rule 
do not want full-time work. In these countries, as well as in Denmark, the difference between 
the sexes is exceptionally big. 
Within the EU, approximately 27 percent of the men and less than 18 percent of 
the women engaged in part-time employment have opted for part-time status because they have 
not managed to find full-time work. This is used as the measure of reluctance, or involuntary 
nature of part-time employment. However, the situation varies between countries as well as 
between men and women. In the Netherlands and Austria the percentage of reluctant part-time 
workers is minimal among respondents of both sexes; involuntary part-timers form a relatively 
small share of both men and women in part-time employment in Germany and Denmark, too. 
The largest numbers of reluctant part-timers are found among men, and the 
smallest numbers among women. Half of male part-time workers in France, Greece, Italy and 
Ireland find their part-time status undesirable. Largest shares of involuntary female part-time 
workers (40%) are found in Finland and France. Male part-timers in Belgium and female 
part-timers in Italy and Greece are more reluctant than the EU average. The least reluctant 
part-time workers are found among women in the Netherlands, Austria and the UK. 
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The reluctance to engage in part-time employment has become more widespread 
in the 1990s, especially in France, Spain and Germany. The opposite trend prevails in Ireland, 
the UK and Finland. 
In summary, there are significant differences between both the countries and the 
sexes in relation to the voluntary or involuntary character of part-time employment. In the light 
of the indicators used here, part-time work is more often voluntary than involuntary. Men 
engage in part-time work more reluctantly than women. In some countries studied here, as 
many as half of the male part-timers would prefer full-time employment. 
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Source:  Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, various years. 
 
Figure 6a.The voluntary character of part-time employment in the EU countries,  
 1992-1997. The percentage share of those part-timers who stated that they  
 opted for part-time employment because they did not want to work full time. 
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Source:  Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, various years. 
 
Figure 6b. The voluntary character of part-time employment in the EU countries, 
1992-1997.  
 The percentage share of those part-timers who stated that they opted for 
part-time employment because they did not want to work full time. 
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Source:  Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, various years. 
 
Figure 7a. The involuntary character of part-time employment in the EU, 1992-1997.  
 The percentage share of those part-timers who stated that they opted for  
 part-time employment because they had failed to find full-time employment. 
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Source:  Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, various years.  
 
Figure 7b. The involuntary character of part-time employment in the EU, 1992-1997.  
 The percentage share of those part-timers who stated that they opted for  
 part-time employment because they had failed to find full-time employment. 
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4. TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT 
 
Alongside part-time employment, temporary work is an important form of atypical, flexible 
employment. As with part-time work, international comparisons of temporary work are made 
difficult by the factors outlined above. Furthermore, the definitions and regulations concerning 
temporary work differ considerably between countries and vary across  time. As a 
consequence, the results and conclusions presented here are only preliminary attempts to make 
out the extent of changes. (OECD, Employment Outlook 1993, 20; 1996, 6-7.) 
Generally speaking, employment is considered temporary if its duration is limited 
by objective reasons. In permanent employment, or in those cases where the end of the 
employment is not clearly defined, the duration of employment is not determined, whereas in 
temporary employment it is. 
The differences in temporary employment patterns between countries and across 
time are explained by a number of factors, such as occupational structure, employment 
legislation, economic circumstances, and cultural norms.  
 
4.1 Temporary work is increasing 
 
Even when we account for the differences in definitions, the share of temporary employment 
varies greatly between the EU countries (Figures 8a and b). In 1997, approximately 12 percent 
of all employees in the EU countries were engaged in temporary work contracts. The share of 
temporary employees was low – no more than 8 percent of all employees – in Luxembourg, 
Italy, Belgium, the UK and Austria. Temporary jobs were exceptionally common in Spain. In 
Finland, too, there were more temporary workers than in the EU on average. (Eurostat, Labour 
Force Survey 1997.) 
Contrary to the common belief, the share of temporary work of total employment 
has not increased significantly in most EU countries between 1983 and 1994. Furthermore, no 
clear pattern emerges of the developments in this period. In some countries the share of 
temporary work increased, in others it declined. (OECD, Employment Outlook 1996, 6-8, 
19-20.) 
Generally speaking, the differences between countries were smaller in 1983 than 
in the 1990s. In 1983, the share of temporary employment was highest in Greece (16,2%) and in 
  
 
131 
Spain (15,5%). In 1997, temporary employment was most common in Spain (33,6%), followed 
by Finland (17%). 
The profile of changes between 1983 and the 1990s is uneven. Temporary 
employment has become more common in most countries examined here. This trend has been 
particularly strong in Spain, and only slightly less strong in France, the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Finland. In contrast, temporary employment has clearly declined in Portugal and Greece. In the 
case of Portugal, however, the share of temporary employment rose again in 1997. In some 
countries, the variations in temporary employment in one direction or another have been 
relatively small or insignificant. 
 
Differences between men and women 
Figure 8a-b indicates that temporary employment is more common among women than among 
men, although the difference is less pronounced than in the case of part-time employment. Only 
in Greece, in 1983, was temporary employment more widespread among men than among 
women, but by the 1990s the differences between men’s and women’s temporary employment 
reflected the pattern evident in the other countries. The gap between female and male temporary 
employment had become insignificant in Germany and Austria in the 1990s. 
In most countries the pattern of change – increase or decrease in temporary 
employment – is similar for women and men. Insofar as there are differences between women’s 
and men’s temporary employment, they have been negligible. In Finland, however, the 
difference between women’s and men’s temporary employment clearly grew during the worst 
years of the recession. In the mid-1990s, this gap is narrowing as part-time employment is 
decreasing among women and increasing among men. In Spain, too, the gender gap has 
narrowed in a similar fashion. 
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Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 1996, 7-8; years 1983 and 1994. Figures for other years are based on 
the author’s own calculations that are in turn based on Eurostat Labour Force Surveys 1992-93 and 
1995-97 (For Austria, data exists only from 1995 onwards, and for Sweden from 1994 onwards. 
Note also the different scale in the figure for Spain). 
 
Figure 8a. Percentage share of temporary employees of male and female employees in 
1983 and 1992-1997. 
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Source:  OECD, Employment Outlook 1996, 7-8; years 1983 and 1994. Figures for other years are based on the 
author’s own calculations that are in turn based on Eurostat Labour Force Surveys 1992-93 and 
1995-97 (For Austria, data exists only from 1995 onwards, and for Sweden from 1994 onwards. Note 
also the different scale  in the figure for Spain) 
 
Figure 8b. Percentage share of temporary employees of male and female employees in 
1983 and 1992-1997.  
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Temporary work concentrated in some groups 
As with part-time employment, temporary work is concentrated in some groups of employees. 
The main explanatory factor for the share of temporary work lies in the employee’s age: the 
share of the temporarily employed is smaller in older age groups. An industry breakdown 
reveals that temporary work is concentrated in seasonally fluctuating industries such as 
agriculture and construction, but it is widespread also in the service sector. Temporary 
arrangements are fairly common in white-collar and office work and in the public sector, and 
less common among blue-collar workers and those employed in manufacturing. New 
employment contracts, too, are frequently temporary. (Bruegel and Hegewisch 1994, 49-50; 
Eurostat, Social Portrait of Europe 1998, 122; OECD, Employment Outlook 1993, 23; 1996, 8; 
Sutela 1998, 38-41.) 
 
Overlap of part-time and temporary employment 
There is often an overlap between part-time and temporary work, which reinforces the ‘female’ 
nature of temporary employment. In comparison with full-time work, a considerably greater 
share of part-time work is carried out in temporary contractual arrangements (Eurostat, Social 
Portrait of Europe 1998, 122). There are notable differences between countries in this respect. 
In 1991, the share of temporary workers in part-time employment was small (10-15%) in 
Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and the UK. The polar opposite (45-69% of 
part-time employment temporary) was represented by Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland. The 
overlap was considerable in Portugal and Finland, too: over one third of part-time workers were 
on temporary contracts. (OECD, Employment Outlook 1993, 22.) 
 
4.2 Voluntary and reluctant temporary workers 
 
Data from the Eurostat Labour Force Survey is used to assess whether temporary employment 
primarily serves the needs of employers or employees. This survey charted the reasons for 
temporary employment by asking respondents to indicate why they opted for temporary 
employment. The respondents chose from: 1) contract covering a period of training, 2) could 
not find permanent job, 3) did not want permanent job, 4) contract for probationary period and 
5) no reason given. The results of these surveys are available mostly only for the 1990s and 
there is still no data for all countries and all the possible reasons for temporary employment. 
(Eurostat, Labor Force Survey 1992-1997.) 
The employment situation can be considered involuntary when the respondent 
indicates the failure to secure permanent employment as the reason for temporary employment. 
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Temporary work is voluntary when the respondent says that s/he does not want a permanent 
job. Measured in this way, Figures 9a and b indicate the involuntary character of temporary 
employment and Figures 10a and b the voluntary character of temporary work. 
Taking the EU as a whole, in 1997, 20 percent of all respondents indicated that 
training was the main reason for their temporary status; for 4 percent, employment was 
temporary for the duration of a probationary period. 41 percent had not managed to find 
permanent employment and 8 percent did not want a permanent job. Over a quarter of 
respondent did not indicated a reason for their temporary employment status.    
Almost half of temporary work was undertaken reluctantly in the EU in 1997. 
However, differences between countries are considerable. The share of reluctant temporary 
employees is exceptionally small in Germany and Austria. In both countries, half of the 
respondents indicated that they were in temporary employment as part of education-related 
training; one quarter of temporary workers in Austria were in their probationary period. In 
Denmark and Italy, too, the share of those in training is higher than on average. 
The situation is reversed in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Sweden. Here, almost 80 
percent of temporary employees would have preferred permanent employment. In Ireland and 
Finland, too, the share of reluctant temporary workers is remarkably high, 60-70 percent. In 
Ireland, the share of the reluctant workers is declining and the low 1995 figure for Finland 
seems to be an exception. 
In the EU as a whole, the share of reluctant temporary employees has increased 
somewhat in the course of the 1990s. This upward trend is not, however, shared by all the 
countries. In some countries the share of the reluctant workers has remained steady, in others it 
has declined between 1992 and 1997. 
On the whole, there are no great gender differences. The situation is not uniform 
in those countries where the differences are clear. In Ireland and the UK men are more 
unwilling to engage in temporary work than women. In Denmark, Belgium and Austria the 
situation is the reverse, in other words women are more commonly than men in temporary 
employment because they have not managed to find permanent employment. The direction of 
the change – increasing or decreasing reluctance – has usually been the same for men and 
women in the countries studied here. 
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Source:  Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, various years. 
 
Figure 9a. Involuntary nature of temporary work among temporary employees in the EU 
in 1992-1997. The percentage share of employees who indicated that they are 
employed temporarily due to failure to find permanent employment. 
 
 
 
DEN
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
MEN
WOMEN
NL
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
MEN
WOMEN
BEL
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
MEN
WOMEN
AUSTRIA
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
MEN
WOMEN
GER
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
MEN
WOMEN
SWE
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
MEN
WOMEN
FIN
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
%
MEN
WOMEN
EU
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
MEN
WOMEN
  
 
137 
 
Source:  Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, various years. 
 
Figure 9b. Involuntary nature of temporary work among temporary employees in the EU 
in  1992-1997. The percentage share of those who indicated that they are 
employed temporarily due to failure to find permanent employment. 
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Source:  Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, various years. 
 
Figure 10a. Voluntary character of temporary work among temporary employees in the 
EU, 1992-1997. The percentage share of those who stated that they opted for 
temporary work due to unwillingness to engage in permanent employment. 
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Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, various years. 
 
Figure 10b. Voluntary character of temporary work among temporary employees in the  
 EU in 1992-1997. The percentage share of those who stated that they opted  
 for temporary work due to unwillingness to engage in 
permanent employment. 
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It has been argued that the reluctance to undertake temporary work and the incidence of 
temporary work are connected so that reluctance increases as the share of temporary work of 
total employment rises. Increase in temporary work does indeed to some extent increase 
reluctance, but not in a straightforward way (Nurmi 1998a). The above results show that 
temporary employment is exceptionally prevalent in Spain, as is the reluctance to engage in 
temporary employment. However, reluctance is widespread in Portugal, Greece and Ireland, 
too, although the share of temporary employment is not above the EU average in these 
countries. 
As Figures 10a and b indicate, temporary work is on the whole not undertaken 
voluntarily, in other words the respondent would have preferred permanent employment. In the 
EU as a whole, 8 percent of all temporary employees do not want permanent employment. But 
as with the incidence of the involuntary workers above, there are considerable differences 
between the countries. 
In the Netherlands, many temporary workers have opted for their status 
voluntarily. In Denmark and the UK, too, temporary workers are considerably happier with 
their status than in the EU on average as one quarter of British and Danish temporary workers 
do not want permanent work. In contrast, in Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Germany, 
voluntary temporary employment is an exception. 
 In the light of the indicators used here, temporary employment is to a much larger 
extent than part-time employment dictated by the structures of the labour market, and serves to 
a lesser extent the flexibility needs of the worker.  
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5. UNEMPLOYMENT 
5.1 Unemployment in the EU 
Unemployment rate 
Maintaining high levels of employment has become more difficult in many countries. 
Unemployment in general, and long-term unemployment in particular have grown. There are 
important differences between countries in this respect. 
Unemployment became a problem already in the 1980s. Unemployment rose to 
record-high levels and long-term unemployment increased in many countries as a result of the 
surprisingly deep and long recession of the 1990s. The labour markets in the 1990s have also 
been characterised by the increased levels of youth unemployment. 
The deepest point of the recession was reached in most countries by 1994 when 
unemployment in the EU as a whole was at its highest level (11,6%). After this, the 
employment situation has on the whole improved, albeit only marginally and more slowly than 
expected. In 1997, 11,2 percent of the EU labour force was still unemployed whereas the figure 
for the OECD was considerably lower (7,2%). The EU has indeed emphasised the importance 
of reducing unemployment and rising employment alongside developing equal opportunities 
for men and women. 
Figure 11 indicates that unemployment was clearly lower in the Nordic countries 
than in Central and Southern Europe and in the UK until the late 1980s. The 1990s recession 
changed the picture radically. Unemployment doubled in the Nordic countries and differences 
between countries grew. In Finland, unemployment soared to unprecedented levels very 
quickly, reaching the Spanish level. Spain has experienced mass unemployment since the early 
1980s. At its worst, unemployment reached 18,2 percent in Finland and 23,9 percent in Spain. 
Long-term unemployment, too, exploded in Finland and reached levels well above those in the 
other Nordic countries. 
Unemployment started to decrease in the mid-1990s in Spain, Finland and Ireland 
that had experienced particularly high levels of unemployment. In the Netherlands, the UK and 
Denmark, too, the employment situation is improving. In contrast, unemployment increased 
clearly in Germany in 1997. In France and Italy, too, the employment situation worsened 
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somewhat. Unemployment in the EU is expected to sink below 11 percent in 1998. (OECD, 
Employment Outlook 1997, 1-4; 1998, 3-4.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  OECD, Labour Force Statistics, various years. Year 1997 OECD, Employment  
 Outlook 1998, 191. 
 
Figure 11. Unemployment rate (total) in the EU countries, 1965-1997. 
 
The employment situation of young persons was also in 1997 poor in comparison with the rest 
of the population in all EU countries; the unemployment rate among 15-24-year-olds was 20,4 
percent. The situation was worse than the average in Finland, France, Greece, Italy and Spain 
(OECD, Employment Outlook 1998, 194-196). Unemployment, it seems, will remain a serious 
social and economic problem for a long time. 
 
Unemployment among men and women 
Study of the differences between men’s and women’s unemployment in the EU indicates that 
women have been affected by unemployment more severely than men (EC, Employment in 
Europe 1995, 35). The same is true for the OECD countries as well as for the European member 
states of the OECD. In 1997, unemployment rate among women in the EU was 12,4 percent, 
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and among men 9,5 percent, in other words the gap between men’s and women’s 
unemployment is 2,9 percentage points. (OECD, Employment Outlook 1998, 192-193.) 
The ’gender gap’ in unemployment rates varies significantly between countries as 
well as over time within countries. These variations are illustrated in Figure 12 that shows the 
gender gap in unemployment (men’s unemployment rate minus women’s) in 1965-1997. The 
figure is interpreted as follows: When the curve sinks below zero, men’s unemployment rate is 
smaller than women’s by the percentage points indicated. When the curve rises above zero, 
men’s unemployment rate is larger than women’s by the percentage points shown. 
 
Source:  OECD, Labour Force Statistics, various years. Year 1997 OECD, Employment  
 Outlook 1998, 192-193. 
 
Figure 12. Gender difference in unemployment rates, 1965-1997. 
 
There were no significant differences in men’s  and women’s unemployment rates in Finland 
and Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1990s recession, men’s unemployment grew 
more rapidly and exceeded that of women in Finland, and a similar, but weaker, development 
took place in Sweden. After the recession bottomed out, the gender difference in 
unemployment started to shrink and resulted in slightly higher unemployment among Finnish 
women in 1996. Women’s relative position continued to weaken in 1997 as the unemployment 
rate among men was 13,9 percent and among women 15,1 percent. 
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In Ireland and the UK, men’s unemployment was until the mid-1980s higher than 
women’s. During the early1990s this difference disappeared in Ireland, but increased to the 
disadvantage of British men. 
In the remaining EU countries women’s unemployment has as a rule been higher 
than men’s. The difference is particularly large (with unemployment among women being 5-10 
percentage points higher) in Spain, Greece, Italy and Belgium. For instance, in 1994 when 
unemployment reached a record level, unemployment rate among Spanish women was 31,4 
percent, in contrast to men’s 19,6 percent. In 1985-1997, unemployment rate among Greek men 
has varied between 5 and 6,5 percent, and among Greek women between 11,5 and 15 percent. 
In Italy, men’s unemployment rate has varied between 7 and 9 percent, and women’s between 
16 and 19 percent. Unemployment among Belgian women has vacillated between 10 and 18 
percent, and among Belgian men between approximately 5 and 8 percent. 
Study of age groups reveals many exceptions to the overview sketched above. 
Exceptionally high unemployment has affected teenagers (15-19-year-olds) and young adults 
(20-24-year-olds) in particular. The differences between men and women in these age groups 
have also been bigger than in the population as a whole. (OECD Employment Outlook 1998, 
192-202; OECD, Labour Force Statistics, various years.) 
 
5.2 Long-term unemployment 
Share of the labour force 
With the increase in unemployment and long-term unemployment, the definition of long-term 
unemployment has undergone changes. In 1968, unemployment that lasted at least six months 
was defined as long-term unemployment in the OECD. The current definition includes those 
who have been unemployed for 12 months or longer (OECD, Employment Outlook 1993, 86). 
In the 1990s, unemployment was at its highest level in 1994 when the share of 
long-term unemployed of the total labour force of the member states was 5,4 percent. Since 
then, the incidence of the long-term unemployed has declined somewhat. Both in 1996 and in 
1997, the long-term unemployed constituted 5,2 percent of the total EU labour force. (Eurostat, 
Labour Force Survey 1994, 1996, 1997.)   
There are, however, considerable differences between countries. In most 
countries, the share of the long-term unemployed is 4-6 percent. The situation has been 
particularly serious in Spain where the share has been 11-12 percent of the labour force 
throughout the 1990s. The difference between men and women in this respect is striking in 
Spain. In 1997, 16,1 percent of female labour force and 7,5 percent of male labour force were 
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counted as long-term unemployed. In Italy and Ireland, too, the long-term unemployed form an 
above-average share of the labour force, namely 7-9 percent. Unlike in Spain and Italy, men in 
Ireland have been affected more than women by long-term unemployment. Long-term 
unemployment declined significantly in Ireland in 1997. (Eurostat, Labour Force Survey 
Results 1994-1997.) 
In contrast, long-term unemployed have formed a remarkably small share of the 
labour force (1-2 percent) in Denmark, Luxembourg and Austria. The situation used to be 
similar in Sweden, but in 1997 long-term unemployment there increased to 3,5 percent. 
(Eurostat, Labour Force Survey Results 1994-1997.) 
In many countries, older workers (over 55-year-olds) were particularly severely 
affected by long-term unemployment. The duration of long-term unemployment tends to be 
shorter among younger people. (OECD, Employment Outlook 1995, 20.) 
 
The share of long-term unemployment of total unemployment 
Long-term unemployment can also be approached through its share of total unemployment. 
Figure 13 illustrates the percentage share of the long-term unemployed of the total number of 
unemployed persons in 1965-1997. 
 
Source:   OECD, Employment Outlook, various years. 
 
Figure 13. The share of the long-term unemployed of all unemployed persons in the EU  
  countries, 1980-1997. 
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The figures illustrate that the 1990s are in many OECD countries characterised by rising 
long-term unemployment. During the recovery of the late1980s, the share of the long-term 
unemployed declined in some cases remarkably. With the onset of the 1990s recession, 
however, the share of the long-term unemployed increased again. 
In comparison with North America and Scandinavia, long-term unemployment 
has plagued the countries of Central and Southern Europe in particular. In Ireland, too, the share 
of the long-term unemployed has been exceptionally large since the mid-1980s. Before the 
1990s’ recession, few people in the Nordic countries had experienced long spells of 
unemployment, although the figures for Denmark were significantly higher than for the other 
Nordic countries. 
As during the first half of the 1990s, in 1997 over half of the unemployed persons 
in the EU had lacked work for longer than one year. Long-term unemployment was higher than 
the average (over 50 percent of the unemployed) in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain. 
Generally speaking long-term unemployment had not declined significantly by 
1997. However, in the UK, Ireland, Finland and Belgium the share of the long-term 
unemployed has started to diminish. The opposite development has taken place in Sweden 
where the share of the long-term unemployed rose markedly in 1997. In Austria, Italy and 
Portugal, too, the share continued to grow in 1997. 
Long-term unemployment has then become a persistent and serious economic and 
social problem. The EU has identified combating long-term unemployment as one of the core 
tasks of labour market policy in the member states. The diversity of the causes and 
consequences of long-term unemployment calls for a broad spectrum of methods to address the 
problem. Special attention must be given to the weak position of women and older unemployed 
persons. (EC, Employment in Europe 1995, 11.) 
 
Differences between women’s and men’s long-term unemployment  
The above discussion on unemployment rates established that unemployment is on the whole 
higher among women than among men. There are, however, differences between countries. 
High female unemployment is a particularly serious problem in countries of the Central and 
Southern European welfare models. The division of long-term unemployment between the 
sexes is illustrated in Figure 14. The difference between men’s and women’s rates has been 
calculated by subtracting women’s long-term unemployment rate from men’s. 
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Source:     OECD, Labour Force Statistics, various years. 
 
Figure 14. The gender difference in long-term unemployment in the EU, 1980-1997. 
Interpretation: When the curve sinks below zero, the incidence of long-term unemployment among women is 
higher than among men by the percentage point(s) indicated. When the curve is above zero, the incidence of 
long-term unemployment among men is higher than among women (men’s long-term unemployment rate minus 
women’s) 
 
 
These figures reveal great variation between countries and over time within countries. As with 
unemployment in general, women’s situation in comparison with men’s in relation to long-term 
unemployment is on the whole weakest in the countries of Central and Southern Europe. 
Greece and Spain stand out clearly. Women’s long-term unemployment has in these countries 
been considerably more common than men’s. Also in Portugal, Belgium and France women’s 
long-term unemployment exceeds men’s. In Belgium, the difference between men’s and 
women’s rates has been low in comparison with the earlier rates. 
As countries where the difference between men and women is exceptionally 
large, the UK and Ireland resemble Spain and Greece. However, the situation in the UK and 
Ireland has been the reverse throughout the period under study as men’s long-term 
unemployment has been considerably higher (12-20 percentage points) than women’s. 
In Italy, Sweden and Finland the difference between men’s and women’s 
long-term unemployment has on the whole remained relatively small. During the 1990s 
recession, however, men’s long-term unemployment increased in the Nordic countries more 
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rapidly than women’s, as a consequence of which the gap between the sexes grew. As the 
economy took an upturn, the differences started to narrow in Finland and Denmark. 
When studying the division of unemployment between the sexes it is important to 
bear in mind that institutional factors that vary between countries have an impact on the 
measured level of unemployment. The conventional ILO definition of unemployment 
underestimates the labour supply, and in particular women’s labour supply. For instance, in a 
weak labour market situation women are more likely than men to withdraw from the labour 
market and to become ‘invisible’ (from the point of view of conventional unemployment 
statistics). This 'hidden unemployment' then reduces women’s recorded unemployment rates. 
As the labour market situation improves, women return to paid employment. The employment 
rate rises, but the unemployment rate does not fall as new jobs are created. (Rubery and Fagan 
1998, 32-33.) 
The recorded rate of unemployment is also influenced by the extent to which 
registering as unemployed pays off. In some countries women do not fulfil the qualifying 
conditions for unemployment benefits due to their career history, their current employment and 
family situation, or because they fail to meet some other criteria. Unemployment may remain 
unregistered if registration brings no economic benefits. Even if a woman’s career history is the 
same as a man’s, her unemployment benefits may be smaller or non-existent as women are 
regarded as mothers or dependent on their partner. On the other hand, women’s unemployment 
rate may be increased by the so-called unemployment traps. A trap is created when working 
does not increase the disposable income of the household as taxes increase, social benefits are 
lost and the unemployed partner’s benefits are reduced. In some countries, where both partners 
are unemployed, the social security system appears to encourage women in particular to 
withdraw from or to stay outside the labour market. Means-testing based on family income 
reinforces this tendency. Exit from the unemployment trap is made more difficult for women by 
the fact that women’s wages are generally lower than men’s and also because the costs of child 
care are calculated as part of the costs of women’s employment. (Rubery, Smith, Fagan and 
Grimshaw 1998, 215-219, 240-243.) 
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6. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
 
The dual-earner model 
Wage labour among married women has increased dramatically during the last three decades. 
The manner in which women’s roles as mothers and wage earners interact has undergone 
profound transformation. Marriage and child rearing keep fewer and fewer women away from 
the labour market. The models of male wage earner and full-time motherhood are giving way to 
the dual-earner model. 
As a result of this transformation, welfare state regimes have converged with 
respect to women’s employment outside the home. The increase in women’s labour market 
participation has brought about greater similarities among women as well as between women 
and men. Decrease in male labour market participation, for instance due to early retirement 
pensions, has speeded up the convergence of men’s and women’s labour market positions.  
 
The many faces of atypical work 
The claim that atypical employment increased strongly from the 1980s onwards and during the 
1990s recession in particular does not hold for all EU countries when we use changes in the 
shares of part-time and temporary employment as yardsticks. In many countries, however, the 
trend is upwards. 
The frequency of part-time work varies greatly within the EU. Part-time 
employment is particularly widespread in the Netherlands. Between 1979 and 1996, part-time 
employment has increased in the Netherlands, Ireland, the UK, Belgium, Austria and France. 
Part-time work as form of labour market flexibility is fairly gender specific. In all 
countries, most part-time work (between 70 and 90 percent) is undertaken by women. 
However, countries differ with respect to the share of part-time work of women’s total 
employment outside the home. In the Netherlands, as much as 70 percent of women’s work is 
done on part-time basis. In Sweden, Denmark, the UK and Germany, too, part-time work is 
relatively common among women. Countries differ with respect to the changes in women’s and 
men’s positions. In some countries the gender gap has become smaller, in others it has remained 
the same or grown larger. 
  
 
151 
Part-time work as a form of flexibility that benefits and suits the employee was 
measured on the basis of the share of part-time workers who did not want full-time work. Using 
this definition, half of part-time employment within the EU in 1997 was voluntary. The gap 
between the sexes is striking, however: 65 percent of women and 35 percent of men did not 
want full-time employment. It is worth noting that the difference between men and women was 
small in Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Austria and Finland. Countries differ greatly with 
respect to the share of voluntary part-time employment, too. In Spain, Belgium and Portugal 
part-time employment is very rarely taken up on the grounds that the employee does not want 
full-time work. The reverse is the case among British, Dutch and German women. 
The extent of reluctant part-time employment, that is to say flexibility that 
primarily serves employers, was assessed by measuring the share of those who would have 
preferred full-time employment. Overall, 27 percent of men and 18 percent of women were 
reluctant part-timers, but the figures for both sexes varied greatly between countries. The 
highest proportions of reluctant part-time workers were found among men, the lowest among 
women. Half of part-time employed men in France, Greece, Italy and Ireland were reluctant i.e. 
would have preferred full-time status. The largest shares of reluctance among female 
part-timers (about 40 percent) were found in Finland and France. There were notable 
differences between countries, too. In the light of the methods used here, part-time work 
seemed to serve mostly the flexibility needs of employees, and did therefore not confirm the 
claim that it was largely an emergency solution dictated by labour market strictures. 
As with part-time work, the share of temporary work varied greatly between the 
countries compared here. The general picture of the changes that took place between 1983 and 
1997 lacks clarity. In most countries temporary work had increased. This development was 
particularly obvious in Spain, but also clearly visible in France, the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Finland. In some countries the share of temporary work sank, in others still it remained more or 
less stable. 
Temporary work is more typical feature of women’s than men’s labour markets 
but not to the same extent as with part-time work. There is no uniform direction to the changes 
in the gender difference. In most cases the changes have been similar for both sexes with 
respect to the increase or decrease in temporary employment. 
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All in all, there have been many and diverse changes in both temporary and 
part-time employment within the EU. The general picture hides the diversity of the member 
states. The overall picture of one country, too, conceals how changes have occurred in different 
subsectors of  the labour market. Atypical work is concentrated in certain groups of workers 
and changes in its share may in some segments be much stronger or weaker than in the 
country’s labour market as a whole. (Nurmi 1998a.) 
In the light of the indicators used in this study, temporary employment serves the 
needs of employees only rarely as in 1997 only 8 percent of temporary workers within the EU 
did not want permanent work. Over half were in temporary employment because they had not 
managed to find permanent work. Countries differ in this respect, too. Involuntary temporary 
work was exceptionally common (80 percent) in Spain, Greece, Portugal and Sweden. In most 
cases there were no significant differences between men and women. 
 
Unemployment is a persistent and serious problem 
Many countries faced rising unemployment rates already in the 1980s but the deep and 
persistent recession of the 1990s led in many countries to record-high levels of unemployment 
and long-term unemployment.  
Until the late 1980s, unemployment levels in the Nordic countries were 
comparatively low, as was the proportion of the long-term unemployed. As a consequence of 
the 1990s’ recession the unemployment rate in the Nordic countries doubled. In Finland, 
unemployment soared to unprecedented levels, reaching the Spanish level of mass 
employment. With economic recovery, employment has grown and unemployment has 
decreased somewhat, but more slowly than expected. In some countries falls in unemployment 
were registered, especially in Spain, Finland and Ireland where the employment situation had 
been particularly bleak. In contrast, unemployment continued to rise in Germany in 1997. In the 
EU as a whole, unemployment is expected to sink below 11 percent in 1998. 
Long-term unemployment had not shown signs of declining by 1997. Over half of 
the unemployed in the EU had been without work for longer than a year in that year. Long-term 
unemployment exceeded the EU average in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain. 
The extent to which unemployment and long-term unemployment affects men 
and women differently varies across the EU countries as well as over time within individual 
  
 
153 
countries. In many EU countries women’s unemployment rate exceeds that of men’s. Women’s 
unemployment rates are considerably higher than men’s in Spain, Greece, Italy and Belgium. 
Women’s situation in comparison with men’s in relation to long-term unemployment is on the 
whole weakest in the countries of Central and Southern Europe. Greece and Spain stand out 
clearly. Also in Portugal, Belgium and France women’s long-term unemployment exceeds 
men’s. In Belgium, the difference between men’s and women’s rates has been low in 
comparison with the earlier rates. 
In Ireland and the UK, men have been harder hit than women by long-term 
unemployment. 
Overall, it seems that unemployment and long-term unemployment will remain 
for a long time serious social and economic problems in the EU. Raising employment and 
reducing unemployment are indeed the main aims of EU employment policy. 
 
New emphasis on equal opportunities in EU employment policy 
During recent years EU has increasingly committed itself to integrating equality between men 
and women into all areas of EU policy making. Equal opportunities have been emphasised in 
outlines of employment policy, too. Equal opportunities is one of the four pillars of action 
(employability, entrepreneurship and adaptability are the other three) for member states 
employment policies in 1998 and 1999. In order to strengthen equal opportunities the member 
states should adopt a gender-mainstreaming approach in implementing the guidelines of all four 
pillars. (EU, Bulletin on… 1996 (8), 1; EU, Draft Joint Employment Report 1998; EC, Proposal 
for a Counsil Resolution on the 1999 Employment Guidelines 1998.)  
Promoting equal opportunities means first of all actively increasing women’s paid 
work outside the home as in many member states women’s participation in the labour market is 
considerably lower than men’s. National social policies play a central role in reaching this aim. 
Structures (such as tax policy, social security, social services, education, and so on) should 
encourage women to take up paid employment and ease women’s return to the labour market.  
In addition to increasing employment rates among women, equal opportunities 
call also for evening out other differences between men and women (gender gaps), such as 
differences in unemployment rates, in the proliferation of atypical work, in education and in 
incomes. Attention should also be given to the imbalance in the representation of women or 
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men in certain economic sectors and occupations, and to the under-representation of women in 
decision making both in working life and in politics.  
Gender-specific preconditions of wage labour are in many ways connected to the 
unfair division of unpaid work at home between men and women. The realisation of this 
connection is reflected in recent EU proclamations. The importance of facilitating the 
combination of work and family life is emphasised. This calls for increasing the availability of 
high quality, affordable services for children and other dependants and fairer division of family 
responsibilities (domestic work, family-related breaks from work) between men and women. 
We need policies designed to enable men to adjust their employment patterns and to become 
more actively involved in parenting and other care work. The state has a critical role to play in 
updating the institutional framework within which women and men carve out their work and 
family lives.  
However, as Rubery and Fagan (1998, 18, 96, 114) point out, there is no reason 
for excessive optimism despite the fact that the rhetoric of equal opportunities has proliferated 
in the EU. In many EU member states welfare structures are still based on the traditional male 
breadwinner model and some member states have not yet committed themselves seriously to 
equal opportunities for men and women. Even when the willingness is there, real issues remain 
to be addressed. How to incorporate equal opportunities into all levels of national employment 
policies and, more importantly, how to extend equality of men and women into everyday life? 
The distance between laws, agreements, recommendations, directives, statements and 
proclamations (that are important and necessary in themselves) and practical applications is 
long.  
Changes in labour markets and family structures (including increase in women’s 
wage labour, rise of atypical and more flexible labour markets, increased divorce rates, single 
parenthood and neo-families, and declining birth rates) call for a fundamental reassessment of 
employment policies and welfare state structures. These need to be modified to respond to the 
more diverse and individualistic needs of contemporary society. Individual entitlement to social 
rights is an essential part of promoting equal opportunities.  
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Marika Kanerva 
 
SOCIAL RIGHTS OF ATYPICAL WORKERS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A hundred years after the introduction of the first social insurance programmes, social protec-
tion in Europe is facing a changing society and consequently it needs to readapt. When first 
social insurance schemes were developed in the age of industrialisation and nation state, social 
security is now facing a new socio-economic context, characterised by the transition to 
post-industrial modes of production, increasing globalisation, trends towards supranational 
integration and rapid changes in demography and social relations (Ferrera, 1996). Current 
trends in the European labour market indicate that the form of employment for which social 
insurance was originally designed will decrease in importance in the future, as at the same time 
when unemployment is high the new jobs that are being created are increasingly part-time and 
fixed-term. In addition, employment is shifting away from agriculture and industry towards the 
service sector where female participation is high, and working hours vary greatly (Social Pro-
tection in Europe, 1995). Consequently, the rapid change that is taking place within, and out-
side, the European Union has fuelled the debate on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the 
current form of social security in tackling new problems. Three aspects of this change are of 
central importance, namely labour market changes, changes in family formation and social 
relations, and the salience of new types of risk (Clasen, 1997).  
 
1.1 New types of risks and needs 
 
Social needs have been rapidly changing their nature during the past couple of decades. First of 
all, a thorough restructuration of the modes of production and the functioning of the labour 
market is taking place in Europe. The so-called ‘fordist’ employment (i.e. stable and guaranteed 
jobs with indefinite contracts) has been undergoing a steady decline in the last decade or two, 
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being compensated by the atypical forms of employment. However, this has provided only 
partial compensation, which has meant a considerable growth in the numbers of the unem-
ployed, who need to be supported as well in order to prevent their marginalisation from active 
society. But especially when atypical workers are examined, it has been suggested that there is 
a need for a thorough revision of rules concerning the access and the maturation to welfare 
entitlements to avoid penalising people in atypical employment (Ferrera, 1996). Moreover, 
there is no sign of a return to high levels of ‘fordist’ employment. New jobs will be increasingly 
less standard: there are new demands such as higher productivity, mobility and flexibility, high 
education and more skills. It may be that full employment, defined as mainly for men, and 
largely in manufacturing, with people having more or less the same job for life, is gone. What is 
to be feared, is a scenario of a polarised labour market (and a two-tier society) with a division 
into full-time employed with full or nearly full benefits and the precarious workers in 
non-standard jobs with weaker or no social protection. (Ferrera, 1996) 
However, there are also other changes relevant in the context of new forms of 
work. One of the most significant changes in the labour market during the past 30 years is 
characterised by an increase in female labour market participation. When it comes to atypical 
work, the issue of gender is crucial, given the concentration of women in atypical forms of 
employment. Yet, if we look at the European Union member states, the male breadwinner 
model is still embedded in many European social security systems. The eligibility conditions in 
the prevailing social security systems, based on continuous employment history and minimum 
weekly hours or earnings thresholds, hinder women's equal access to benefits, given their 
overrepresentation in low-paid, precarious and atypical employment. (However, the assump-
tion of full-time continuous employment among men can also be increasingly called into 
question. Young people, both male and female, face increasing difficulties in making their 
initial entry into employment; more men opt for early retirement; and the move to non-standard 
employment and the extension of periods of full- and part-time training is affecting all seg-
ments of the labour force (Grimshaw & Rubery, 1997)). The question is, how can such a system  
protect the needs of those (mainly women) who work part-time, temporarily and/or are engaged 
in caring?  
What is in order here is not only a higher and more effective provision of facilities 
for family support (for both childcare and for the care of the elderly), but also a revision of all 
those regulations which directly or indirectly penalise women when interrupting work for 
childbearing or caring responsibilities. An incisive response requires the experimentation of the 
new, integrative instruments of protection with individualised social rights. The establishment 
of specific leave from work for family reasons could also be considered in this context, taking 
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into account the one more important change affecting current society, population ageing. The 
over-60 age group, mainly retired people, will rise by almost 50% during the next 25 years 
(Ferrera, 1996). It must be noted that ageing generates not only a growing demand for tradi-
tional benefits and services, but also new demands both on the side of the aged themselves (e.g. 
nursing care) and on the side of the family members (almost exclusively women) who perform 
caring tasks.  
Faced with such a rapidly changing structure of needs, the traditional design of 
our social protection systems shows clear signs of obsolescence. Tailored as they are on 
old-fashioned conceptions of work and family relations, social insurance schemes tend to 
concentrate benefits on risks which no longer automatically generate need, while they in-
creasingly fail to intervene where the demand is more urgent. As Esping-Andersen puts it, in 
addition to market failure there is “possibly also welfare state failure; that is, the edifice of 
social protection in many countries is ‘frozen’ in a past socio-economic order that no longer 
obtains, rendering it incapable of responding adequately to new risks and needs.“ (Esp-
ing-Andersen, 1996) 
 
1.2. The research setting and basic concepts 
 
As is well-recognised, the core of social protection is founded mainly on state support against a 
range of standard risks: old age, sickness, maternity, work injury and unemployment, listing 
just those that are under examination in this study. Social security is, thus, usually used as a 
‘container concept’, under which a whole set of schemes and provisions are brought together 
although an important variety exists in the particular content of it across different countries 
(Berghman, 1993). In this study, the main emphasis lies within those systems that provide the 
primary support in case of contingency, i.e. social insurance schemes. Basically, the aim is to 
examine how atypical workers fare in relation to the ‘standard’ full-time workers, when in need 
of benefits. Also, where possible, the study will try to examine the extent to which benefit 
recipients are compelled to apply further support, for instance in the form of social assistance, 
i.e. means-tested benefits.  
The concept of social rights refer here to T.H. Marshall’s well-known division of 
the concept of the citizenship into the concepts of political rights (the right to vote), civil rights 
(the right to equal treatment before the law) and social rights (the right to a fair share of the 
nation’s resources) (here interpreted by Deacon et al., 1997). By definition, the social rights 
remain a vague and ambiguous concept. When it comes to social security the fairness in re-
distributing income can basically refer to three different principles: benefits are either based on 
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(previous) employment, or need, or they are granted universally. To some extent, these dif-
ferent principles of redistributing income can be identified with Esping-Andersen’s 
well-known regime typology (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The worlds of welfare capitalism in 
Europe can be divided into liberal regimes with mainly means-tested and residual benefits of 
rather broad coverage; conservative corporatist regimes (continental Europe), providing fairly 
high benefits in case you have a sufficient work history; and social democratic regimes (Nordic 
countries) with a combination of work-based benefits and, more importantly, universal, citi-
zenship-based benefits.  
  However, Deacon, Hulse & Stubbs (1997) claim that social policy activities 
traditionally analysed and undertaken within one country -or using a typology such as Esp-
ing-Andersen’s-  now take on a supranational and transnational character. They claim that 
within the European context it is now being recognised that the future of welfare state diversity 
within the European Union will be affected by the supranational social policies of the Com-
mission. According to them, this means the levelling down and up towards a conservative 
corporatistic regime type (rather than liberal or social democratic). If this is correct, it will be all 
the more interesting from the viewpoint of atypical workers, due to the work-centred nature of 
the conservative corporatist regimes mentioned above. In addition, a  fourth option of income 
redistribution has also been suggested, i.e. the basic income model, which guarantees a uni-
versal income to everyone with no reference to work. Claus Offe has suggested that the 
changing patterns of work within Europe suggest the need for social policy in the EU as a whole 
to break from work-based entitlement to a citizenship entitlement of basic income or social 
dividend (Offe, 1991). 
However, in order to evaluate the relevancy of the different principles of redis-
tributing income when it comes to the atypical worker, we will first examine atypical work in 
all its variations, how common it is and what are the specific implications from the social 
protection point of view.  
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2. Atypical work in the European Union 
Figure 1. presents an index indicating the increase in flexible workforce in the EU. In the figure 
flexible workforce refers to the self-employed, the part-time employed and those employed on 
fixed-term contracts. In addition, domestic work (caring) is also studied. Despite the decrease 
in some countries, an overall increase can be detected. Atypical employment, which is also 
referred to as precarious, non-standard or contingent employment, is defined here as any ar-
rangement that differs from full-time, permanent salary or wage employment. 
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Figure 1.  The development of the flexible workforce in the European Union, 1985 and 
1995 (EU 1985 = 100, EU 1995=115) (Source: de Grip et al., 1997) 
 
 
2.1 Part-time employment 
  
As shown above , a widespread, but very gradual, trend that is evident across the Union towards 
greater flexibility in working time arrangements. One of the most marked features of labour 
market developments over the past decade has been the increase in part-time working, espe-
cially during the recent recession when it seems to have provided a way for employers to adjust 
their workforce in accordance with changes in demand (OECD, 1997). In a number of member 
states, however, especially in the South of the Union and in Finland, part-time employment 
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remains comparatively rare. Fixed-term employment and self-employment are most common 
in Southern Europe. Highest percentages of part-time work are found in the Netherlands and the 
UK, where 29,3% and 20,3% of the employed, respectively, work part-time. The share of 
part-time employment as a percentage of total employment has been increasing since the 1970s 
in all countries except Denmark. In all countries part-time work is mainly done by women, 
especially in the Netherlands (87,3%), Austria (86,4%), the UK (85,7%) and Belgium (82,4%) 
although these figures have been decreasing (OECD, 1997).  
While in many cases the basic conditions of part-time employment are not greatly 
inferior to those in full-time contracts, if looked at from one perspective part-time jobs are a 
means of enabling women especially but also some men to reconcile family responsibilities 
with working careers -and the need to earn an income- while at the same time enabling em-
ployers to organise their activities more flexibly. From another perspective, they represent 
inferior jobs with limited career prospects and limited social security, taken up only because 
those concerned have no alternative option. Typical problems attached to part-time workers 
social security entitlement is not being covered by a benefit scheme due to various earnings and 
hours thresholds. 
 
2.2 Fixed-term employment 
 
Instead of the term ‘temporary employment’ which the EU defines as being employed by a temporary work 
agency which acts as an employer and thus secures a long-term job contract (EUROPA, 1998), 
the term ‘fixed-term employment’ is preferred here. 
Fixed-term contracts have been most common in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and 
least common in Belgium, Italy, the UK and Luxembourg. As a proportion of all employees, 
women were more likely than men to be on fixed-term contracts in all member states except 
Greece. In Belgium, Luxembourg and the UK, women constituted well over 50% of all workers 
on temporary contracts (Hantrais, 1995). 
During the past decade, a third of the additional jobs which were created in the 
EU over the growth years 1987 to 1990 were fixed-term, and 40% of the new jobs were for 
men. Three-quarters of these extra jobs, however, were generated in one country, Spain. Only 
in two other countries, France and Portugal, was the expansion of fixed-term contracts of any 
significance over this period. In the subsequent four years, only in the Netherlands was there 
any marked growth in fixed-term contracts, although there was also some expansion in Ireland, 
Spain and Italy. Overall, however, the proportion of fixed-term jobs fell over this period 
(Employment in Europe 1995). 
In 1994, only 10% of men and 12% of women in employment worked on 
fixed-term contracts. Only in Spain (where at 30% it was considerably higher than in the rest of 
the Union), Denmark and Finland (where it was just over 11%) was the proportion of men 
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employed in such jobs more than 10%. For women, among whom fixed-term jobs were more 
common, the share of such jobs was over 10% in nine member states -in Finland it was 14%, in 
the Netherlands 15% and in Spain as high as 37% (Employment in Europe, 1997). 
Even though these figures reflect differences across the EU in labour market 
regulations and member states' own practices and thus they are not necessarily an indication of 
instability or precariousness of employment, it does not mean that fixed-term employed would 
not be faced with similar problems such as, most typically, being left outside the schemes when 
not working long periods enough for the same employer. However, this is more of a problem 
with company schemes where the period of vesting can be several years.  
 
2.3 Care Work 
It is somewhat difficult to say exactly how many women are actually involved in caring, but the 
number of mothers engaged in paid work gives us an indication of the prevalence of care work 
by women. In 1991 across the EU as a whole, 41% of women aged 20 to 39 with a dependent 
child under 15 were inactive, (20% were in part-time work, 31% were in full-time work and the 
remainder were unemployed). These rates varied between member states, the inactivity rate 
ranging from 24% in Denmark to 59% in Ireland (and the part-time employment rate from 3% 
in Greece to 36% in the Netherlands) (Luckhaus & Ward, 1997). 
As the population ages and as more women take up paid employment, the issue of 
the effect on the social rights of those who need to look after young children, disabled adults or 
elderly invalids and who interrupt their working careers for this reason is becoming more im-
portant. Indeed the problems posed by this development are increasingly recognised across the 
EU, and in most member states measures have been introduced in recent years to improve the 
position of the carers. Nevertheless, the focus has so far been on caring for children and in many 
cases difficulties remain for those caring for the disabled and invalid. It is important to note here 
that, at the same time, even in the case of child care, the amount of benefits payable and the 
extent of provisions for time-off with job reinstatement at the end of the period vary markedly 
across the Union. The social security aspect to the problem for carers, either of children or 
adults, who return to work is that they may have an insufficient employment record to qualify 
for insurance-based benefits, especially for unemployment benefits and sickness and maternity 
benefits (Luckhaus & Ward, 1997). 
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2.4  Self-employment 
 
In 1994, the scale of self-employment in the EU ranged from around 8% of the total number of 
the employed in Denmark and 9% in Germany to 25% in Portugal and 34% in Greece. In most 
member states, the proportion of the self-employed in the workforce has remained fairly con-
stant over time, although it has fallen somewhat in the countries of Southern Europe as a result 
of the decline in agriculture. A great majority (90%) of the self-employed work full-time. The 
variation in the frequency of female part-time self-employment is similar to that in salary and 
wage employment, although the figures tend to remain at a lower level. Approximately 16% of 
those counted as self-employed are unpaid family workers outside the social protection ar-
rangements except to the extent that as wives they have derived rights or pay contributions 
voluntarily (Social Protection in Europe, 1995).  
 
 
3. Research methods 
 
The data for this study has primarily been obtained from databases including Eurostat publi-
cations, and the data compilation Social Security Programs throughout the World (U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services, 1997), unless a different source is indicated. The study 
has utilised a number of national sources as well as literature giving insights into the benefit 
systems of individual countries. Examples of ‘typical’ atypical workers will be used to illustrate 
the actual outcomes of the system design of the social security systems; the purpose of this is to 
calculate how much different types of atypical workers receive in insurance-based benefits in 
comparison with full-time workers.  
With regard to pensions, the model cases are all in pensionable age and have two adult children. 
Case 1, ‘full-time worker’, is a former male employee who has worked for 40 years for an 
average production worker’s pay (APW). Case 2, ‘the carer’, has worked for 20 years with 75% 
of the average pay as she, as a woman, will typically receive a lower pay than a male worker 
would. Apart from working, she has spent 20 years at home looking after her 2 children. Case 3, 
‘the part-timer’ has also worked for 20 years part-time 20 hours per week, also for 75% of 
average pay.  
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Table 1. The model types of full-time worker, carer and part-time worker 
 FULL-TIME 
WORKER 
CARER PART-TIME 
WORKER 
PENSION
S 
 40 years at work 
 full-time job 
 
 average pay 
 in pensionable age 
 2 children 
 20 years at work 
 full-time job 
 20 years at home 
 75% of average pay 
 in pensionable age 
 2 children 
 20 years at work 
 part-time work 20 
hrs/w 
 
 75% of average pay 
 in pensionable age 
 2 children 
OTHER  
SOCIAL 
SECURIT
Y  
SCHEME
S 
 10 years at work 
 full-time job 
 
 average pay 
 35-years-old 
 2 children 
 1 year at home 
 full-time job 
 previously 5 yrs at 
work 
 75% of average pay 
 35-years-old 
 2 children 
 5 years at work 
 part-time work 
20hrs/w 
 
 75% of average pay 
 35-years-old 
 2 children 
 
For the other systems the example cases are all 35 years old and have two children. Example 
case 1, ‘the full-time worker’ is a male employee with an average paid full-time job. Case 2, 
‘the carer’, is temporarily out of the labour force having spent the previous year at home 
looking after her children. Previously she worked full-time receiving 75% of the average pay. 
Case 3, ‘the part-timer’, works part-time 20 hours per week for 75% of the average pay.  
Both the carer’s and the part-time worker’s working periods have been assumed to take place at 
a later stage of their lives. Carer’s possible derived rights as a wife or a family member are not 
included in the calculations. Social assistance benefits are not included either. This goes with 
the idea of studying the effects of the system design rather than the actual levels of (sufficient) 
income maintenance. From a different viewpoint, we could also ask what kind of employment 
the social insurance schemes refer to, i.e. what is considered acceptable employment.  
Certainly, the typical case method is not without its drawbacks. The use of typical cases is 
inevitably arbitrary and simplistic. However, the aim in this research is not calculate what is the 
actual financial situation of the atypical workers. Thus, rather than that, this study focuses more 
on the system design and its outcomes. What are the merits and shortcomings of the various 
social insurance systems? If something goes wrong already in the system design, especially in 
this case where the social insurance is studied being comprehended as the primary source of 
income during contingency, if something goes wrong already there why should we even con-
tinue to look at social assistance, for example. The following chapters will aim at giving a 
sufficient number of details with the analysis of, first, pensions, followed by sickness and 
maternity benefits, work injury benefits and unemployment benefits.  
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4. Pensions 
  
In four member states, namely Sweden, Netherlands, Finland and Denmark, a basic pension is 
payable to all resident nationals, irrespective of whether and how long they have worked. This 
kind of scheme provides a pension to everyone irrespective of their work history. The pension, 
however, is set at a minimum level, sufficient to meet basic needs. In all four countries, sup-
plementary earnings-related pensions exist to increase retirement income.  
The UK and Ireland also have national insurance schemes but they cover only 
those who are working or looking for work (i.e. who are part of the labour force) and whose 
earnings exceed a minimum level. In the UK, however, those who are not in the labour force or 
whose earnings fall below the lower limit for paying social contributions can make voluntary 
contributions to obtain a national insurance pension (although this is not the case for other 
insurance benefits).  
In the remaining 9 countries, there is no single national scheme. Eligibility is 
based on occupational status, i.e. is contingent on satisfaction of conditions which require at 
least some participation in paid employment, while access to employer-sponsored company 
schemes is contingent on being employed within the particular enterprise (or industry) con-
cerned and rules (for instance regarding the age of retirement) often vary between those 
working in the public sector and those in the private sector as well as between wage or salary 
earners and the self-employed. Membership of one of the several insurance schemes is com-
pulsory for the vast majority in employment. There are no minimum earnings requirements 
except in Austria. In several cases the self-employed are excluded from coverage as are some 
atypical workers including in most cases family workers. Minimum assistance benefits are 
available in all countries, however, to all those who reach the retirement age without adequate 
insurance coverage.  
The method and time in which pension is accumulated varies between different 
countries. Also, the definition of income (the reference salary) that is used in pension calcula-
tions varies. In some countries pension is calculated on the basis of the total lifetime income, 
whereas in other countries pension is based on the income earned during the last working years. 
Due to these differences, the actual pension can end up being very different in selected two 
countries, even in cases where the replacement rates were set at the same level. 
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Figure 2. The level of work pensions in PPPs and income replacement rates in the EU 
countries in 1997 
 
Figure 2 indicates that the highest pensions, for a full-time worker, are paid in Germany, Aus-
tria, Spain, Finland and Sweden. The high Spanish figure is based on the assumption that the 
example case is actually able to achieve the maximum benefit. Also, in Luxembourg the 
full-time worker can achieve the maximum benefit because it is set at such a low level that the 
actual replacement rate remains below 50% of average income in contrast to the 80% target 
level of replacement. The maximum benefit level is usually set at such a high level that it is not 
achieved by those with average pay, and the level of compensation diminishes rapidly when 
going to higher income groups. The opposite case is illustrated by Finland, where the target 
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level of benefit is, in principle, the same in all income groups. Other countries are situated 
between these two extremes. However, international comparisons show that the effect of the 
income ceiling is eliminated by collective and individual arrangements. The stronger the posi-
tion of certain occupational groups in the labour market, the likelier those groups are to have 
their own additional pension schemes. And the stronger the group, the better the additional 
benefits (Kangas, 1992).  
In general, the countries compared here are fairly similar when it comes to the 
number of years required to qualify for employment-related pension. In most cases the full 
pension is gained in 40 years. In Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK a longer insurance time 
is required. In Austria, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and France the qualifying time is 
shorter. It is interesting to note that labour force in the EU has become concentrated in a nar-
rower age range, from 25 to 60 or 65 years, despite the ageing of the population as a whole 
(Social Protection in Europe, 1995). From the point of view of calculating pension entitlement 
this means that fewer and fewer people are gaining entitlement to maximum benefits. It needs 
to be added that even though the example cases here are in pensionable age, early exit from the 
labour market has considerably decreased the actual pension age. This has been especially true 
of the countries of Central Europe and Finland (Kangas, 1992). Leaving the labour market 
before the regulatory age in statutory schemes usually leads to a reduced pension. 
In a number of member states arrangements exist for moderating the effect of 
domestic work on the final pension.  This can be done either in the form of calculating the 
pension on the basis of earnings over a limited number of best years rather than over the entire 
time spent in employment (as in Spain, Portugal or Finland), dropping years spent in caring 
activities explicitly from the calculation (as in the UK or Ireland), crediting contributions 
during periods of caring (as in Luxembourg, Germany, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands or Bel-
gium) or allowing voluntary payment of contributions (as in Italy or Greece). In many cases, 
however, such arrangements provide only partial compensation. The carer has to settle with the 
minimum pension in Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal, despite the 
fact that caring bonuses exist in all these countries. In 10 out of 15 countries the carer receives a 
relatively smaller share as income replacement in comparison with the full-time worker. The 
countries that compensate for the low earnings are Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the 
UK.  
Pension scheme membership may be conditional on participation in employment 
of a certain number of hours or in employment above a certain income level. Hours and earn-
ings thresholds of this kind appear to influence access to state or employer-sponsored national 
schemes in five member states, namely in Austria, Spain, Ireland, Germany and the UK. An-
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other rule that may be crucial to part-time and fixed-term workers is referred to as vesting 
(Luckhaus & Ward, 1997), meaning the period needed to acquire the pension rights. Belgium 
does not impose any minimum period of membership. The Finnish occupational pension is also 
very liberal as even short-term employment adds to the pension. In other European countries 
the minimum working time varies from 3 years in Sweden to 15 years in Spain. The period of 
vesting, which may be imposed by employer-sponsored company schemes, is regulated by 
statute in a number of member states differing from 2 years in the UK to 10 years in Germany. 
Moreover, the penalty for leaving a scheme prior to reaching the minimum period is especially 
severe since it involves a loss of the contributions paid into the scheme to date as well as failure 
to acquire pension rights for the period concerned. In this respect, it may be noted, less than 
20% of part-time workers are members of employer-sponsored company schemes, as first they 
often do not reach the earnings and hours thresholds, and second have not been employed long 
enough (by the same employer) (Ginn & Arber, 1998). 
The earnings-related pensions of part-time workers often remain below the 
minimum limit and are raised by minimum pension rules. The part-time worker has to settle 
with the minimum pension in Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal 
and Spain. In France the minimum pension is reduced by the number of years of 
non-employment, and thus it will be of no compensation for low income part-time workers. In 
Belgium, France and Portugal, which do not have a basic pension system, the 'social pension' 
paid to the part-time worker is means-tested. In 3 countries out of 15 (France, Greece and the 
UK) the part-time worker ends up with a smaller income replacement than the full-time worker.  
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5. Sickness and maternity benefits 
5.1 Sickness benefits 
 
There are great differences in the coverage of the sickness benefit systems between the coun-
tries. In the case of sickness benefits, eligibility is confined to wage and salary earners in 
Austria, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands, but also covers the self-employed in 
Belgium (basic protection only), Denmark, Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal (voluntary), Sweden, 
the UK and (partially) Germany and in Finland. In the two latter countries students are covered, 
too. The coverage is broadest in Finland although some cuts have been made during the 1990s, 
as a consequence of which eligibility has been restricted and, for example, housewives have 
been excluded. In Central Europe only the wage earners are generally covered. Even some 
wage earners are left uncovered in Spain and Greece.  
In several countries the precondition for benefit entitlement is either receiving a wage or a 
salary, or paying contributions during a certain period of time before the illness. In Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Luxembourg, in order to receive sickness benefit one has to be 
covered by insurance and prove that the illness has resulted in loss of income. In case a carer 
falls ill soon after returning to paid employment this kind of systems are very beneficial. It is 
more difficult to obtain sickness benefits in some countries where a minimum period of work is 
required: in Finland 3 months and in France 200 hours of work in last 3 months. Also, in 
Denmark there is a work requirement of 120 hours in the last 13 weeks, employed by the same 
employer. In this case fixed-term workers are also excluded, although the part-time employed 
working at least 10 hours a week are covered. In other countries different combinations of 
contributions and working time are applied. For example in the UK 6 months contributions and 
weekly income above a certain limit are required. In Austria, too, earnings must exceed a cer-
tain limit.  
When comparing the absolute levels of compensation (figure 3), the highest sickness 
benefits are paid in Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium. The part-time worker also receives 
the best benefits in these countries. The carer’s entitlements are cut off as soon as she stops 
working, except in Spain, where the very liberal eligibility rules, 180 days of contributions 
during last 5 years, would give an entitlement even after a fairly long period of 
non-employment.  
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Figure 3.  The level of sickness benefits and the income replacement rates in the EU 
countries in 1997 
 
The compensatory level of statutory insurance is the highest in Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Greece and Luxembourg. In all these countries the benefit is 100 per cent of wage. However, in 
Belgium and Germany the level of compensation decreases in the course of longer periods of 
sickness. In Denmark the set replacement rate is defined as 90 per cent of wage. However, the 
maximum benefit is so low (57% of APW) that the part-time worker is able to achieve the same 
level. In Sweden, Italy and Spain the level of compensation is higher during longer periods of 
sickness. The benefits are weakest in the Mediterranean countries, France, the UK and Ireland. 
In the latter two countries there is no actual statutory earnings-related insurance. In practice, the 
benefit is flat-rate and the earnings-related benefits are arranged by collective insurance. The 
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sickness insurance schemes rarely contain a minimum benefit (only in Finland, and in France 
after 6 months of sickness) which improves the benefit level of part-time workers. 
The duration of the waiting period varies greatly, from 0 to 7 days, between dif-
ferent countries in Europe, although there is no waiting period at all in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden. However, in most countries wage earners are covered by 
wage arrangements for sickness periods, and receive full wage or salary during 1-6 months of 
sickness from the first day of sickness. Thus, occupational insurance fills the gaps in statutory 
social security and the effect of waiting periods is eliminated (Kangas, 1992). However, to the 
disadvantage of carers and part-time workers, they are not usually covered by occupational 
insurance. The collective benefits are not limited to waiting periods only. In most countries the 
benefit levels are greatly improved through occupational insurance. In Belgium the starting 
level of compensation is 60 per cent, but usually the employer pays a full salary for at least the 
first month of sickness. In Greece, where the level of compensation in statutory sickness in-
surance is 50 per cent of salary, the collective arrangements guarantee full salary during the first 
30 days for those who have been employed for at least a year by the same employer. In Italy the 
level of compensation in statutory sickness insurance is 50 per cent during the first 20 days of 
sickness. However, certain officials and some other groups of wage earners receive a full salary 
according to collective arrangements. In Portugal, most employers pay daily allowances, with 
the level of compensation varying between 60 to 100 per cent. Also, in the Netherlands most 
wage earners have additional insurance. In Germany, where the compensatory level of statutory 
insurance decreases after 6 weeks of absence to 80 per cent, about half of the wage earners 
receive full salary on the basis of collective agreements also after the first 6 weeks.  
In Finland and in Sweden the entitlement to sickness benefits extends over pe-
riods of unemployment. In the UK the Incapacity Benefit (paid under sickness insurance pro-
gram) is, in principle, paid to the unemployed if they satisfy the contribution conditions which 
the example cases here do not. In general, there is little information on unemployment and 
social security entitlements, although such data is urgently needed. 
 
5.2 Maternity benefits 
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The terms of eligibility and the coverage of maternity insurance vary in the same way as in 
sickness insurance. The coverage is the highest in the Nordic countries. In Central and Southern 
Europe the terms of eligibility include having a wage or a salary and/or being a member of a 
sickness fund.  
In the case of maternity benefits, all economically active women are eligible in all 
countries, except in Ireland and the Netherlands, where the self-employed are excluded, while 
in Luxembourg and Finland women who are not in employment are also covered. In a few 
countries, fathers who are in work can claim benefits for a newborn child instead of the mother 
(Social Protection in Europe, 1995).  
 
Figure 4.  The level of maternity benefits in PPPs and the income replament rates in the 
EU countries in 1997 
 
The bar charts in figure 4 show that in Austria, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal 
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the maternity benefit is 100 per cent of salary. After the period covered by the employer, the 
statutory benefit will be applied. In Denmark the benefit level is quite high by definition, but the 
maximum benefits are so low that the set replacement rates remain unachieved even in average 
income groups. The German system aims at a 100% replacement rate, but the maximum benefit 
is set at such a low level that the actual replacement rate remains below 50%. 
Similarly to sickness insurance, fixed-term and temporary workers are excluded 
in Denmark. In Finland and Sweden, the carer will receive a guaranteed minimum benefit. In 
Luxembourg a maternity allowance is paid also to those who suffer no loss of income. In Bel-
gium, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden there is no minimum work period required, which works 
to the advantage of the carer in case she returns to work. In Greece and Spain the eligibility 
rules are so liberal that even the carer is entitled to work-related benefits. In Ireland the 
part-timer benefits from the minimum benefit which is not applicable in the other countries. 
The duration of payments varies markedly between countries. In Germany and 
Ireland the duration is the shortest, 14 weeks. The duration is longest in Sweden (51 weeks) and 
in Finland (46 weeks). The duration of the maternity benefit is longest in the Nordic countries. 
In Sweden the maternity benefit is paid for 51 weeks, in Finland for ca. 43 weeks and in 
Denmark for 28 weeks. In other countries the duration varies from 14 to 24 weeks. In Italy the 
period of payment can be extended at a reduced benefit level. 
 
6. WORK INJURY BENEFITS 
 
Work accident schemes are composed of two different systems: benefits for fixed-term work 
injury and benefits for permanent work injury. Only wage and salary earners are typically 
eligible for cash benefits in case of occupational injuries and diseases; the self-employed are 
covered only in Austria, Luxembourg and Sweden, and some self-employed persons are cov-
ered in Denmark, Germany and Italy. In a few countries, students are also included in com-
pulsory insurance schemes. The casual labour in Belgium is explicitly covered and domestic 
workers are excluded in Ireland. In the Netherlands there is no work accident insurance, but 
instead the work injury benefits are paid under sickness insurance scheme. The payment of 
benefits starts from the 1
st
 day of contingency except in Greece where the benefit is payable 
after a 1 day waiting period.  
  
 
178 
 
 
Figure 5.  The level of benefits for fixed-term work injury in PPPs and the income  
replacement rates in the EU countries in 1997 
 
In general, work injury benefit schemes are rather straightforward. Therefore, the replacement 
rates  reflect for the most part only the differences in the average wages. 
Finland and Luxembourg pay 100% of the pay as fixed-term work injury benefit. 
Even at their lowest level the benefits are 50% of the reference pay, except for the Irish and 
British full-time workers who receive a flat-rate benefit of approximately 20% of their pay.   
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Figure 6.  The level of benefits for permanent work injury in PPPs and the income 
replacement rates in the EU countries in 1997 
 
 
The level of benefits is markedly higher in permanent work injury scheme, in 
which Belgium, France, Italy and Sweden provide a 100% replacement rate. Even at their 
lowest level the benefits are nearly 70 % of the reference pay, except for the Irish and British 
full-time workers who receive a flat-rate benefit of 30-40% of their pay. 
The work injury benefit does not compensate for the low income of the part-time 
worker except possibly in countries with flat-rate benefits, where the level of benefits is set 
through a ‘levelling-down’ method. Whether this measure increases equality is questionable. 
7. Unemployment insurance 
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In the case of unemployment benefits, rules governing eligibility vary not only 
across countries, but also with respect to the type of benefit scheme in force. In Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden membership of unemployment insurance funds is voluntary and also open 
to the self-employed. In all the other countries, unemployment insurance is compulsory, but 
only for employees; Luxembourg is the only country which offers insurance benefits to the 
self-employed. Some countries provide specific unemployment assistance which is paid when 
eligibility to insurance benefits has not matured or has expired; these include the Nordic 
countries, France, Germany, Spain and Portugal and Ireland. In the latter, eligibility to unem-
ployment assistance also extends to the self-employed. Thus, in Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden the coverage of unemployment insurance 
schemes is high, whereas in Southern European countries the benefit coverage is limited to 
certain groups of wage earners.  
In Sweden, Finland, Italy and Greece the waiting periods are rather long, ap-
proximately one week.  In the UK and Ireland the waiting period is 3 days. In the rest of the 
countries benefit is paid from the first day of unemployment. The situation presented in Figure 
7 is the 1st day of unemployment after the waiting period. 
In relation to the earnings of our example case, the average paid full-time worker, 
benefit rates under unemployment insurance vary from lows of around 20% to 30% in the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Italy, to 80% in Luxembourg. In most countries unemployment 
benefit is independent of whether or not the spouse is working (the exceptions are Austria, 
Ireland and Spain) but there is also considerable variation in the duration of the benefit, the 
shortest duration being 6 months in Italy and the longest 7 years in Denmark (excluding Bel-
gium where the duration is indefinite). The set replacement rate is highest in Denmark, where 
the benefit is 90 per cent of gross income. Also, the period of payment is quite long. However, 
setting a maximum benefit cuts the set rate substantially. An upper ceiling is applied for the 
full-time worker in the Danish and Swedish examples. The ceiling is set at such a low level in 
Denmark that it restricts even the carer’s unemployment benefit. In Luxembourg, too, the level 
of benefits approaches 80 per cent which is achieved by both the full-time worker and the 
part-time worker. The lowest levels are found in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and the UK. 
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Figure 7.  The level of unemployment benefits and the income replacement rates in the 
EU countries in 1997 
 
In several countries the duration of unemployment benefits varies according to 
the insured person’s age and work history. This is the case in France, Greece, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. The duration is longest in the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Germany. 
The Finnish unemployment benefit is also paid for a fairly long period, as is the Spanish 
maximum benefit. In most countries there is no limit for the duration of payments for those who 
are outside the actual unemployment insurance.  
In general, the qualifying conditions for the receipt of unemployment benefit in 
cases where a person loses a job soon after returning to work tend to pose a problem. This is not 
the case in Finland where unemployment benefit is paid after five days of registered unem-
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ployment. As in pension schemes, there are caring bonuses attached to unemployment benefit 
schemes. In Germany and the Netherlands, there are special provisions for those returning to 
work from caring for children at home, but these are not available to those caring for adults, 
(which is possible in the UK). In Belgium and Greece, some of the provisions for leave from 
work enable the carer to remain insured and so to qualify for unemployment benefits, but in 
general, in three of the countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal) the carer is not entitled 
to any unemployment benefit due to the strict eligibility rules. In Finland, where the aim is not 
only to compensate for the loss of income, but also to provide the same level of benefits to 
everyone, the carer actually gets a better unemployment benefit than the full-time worker does, 
even though the benefit is paid under an earnings-related scheme.  
 In Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain the replacement rates are equal 
for all example types, but in Greece the part-timer’s compensation is lower due to the as-
sumption that she is a wage-earner with a 40% replacement rate, whereas the full-time worker 
is assumed to be a salary earner with a 50% replacement rate.  
The part-time worker is compensated for her low income in 7 countries, namely in 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. In 4 countries (France, 
Greece, Italy and the Netherlands) there are no earnings or hours thresholds set for the 
part-timer or low-income earner. The part-time worker has to settle with minimum benefits in 
France, Portugal and Sweden. (It could also be that minimum benefits are set at a fairly high 
level. In Sweden the carer receives the minimum benefit which indicates a fairly high level of 
the minimum unemployment benefit). But even though the example cases here mostly qualify 
for receipt of unemployment benefits it has been calculated that in 1992, only 30 % of the 
unemployed in the EU received unemployment benefits (Grimshaw & Rubery, 1997). 
It is worth mentioning that in Denmark and Finland, where the part-time worker’s 
benefit compensates for 90% of income loss, this is very likely to create an incentive problem. 
Also, in Portugal there seems to be an incentive problem, as the benefit is 100% of the pay 
resulting from the fact that both the part-timer’s pay and the minimum unemployment benefit 
are at the level of the minimum wage.   
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8. Conclusions and further discussion 
 
There is still great variation in the principles guiding the benefit systems in the EU. It is hard to 
evaluate with certainty to what extent the harmonisation process of the European social security 
schemes has managed to standardise the systems, or the outcomes. With regard to the example 
cases, the system design is more harmonised when it comes to part-time work. The part-time 
worker receives a benefit in relation to her income, which is occasionally lifted up to the level 
of the minimum benefit (maximum benefit is also occasionally applied in the case of a full-time 
worker thus increasing equality, although it is more likely that the purpose has been to cut 
costs). In the case of a carer, the practices are more varied or even arbitrary and raise the 
question of whether the different social security schemes actually aim at income replacement or 
securing a satisfactory level of income maintenance. This is reflected by the fact that the carer 
receives no benefit in most countries’ sickness and maternity benefit systems and sometimes 
not even in unemployment benefits systems.  
In general, the level of benefits varies greatly between the countries. The highest 
benefits are paid in Central and Northern Europe, whereas benefits are lower in Southern 
Europe and Ireland and the UK. Even though a part-time worker regularly ends up with lower 
benefits than a full-time worker, the replacement rates show that there is some compensation 
for low income whereas carers receive less compensation. Especially in pensions, carers have 
to settle for lesser compensation. This indicates a blurred connection between the contribution 
made and the final (pension) benefit. It could be argued that from the carer’s and part-time 
worker’s point of view the pension system could just as well be a flat-rate scheme as both have 
to settle for minimum pensions in most countries. This suggests that for an atypical worker the 
most beneficial form of income redistribution is the universal model. However, if flat-rate 
benefits were to become more common, the fear is that they need to be increased to too high a 
level relative to earnings from work, which could adversely affect work incentives; this is 
another issue of current concern. On the other hand if they are too low and social benefits 
gradually fall behind earnings, those who can seek compensation in private insurance will do 
so, thus weakening broad support for the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1996). 
Saying the same from another viewpoint, when examining the results from the 
regime perspective, the results support the presumption that if the European Commission is to 
promote the continental (conservative corporatist) model as it was suggested, it will result in 
greater income differences between different worker groups, as the full-time worker (especially 
in pensions) receives highest benefits in the continental Europe, where the carer and part-time 
  
 
184 
worker usually settle with the  minimum pension. Furthermore, in continental Europe, the fact 
that atypical workers receive lower benefits has even been used to exclude them from social 
insurance altogether, pointing at the potential impact of contributions on low incomes. The low 
level of contributions which they would be able to pay is an issue, in that they would give rights 
only to very low earnings-related benefits which, in practice, might not be any greater than 
means-tested allowances (Equal Opportunities for Women and Men in the European Union, 
1996).  
According to Ploug & Kvist (1994d) there are two problems that we are facing 
due to atypical employment. First, there is the problem of social rights, the focus of this re-
search. Second, atypical work poses a financial problem as atypical workers pay less tax, but 
are more vulnerable and more often in need of benefits. The latter will undoubtedly be of great 
importance in the future if we are to see more part-time work and fragmented periods of em-
ployment. In this debate, on the one hand there are those who want to increase labour market 
flexibility by reducing contributions and the costs to employers - as well encouraging more 
part-time jobs - and on the other hand those who wish to see improved social protection. It has 
been suggested that there does not need to be a trade-off between these two, as, for example, 
putting more emphasis on active labour market measures and ‘social investment’ a balance 
between high employment and sound social protection could be achieved. It also implies, that 
to secure a proper social protection for the atypical workers, it is maybe not only about simply 
improving the benefit levels and eligibility conditions, but also about  social policy in a broad 
sense. Nevertheless, having said that, with no improvements in the current social protection 
system, it is certain that benefits paid to atypical workers are very likely to be below the poverty 
line which means, especially in the case of pensions, that the number of poor people will con-
tinue to rise in the EU.  
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KATJA FORSSÉN 
 
 
 
FAMILY POLICIES AND THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 
OF CHILDREN IN SOME OECD COUNTRIES 
 
   
1. Introduction 
  
Much social policy is concerned with families and family life. Children and their families are 
very often a central issue in contemporary political and policy debate in most western welfare 
states. This special interest in children’s well-being can be explained in many ways: It is said 
that the well-being of children is not only an indication of a society’s moral worth, children are 
also a human capital, the most important resource for a society’s future (Bradshaw 1997; 
Ringen 1997). Almost every action that welfare states take has impacts on families and family 
life. 
 Economic well-being of families and children are based on a combination of four 
types of resources: work (including earnings and non-market ‘home’ work), social services and 
government benefits; and taxes to pay for them. (Smeeding et al. 1997.) Welfare states differ 
from each other in the way they offer different income package opportunities to the families. 
These differences have been described by clustering welfare states to regimes, although the 
clusters made in family policies are not as clear as in general welfare policies (Gauthier 1996).    
 One reason to the problems in finding similarities in different countries’ family 
policy-making styles is simply due to conceptual problems, i.e., due to the fact that the defini-
tion of family policy is very unclear and vague. Maximalist definitions include everything that 
affects families, whether intended or not. Minimalist definitions include only those policies 
directly targeted on families. The family policy in one country could have both, minimalist and 
maximalist features in it (Kamerman & Kahn 1978; 1994; Kamerman 1986; Ginsburg 1992; 
Bradshaw et al. 1993; Wennemo 1994; Gornick et al. 1996). Consequently, there exist strong 
differences among countries in terms of the governments’ agenda and concern towards the 
demographic situation, but also in terms of the nature of governments’ intervention and the 
level of governmental support for families. While some governments have opted for an expli-
citly interventionist policy aimed at encouraging fertility, or at promoting a traditional family 
structure, others have opted for a less interventionist approach. (Gauthier 1996: see also 
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Wennemo 1994.)  
 Family policy has been defined to mean everything that government does to and 
for the family (Kamerman et al. 1978). Some researchers view family policy as involving not 
only families with under-age children but also other types of households, such as pensioners' 
families (Wilensky 1975). In the present study, family policy is defined broadly to cover both 
social security transfers and social services. This means that the general social security benefits 
such as sickness and unemployment compensation are included in addition to benefits targeted 
specifically for families with children, i.e., child allowances and tax deductions as well as 
services such as day care services. This study apply for maximalist approach. 
 The effectiveness of different family policy systems can be evaluated by ana-
lysing the outcomes of welfare states. The quality of family policy systems can be measured for 
example by comparing child poverty rates, social assistance dependency, infant mortality, birth 
rates and other indicators of well-being. The aim of this study is to compare family policy 
legislation and family policy outcomes in different OECD countries. The special interest will 
be shown to the European countries, because the role of family policy in European Commission 
is still quite unclear (Hantrais 1996). 
 The structure of the study is following: The section after this introduction gives an 
overview of family policies and classifications made of them. This short overview of the pre-
vious studies serves as a platform for empirical analyses on economic well-being. After that I 
will concentrate on family policy outcomes and then look closer at the European family policy 
systems. Data on economic well-being is mostly derived from the Luxembourg Income Study 
Database. Since these inspections are – for data reasons – based on cross-sectional inspections 
it is interesting to display longitudinal development in countries where such data are available. 
This longitudinal scrutiny will be done in the penultimate section. Finally there will be a brief 
discussion of the level and development of the economic well-being of children in OEDC 
countries.     
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2.Family policies in OECD countries 
  
In the past twenty years there has been various attempts to classify different family policy 
systems. Sheila Kamerman and Alfred Kahn (1978) categorised countries according to their 
family policy-making styles. They distinguished between countries that had explicit and im-
plicit family policies. At that time comprehensive (explicit) family policy countries exemplified 
France, Sweden, Norway, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Countries with an explicit but more 
narrowly focused family policy included Denmark, Germany, Austria, Poland and Finland. 
Countries without an explicit family policy and which went so far as to reject the idea of such a 
policy were illustrated by the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel and the United States. 
 In a much more recent study on family policy Anne H. Gauthier presented a his-
torical review of the development of family policy in OECD countries. She clustered countries 
to four different groups. First, in countries belonging to pro-family/ pro-natalist model the 
major concern is low fertility and because of this the main task of family policy is to encourage 
families to have children. This is done by helping mothers reconcile work and family life. In 
this model, relatively high levels of support are provided for maternity leave and child-care 
facilities. Great emphasis is placed on cash benefits and more particularly, towards the third 
child. Gauthier names France and Quebec as examples in this group. (Gauthier 1996, 203.) 
 In the second, pro-traditional model the preservation of the family is the main 
concern. Government takes some responsibility for supporting families, but the most important 
sources of support are seen as the families themselves and voluntary organisations. Under this 
model, a medium level of state support for families is provided. The low provision of childcare 
does not give women the opportunity to combine employment and family responsibility easily. 
Germany is an example given. (Gauthier 1996, 203-204.) 
 In third, pro-egalitarian model seeks to promote gender equality. Men and 
women are treated as equal breadwinners and equal carers and policy aims to support dual 
parent/worker roles. This model is in deep contrast with the previous one. Liberal policies on 
marriage, divorce and abortion mean that there are few restrictions on how people can choose 
their family life. The principle of voluntary parenthood describes this family policy model. The 
best representatives of this model are Sweden and Denmark. (Gauthier 1996, 204.)  
 In the countries belonging to pro-family but non-interventionist model the 
main concern is the families in need. The participation of women in the labour force is not 
discouraged, but limited benefits are provided by the state to support them. Families are viewed 
as basically self sufficient and able to meet their own needs through the private market with 
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only a limited help from the state. It is believed that the market will meet any needs that emerge, 
as long as it is not hindered by government regulation. The UK and USA can be regarded as 
best examples of this model. (Gauthier 1996, 204-205.) 
 As in all classification there has to be remembered that pure models in their pure 
form are found only in limited number of countries. Gauthier’s (1996) classification is in some 
parts very close to typology made by Esping-Andersen (1990). Gauthier’s pro-egalitarian 
model and non-interventionist one match Esping-Andersen’s democratic and liberal models 
respectively, while Gauthier’s traditional and pro-natalist one are closed to Esping-Andersen’s 
conservative model. Neither Esping-Andersen nor Gauthier does single out Southern European 
countries as a distinct model, although Gauthier points out that in her strict analysis of benefits’ 
level Southern European countries were placed in a separate categories.  
 Jane Millar and Andrea Warman (1996) compared welfare states by what kind of 
family obligation the countries presented. They did not construct a typology of national ap-
proaches to defining family obligations because ‘the data they had, told only a part of the story’. 
In spite of this they group countries according how the legislation takes in count the family (see 
table 1). In the Scandinavian countries the emphasis is on individual entitlements and citi-
zenship rights available to all. Those in need are most likely to expect and receive state, rather 
than family, provision and there are rarely any legal requirements to provide support. Children 
in the Scandinavian countries are more likely to be treated as individuals with rights of their 
own than they are elsewhere. (Millar & Warman 1996.) 
 The countries where family obligations are mainly assumed to lie in the nuclear 
family are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
UK. Individualisation is relatively undeveloped; benefits and taxes almost always recognise 
these family obligations. Within this group of countries there are some differences of emphasis. 
In some countries the legal obligations to provide financial support extend only downward 
(from parents to children) and in some countries only upwards (from adult children to parents) 
as well. Ireland and the UK fall into the first category and the other countries into the second 
category. However, although these obligations exist in laws in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands they are rarely enforced. Millar and Warman 
identify differences in approach in respect of care of children. In some countries there is a 
presumption of family care for children. This is true in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK. In these countries childcare coverage seem to be low and 
school hours make it difficult for mothers to be in full-time work. In Belgium and France 
childcare is seen as a responsibility of the state. (Millar & Warman 1996.) 
 In Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece the extended family plays a more important 
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role. Families are expected to support one another across a broad range of relationships and 
someone in need is expected to look first to their family for support. Services that exist are 
mainly for those without family. State provision of childcare for young children is relatively 
low and is not primarily intended as support for working parents. (Millar & Warman 1996.)  
 
Table 1.  Indicators of family policies in various countries in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. 
  
 Child 
bene-
fit 
Single 
parent 
benefit 
Child 
main-
te-nance 
quaran-
tee 
Pa-
ter-ni
ty 
leave 
Leave 
to care 
for 
sick 
child-
ren 
Cove-
rage of 
day care 
Regula-
tion of 
family 
day care 
Family 
policy 
index 
Finland + + + + + ++ + 8 
Belgium + - + + + ++ + 7 
Sweden + - + + + ++ + 7 
Denmark + + + + - ++ + 7 
France + + + + - ++ + 7 
Norway + + + + + + - 6 
Austria + - + + - + + 5 
Germany + - + - + + - 4 
Italy - - - - + ++ + 4 
Greece - - - + + + - 3 
Spain - - - + + + - 3 
UK + + - - - - + 3 
Australia - + - - - - + 2 
Luxem-
bourg 
+ - + - - - - 2 
Portugal + - - - + - - 2 
USA - + - - - - - 1 
Nether-
lands 
+ - - - - - - 1 
Source: Millar & Warman 1996 (tables 3.4  and 3.5) except the family policy index and 
countries Australia and USA. Family policy index is calculated as following: ++= 2 points,  + 
= 1 point and  - = 0 point. 
 
 
 
 Table 1 above allows us to compare the levels of family policies in seventeen 
countries. It is based mostly on Jane Millar’s and Andrea Warman’s above described study. 
There is a great variation in family policy legislation. Scandinavian countries together with 
France and Belgium have quite wide range of family policy legislation. Most countries in 
Southern Europe have the legislation just above or at the same level as the countries belonging 
to the liberal welfare state regimes. This firms the difficulty to place Southern European 
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countries to traditional regimes. Somewhat surprising is the Netherlands – usually ranking very 
highly in the quality of the welfare states – is here among the lowest rankings. The Dutch family 
policy has been developed under the male breadwinner ideology. Day care services were until 
the 1990s quite underdeveloped. In the beginning of 1990s there occurred drastic changes in 
Dutch policy especially towards single parent families. Individualisation and the fragmentation 
of life styles gave rise to the perception that lone motherhood was a self-selected life style that 
no longer required social protection. The results of these changes various in different groups. 
According to Bussemaker et al. (1997) for those mothers who had built their identity primarily 
on full-time motherhood the changes were radical and strongly negative.  
 As all the family policy classifications presented above have shown one of the key 
divider of the family policy systems is how different welfare states help families to reconcile 
family and professional life. When parental leave, leave to care for sick children and childcare 
are considered together it is clear that Nordic countries have gone much further than others in 
supporting parents to reconcile employment with family life. The liberal welfare states together 
with Southern European countries lack this kind of support almost totally. From the poverty 
point of view day care arrangements play important role because employment is one of the 
main factors which keeps families out of poverty. On the other hand it is not only the coverage 
of day care but also the cost of day care which matters. According to recent study (Bradshaw et 
al. 1996) the day care fees of single parents in relation to their incomes are highest in the UK 
(28 %) and USA (22 %). High day care fees might force women to return or stay at home. This 
has been argued to have happened for example in Australia. In Nordic countries the coverage of 
day care and states’ subsidies for day care costs are high.      
 The degree to which family policy legislation has been developed in various 
countries depends largely upon ideological factors. In the Nordic countries, the state has long 
participated in the equalisation of the expense caused by children. In the corporatist countries 
social rights are tied in with family status. This has resulted in women’s and children’s indi-
vidual benefits remaining poorly developed. In liberal welfare states, the family is viewed as so 
untouchable an institution that the state must not interfere with how it functions. Child-raising 
and childcare are seen as private family matters. These ideological factors reflect the way in 
which family policy legislation is developed.  
 Level of legislation tells only one part of the story. Although the social policy 
legislation forms the basis of family policy, it does not tell us how well the legislation is 
working in practise. To get this side of the picture it is necessary to include information about 
the outcomes of the legislation. This will be done in next section.   
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3. The economic well-being of children in OECD countries 
  
  The primary producer and distributor of welfare is the family. Such characteristics of 
the family as the family structure, occupational status of the parents, and the age and number of 
children, have direct effect on the welfare of the family members. It is of course clear that many 
other factors besides the family are involved in the production of welfare for the individual. The 
economic condition of the surrounding society is a stronger factor than family. The welfare 
state has been defined as a state that makes itself responsible for social security and welfare of 
its citizens. It is a state, which seeks to assure the security and adequacy of the standard of living 
of all its citizens. (Rainwater et al. 1986.) By looking the outcomes of welfare states we can 
evaluate how well different welfare states have succeeded to fulfil their task to quarantine its 
citizens’ well-being.  
 
  The economic standing is one of the main factors connected to the well-being of 
households. In this study the economic standing will be measured only by comparing poverty 
rates of different family types in several countries. 
 
Figure l. Poverty in childhood and in the total population in the late 1980s and early  
  1990s (%)   
Figure 1 has two important messages. First it reveals that the differences between welfare state regimes in 
child poverty and general poverty parallel each other. The Nordic countries have low child 
poverty rates, then come the Central European countries, and last the liberal countries in which 
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child poverty is fairly common. Secondly the figure shows that in most countries child poverty 
rates are higher than the poverty rates in the total populations. Many comparisons on income 
inequality and social spending show that the democratic welfare state is universally a good 
bargain for the elderly, whereas the treatment of children is more varied. Affluent democracies 
have instituted social security systems that give the elderly a standard of living roughly on a par 
with that of the population average. The same societies have not instituted “social security for 
children“ which would allow families to give their children an even level standard of living 
(Ringen 1997). Cornia (1997) has pointed out that from the year 1973 to the year 1989 in most 
industrialised countries pension coverage was broadened and existing programmes were im-
proved or consolidated. This meant the relative neglect of social policy towards children and 
adolescents. Ringen (1997) says that if democracy is a system of equal rights for citizens, there 
is a remaining democratic deficit caused by the exclusion of children and the 
non-representation of their interests. Ringen has also noticed that the economic well-being of 
children has got worse in many countries. He argues that even if it were natural for children and 
for families with children to be on the lower side of the distribution, there is nothing “natural“ 
about children and families raising children being disproportionately among the losers in the 
redistribution which occurs when inequality increases. (Ringen 1998, 5.) 
  The common fact in the western welfare states is that marriage and work reduce the 
risk of poverty for women, whereas motherhood and especially single motherhood increase the 
probability of being poor (McLanahan et al. 1995). In many studies it has been indicated that 
single-parent families are often in the low income brackets because there is only one 
wage-earner in the household and because single parents are most often women (Millar 1992; 
Millar et al. 1989). Because women work in low-wage jobs more often then men, the poverty 
risk of single parent families is higher than that of two parent families. It is argued that the 
reason for feminisation of poverty is that as families dissolve women end up in difficult eco-
nomic circumstances because of their reproductive responsibility. So it is the single parenthood 
arising from the breakdown of the family and the difficulties caused by single parenthood 
which add the poverty risk of women and children. 
  Against this background it will be interesting to see how welfare states have acted to 
quarantine the well-being of single parent families. Next two figures show how single parent 
and two parent families are treated in different social security systems from the poverty point of 
view. Figure 2 shows single parents’ poverty rates and the effectiveness of welfare states to 
reduce their poverty risks. Figure 3 shows the same thing in two parent families. As said above 
it is obvious that in all countries poverty risk for single parent families is higher than in two 
parent families. However there is a great difference between different countries according to 
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single parent families’ poverty rates. Single parent families’ risk to live in poverty is the highest 
in USA, Australia and the Netherlands and the lowest in Germany, Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland. During the past ten years there has been a backlash against the economic situation in 
single parent families in the Netherlands, Australia, the UK and USA. There has been a clear 
development to narrow single parents’ autonomy. For example in the UK single parents’ access 
to social housing has been tighten and also benefits for single parent families have been cut. 
Also in USA morally slanted attitudes tend to dictate benefits for single parent families and for 
example the new income support scheme (TANF) is much stricter than the preceding one 
(AFDC). In Scandinavian countries single parents are seen as workers or caregivers. This has 
been made possible by extensive public day care and universal benefits. According to Lewis 
(1997) single parents have a need to be full participants in their society, they want inclusion but 
they also want full participants in their society. This need has been fulfilled in Scandinavian 
countries but not in liberal welfare states.  
  These ideological differences between welfare state regimes can also be recognise 
when looking poverty reduction coefficients. Without any state intervention single parents’ 
poverty rates would be high in every welfare states. Only in USA and in Australia the reduction 
in single parent families’ poverty rate was below 50 %. 
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Figure 2. Poverty rates and poverty reduction coefficients for single parent families in 
different countries, %  
1Poverty rate before income transfers minus poverty rate after income transfers, divided by poverty rate before income trans-
fers.   
 
Figure 3. Poverty rates and poverty reduction coefficients for two parent families in dif-
ferent countries, % 
1Poverty rate before income transfers minus poverty rate after income transfers, divided by poverty rate before income trans-
fers. 
 
The economic well-being of two parent families is much better in every welfare state than in 
single parent families. The poverty risk for two parent families is very low in most of the 
countries except USA, Italy, UK and Australia, but even in these countries two parent families’ 
poverty rates are clearly lower than poverty rates of single parent families.  
   Most of the European countries have taken clear step to protect single parent fam-
ilies more effectively than two parent families. USA, Australia and the Netherlands are coun-
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tries in which single parent families poverty reduction before and after income transfers situa-
tion is lower than in two parent families. In these countries single parenthood has been stig-
matised by providing strict, means-tested benefits and services.  
  This chapter has shown than even if there is a common agreement on the support to 
single parent families the outcomes of state interventions differs enormously. Single parents 
poverty risk has been reduced most effectively in Scandinavian countries (except Norway) and 
in Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium. All in all there seems to be much stronger agreement in 
how two parent families are supported. In every country studied here the poverty rate for two 
parent families were lower than for single parent families.  
 
 
 
4. Can we talk about the European family policy system? 
 
 
As shown earlier in this study there are several country-specific variants when regarding family 
policy legislation or the outcomes of family policy. There have been various attempts to ca-
tegorise countries according to their family policy making styles. According to these classifi-
cations it is not justified to talk about one single form of European family policy. In the Euro-
pean Union family policy was placed very low on the political agenda. Linda Hantrais points 
out three reasons why, until the late 1980s, the European Commission was particularly reluctant 
to intervene in family affairs. Firstly, views on the objectives of family policy are divided along 
ideological lines both within and between countries. Secondly, some governments have con-
sidered family life to belong to the private domain and therefore to be forbidden territory for 
explicit state intervention. Thirdly, the welfare of families has been given low priority because 
social protection in the Union and in most member state is centred on worker’s rather than 
citizenship rights. (Hantrais 1995.) In 1989 the Commission finally drafted a Communication 
on family policies. Hantrais evaluates that there has been little progress towards defining a 
“comprehensive“ European family policy.  
  Table 2 shows the correlation of the legislation level to the outcomes of family 
policy. It shows the diversity between family policy legislation and the economic situation of 
the children living in the lowest quantile. It tells us how poor the poor children really are in 
different countries.  
Table 2.   Typology of different welfare state by the level of legislation and real in-
comes of children in the lowest quantile as a percent of US median income.  
 REAL REAL 
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INCOMES 
60 – 45 % OF 
US MEDIAN 
INCOME 
INCOMES 
44 – 30 % OF 
US MEDIAN 
INCOME 
STRONG 
LEGISLATI
ON 
Finland 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Belgium 
Norway 
France 
WEAK 
LEGISLATI
ON 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Italy 
Netherlands 
USA 
Australia 
United 
Kingdom  
Sources: Legislation (Millar et al. 1996) Real incomes (Smeeding et al. 1997). 
  
It seems that in most cases the strong family policy legislation goes hand in hand with the 
economic situation of children in the lowest quantile. In the Netherlands, USA, Australia, Italy 
and the United Kingdom and France poor children are living in worse economic situations than 
poor children in Scandinavian countries, and in Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg.  Al-
though the strong legislation level the situation of poor children is weak in France. In France 
although the child poverty is not at the same level as in liberal welfare states the deepness of 
poverty is in the same level than in liberal welfare states.   
  In the liberal welfare state it is a task of the market to provide citizens with welfare 
services and benefits. In these countries the aim is to keep the social aspect of the state con-
tained, need-based and selective. In practice this has meant that family policy benefits have 
been targeted only to poor families and to children at risk. The family policies in the UK, 
Australia and United States are targeted explicitly on poor families, especially single-parent 
families, with no special attention to very young children (Kamerman & Kahn 1994). In the 
Netherlands marked shift were occurring towards individualisation of rights and self-reliance, 
accompanied by a more diversified and pluralistic approach. These changes in the Netherlands’ 
family policy legislation means that it is getting closer to liberal welfare state model when 
concentrating on the legislation and child poverty. Also Italy is grouped together with liberal 
welfare states. Italy has featured a long period of family care for children and relatives, along-
side residual state responsibility for family welfare This means that the welfare state recognises 
the legitimate priority of the family group to mediate individual rights (Bimbi 1997). According 
to Saraceno (1997) the policy in 1990s restrict support to social services developed in past. 
Local budget restrictions have led to increased user costs for child care and a reduction in the 
range of services offered. The National Health Service has been transformed into a 
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means-tested social service, with increased costs to families. Saraceno points out that in Italy 
the local-level differences has to be taken account because there exist a great diversity in the 
services delivered in different municipalities, some municipalities are developing ‘child and 
family friendly’ policies.    
  All in all it seems that there is not a coherent family policy system in European 
countries. Nordic countries together with Belgium have strong legislation level and the situa-
tion of poor children is better than in many other countries. Liberal countries together with Italy 
and the Netherlands are grouped to the opposite way: they have weak legislation and the situ-
ation of poor children is worse than in most other countries. This diversity can be explained 
only by ideological and historical factors. In Europe the views continue to diverge about the 
acceptability of state intervention to the family. What is considered as self evident in Nordic 
countries is in many other countries considered to be too far going intervention into the family 
privacy. 
 
 
5. Developmental patterns in time  
 
 
By looking at the outcomes of different policy making styles it is possible to identify two most 
diverse family policy systems, the Nordic one and the Liberal one. In the Nordic countries, 
families with children are supported not only by income transfers but also by comprehensive 
social services, whereas in liberal countries the support for families with children is almost 
totally limited to means-tested benefits. Besides the benefit system one important factor which 
explains the outcomes of different countries is the way the day care for children is provided. In 
liberal welfare states the commercial based day care with high user fees is very often too ex-
pensive alternative for low income families. But unfortunately it often is the only alternative 
available. This situation prevents single parent families to participate in labour market. In lib-
eral welfare states jobless single parent families are almost automatically poor. The Nordic 
welfare states stress a policy in which the manifest objective is to permit parents to choose 
either an at-home role while children are very young or a labour market role. These objects are 
quarantined by publicly provided day care and generous child benefits. 
  The inspections on the economic well-being were based on cross-sectional snap 
shots and these shots identified the Nordic and the Liberal family policies as the two most 
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diverse models, and fortunately the LIS offers longitudinal data just for these two extremes. 
Figure 4 shows how the adopted family policy systems have been effected on the economic 
well-being of children in 15 years perspective. 
 
Figure 4. Development of child poverty in sample countries from 1980 to 1995. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finland (the same trend has also been found in Sweden) has managed to prevent poverty risk 
for children in different family types almost totally. Thanks to the income transfer and day care 
systems that support women's paid employment, the poverty risk for children in different kinds 
of households is nearly at a minimum. As least as far as economic welfare is concerned, the 
Scandinavian model may be called not only woman-friendly but also child-friendly. 
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6.  Discussion 
 
This study has shown that there are several types of family policy systems. Different family 
policy systems create different outcomes. Childrenisation of poverty (Cornia 1997; Forssen 
1998) and fairly extensive child poverty rates are facts of social life outside the Nordic 
countries. The notion that the responsibility for children's welfare belongs to the family has 
survived in both liberal and corporatist countries. This reflected in tough means-testing for 
benefits and services and scarcity of individual social rights, these again reflected in the high 
child poverty rates that have grown worse in many countries in the past few years. From the 
point of view of child poverty, social policies in the liberal countries can be characterised as 
neglectful of children. The absence of comprehensive family policies is linked to overly high 
regard for family privacy. Setting up support systems for families has been restrained by 
ideological factors, such as fear of "sovietization of families." Ideological perspectives that 
emphasise the territorial integrity of the family do not encourage development of services 
targeted for women and children. Yet more and more women have been compelled to find 
employment outside the home. The necessary services have had to be purchased either from the 
private or unofficial sectors. Those without enough money to buy these services have been 
provided with means-tested day care services, often planned specifically for children at risk. 
Conservative values and marginal conditions within a changing society have pushed children 
and families with children into situations that are often riddled with conflict and lead to 
unfortunate end results. High rates of child poverty bear partial witness to this. 
  It is hard to understand why many developed welfare states keep on having high 
and constantly increasing child poverty rates. In the ideological level every welfare state wants 
to quarantine the well-being of children. Child poverty could be reduced in no time at all by 
sufficiently high increases in public support to the families that have children. For some reason 
child poverty continues to be increasing problem in many advanced welfare states. This 
problem cannot be understood by concentrating only on the current situation. The existing 
family policy system cannot be understood without knowledge of its history, because it has 
been transformed through time as a result of compromises between many different interest 
groups. Policy making does not happen in a vacuum. Decisions about social security benefits or 
child protection are made by real people in particular historical settings and under pressure 
from a wide range of individuals and organisations. (Dalton et al. 1996.) To understand the 
policy process in relation to a particular issue, we need to understand all the many factors that 
  
 
202 
form the context of that process. Only this way it is possible to understand why there exist “the 
welfare paradox“ in the leading liberal welfare states.  
  
  
 
203 
References 
 
 Atkinson, A. - Rainwater, L. and Smeeding, T. M. 1995. Income 
distribution in OECD countries. Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study. OECD, Paris. 
 Bimbi, F. 1997. Lone Mothers in Italy: a Hidden and Embarrassing 
Issue in a Familist Welfare Regime. In: Lewis, J. (ed) Lone Mothers in European Welfare 
Regimes. Shifting Policy Logics. Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London.  
 Bradshaw, J. 1997. Child Welfare in the United Kingdom: Rising 
Poverty, Falling Priorities for Children. In: Cornia, G. A. and Danziger, S. (eds.) Child Poverty 
and Deprivation in the Industrialized Countries, 1945 – 1005. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 Bradshaw, J. - Ditch, J. - Holmes, H. and Whiteford, P. 1993. 
Support for children: a comparison of arrangements in fifteen countries. HMSO, London. 
 Bradshaw, J. –Kennedy, S. – Kilkey, M. – Hutton, S. – Corden, A. – 
Eardley, T. – Holmes, H. and Neale, J. 1996. The employment of lone parents: A comparison of 
policy in 20 countries. Family Policy Studies Centre, London. 
 Bussemaker, J. – van Drenth, A. – Knijn, T. and Plantenga, J. 1997. 
Lone Mothers in the Netherlands. In: Lewis, J. (ed.) Lone Mothers in European Welfare Re-
gimes. Shifting Policy Logics. Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London. 
 Casper, L. M. and McLanahan, S. S. 1994. The American family in 
1990: Growing diversity and inequality. Luxembourg Income Study, Working Papers No 115. 
 Cornia, G. A. 1997. Child Poverty and Deprivation in the Industri-
alized Countries from the End of World War II to the End of the Cold War Era. . In: Cornia, G. 
A. and Danziger, S. (eds.) Child Poverty and Deprivation in the Industrialized Countries, 1945 
– 1005. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 Dalton, T. – Draper, M. – Weeks, W. and Wiseman, J. 1996. 
Making social policy in Australia. An introduction. Allen & Unwin, Sydney. 
 Danziger, S. - Smeeding, T. and Rainwater, L. 1995. The Western 
welfare state in the 1990's: Toward a new model of antipoverty policy for families with chil-
dren. Luxembourg Income Study, Working Papers No 128. 
 Esping-Andersen, G. 1990. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. 
Polity Press, Cambridge. 
 Forssen, K. 1998. Child Poverty and Family Policy in the OECD 
Countries. Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper Series No:178. 
 Gauthier, A. H. 1996. The State and the Family. A Comparative 
Analysis of Family Policies in Industrialized Countries. Claredon Press, Oxford.  
 Ginsburg, N. 1992. Divisions of welfare. A critical introduction to 
comparative social policy. SAGE Publications, London. 
 Gornick, J. C. - Meyers, M. K. and Ross, K. E. 1996. Public policies 
and the employment of mothers: A cross-national study. Luxembourg Income Study, Working 
Papers No 140. 
 Hantrais, L. 1995. Social Policy in the European Union. Macmillan 
Press LTD, Houndmills. 
 Kamerman, S. B. 1986. Women, children and poverty. Public 
policies and female-headed families in industrialized countries. In: Gelpi, B. C. – Hartsock, N. 
C. M. – Nocak, C. C. and Strober, M. H. (eds) Women and poverty. The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago. 
 Kamerman, S. B. and Kahn, A. J. 1978 (eds.). Family policy: 
Government ans families in fourteen countries. Columbia University Press, New York. 
 Kamerman, S. B. and Kahn, A. J. 1994. Family policy and the un-
der-3s: Money, services and time in a policy package. International Social Security Review 47 
(3-4), 31-43. 
  
 
204 
 Lewis, J. 1997 (ed.). Lone mothers in European Welfare Regimes. 
Shifting Policy Logics. Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London. 
 McLanahan, S. S. - Casper, L.M and Sørensen, A. 1995. Women's 
roles and women's poverty in eight industrialized countries. In: Mason, K. O. and Jensen, A. M. 
(eds) Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 Millar, J. 1992. It all really starts in the family: Gender divisions 
and poverty. In: Glendinning, C. and Millar, J. (eds) Women and poverty in Britain in 1990s. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. Hertfordshire. 
 Millar, J. and Glendinning, C. 1989. Gender and poverty. Journal of 
Social Policy, vol 18, no:3, 363-381. 
 Millar, J. and Warman, A. 1996. Family obligations in Europe. 
Family Policy Studies Centre, London. 
 Rainwater, L. - Rein, M. and Schwartz, J. 1986. Income packaging 
in the welfare state. Claredon Press, Oxford. 
 Rainwater, L. 1988. Inequalities in the economic well-being of 
children and adults in ten nations. Luxembourg Income Study, Working Papers No 19. 
 Ringen, S. 1997. Citizens, Families and Reform. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
 Saraceno, C. 1997. Growth, Regional Imbalance, and Child 
Well-Being: Italy over the Last Four Decades. In: Cornia, G. A. and Danziger, S. (eds.) Child 
Poverty and Deprivation in the Industrialized Countries, 1945 – 1005. Clarendon Press, Ox-
ford. 
 Smeeding, T. 1988. Poverty, affluence and the income costs of 
children: Cross-national evidence from the LIS. Luxembourg Income Study, Working Papers 
No 21. 
 Smeeding, T. – Danziger, S. and Rainwater, L. 1997. Making Social 
Policy Work for Children: Towards a More Effective Antipoverty Policy. In: Cornia, G. A. and 
Danziger, S. (eds.) Child Poverty and Deprivation in the Industrialized Countries, 1945 – 1005. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
 Wennemo, I. 1994. Sharing the costs of children. Studies on the 
development of family support in the OECD countries. Swedish Institute for Social Research, 
25. 
 Wilensky, H. L. 1975. The welfare state and equality. University of 
California Press, Berkeley. 
  
  
 
205 
 
  
  
 
206 
Tiina Mäkinen 
 
 
INCOME PACKAGES OF THE AGED IN 11 OECD 
COUNTRIES 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Human life can be divided into three different stages, namely youth, adulthood, and old age. 
Every stage involves events and activities such as studying, the birth of a child, unemployment, 
sickness and retirement that influence the needs, labour market participation, and welfare state 
dependence of an individual (Atchley 1976). Labour market participation and life outside work 
no longer follow regular patterns, and a ‘de-standardisation’ of life cycles is now evident in 
industrialised societies. These irregularities present social policy with new challenges. The 
traditional aim of social policy has been to secure the livelihood of individuals during those 
stages of life when participation in the labour market is not possible for one reason or another. 
Social benefits were previously targeted mostly at the passive working-age population, whereas 
at present an increasing share of the total income of the working population consists of income 
transfers (Kolberg & Esping-Andersen 1992; Saari 1996). 
 The changes in life patterns are most evident when we observe trends in the pe-
riods of active labour market participation. The duration of labour market participation has 
shortened in all Western countries. Whereas in the 1960s the average European worked for 45 
years, the average worker in the 1990s retires after 35 years. The duration of retirement has 
correspondingly increased, as a result of both earlier retirement and longer life expectancy, 
from 15 to 25 years. Longer periods in education and difficulties in finding employment have 
postponed the entry of young people into the labour market, and retirement before the official 
pensionable age has shortened the period of active labour market participation. Old-age pension 
systems’ role in controlling labour market participation is changed as fewer people are in fact 
retiring at the age of 65. (Salvage 1995; Guillemard 1997; Walker & Maltby 1997.) 
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 Changes in active labour market participation in combination with destandardi-
sation of life patterns have had an impact on citizens’ sources of income. Increased  irregu-
larity of life courses is also reflected in the irregularity of labour markets as more and more 
people are experiencing alternating periods of employment and  unemployment. The purpose 
of this article is to investigate the impact of irregularities in labour market participation on 
income packages.
16
 To what extent has income from work been replaced by pensions and other 
social transfers (‘social income’) among the older age groups? Older age groups include here 
those aged 50-54 years, 55-59 years, 60-64 years and over 65-year-olds. Does the content of the 
income packages in the mid-1990s differ significantly from the income packages of the early 
1980s? What are the differences between countries and country groups or welfare state models?  
 The EU countries included in this comparison are Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Other countries included are Australia, 
Canada, Norway and the USA. The countries compared in this article have been selected to 
represent different welfare state models which traditionally have been classified on the basis of 
factors such as the relative roles of the family, the state and the market as producers of welfare. 
This article makes use of Korpi and Palme’s (1998) classification of welfare state models to 
clarify the central characteristics of individual welfare states (for a close survey see article 
‘Structural Pressures, Social Policy and Poverty in 15 OECD Countries’ in this book). Canada, 
the UK and the USA are in this article defined as basic security welfare states. Australia 
represents the targeted model. As the best examples of the corporatist model are regarded 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The countries belonging to encompassing model are 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
 More encompassing international databases have opened up new possibilities for 
comparative welfare state studies. One of these international databases is the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) (see Smeeding et al. 1990; Atkinson et al. 1995; Mitchell 1991). The in-
come package analyses in this article are based on LIS data. In addition to LIS data, the 
household-based data from the 1995 income distribution statistics are used for Finland. The 
definition of income distribution has been modified to correspond to the income distribution 
                                                 
16
 For a close survey see Rainwater, Rein and Schwartz 1986; Hedström and 
Ringen 1985. 
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definition used in LIS
17
 (see Uusitalo1989). The income package under study consists of 
wage/salary, income from private enterprise, capital income, sickness daily benefit, work 
disability and unemployment benefits, legislated pensions, occupational pensions, 
means-tested benefits and other miscellaneous income. The unit studied is an individual who 
lives in a household where the reference person belongs to one of the age categories listed 
above. The study includes only those households that have income from the income compo-
nents listed above (negative income components are not given consideration here). Income 
package analysis then depicts the average
3
 share of an individual income component of the 
gross income of a household. 
                                                 
17
 The following income components have been removed from the income 
distribution statistics: perquisites, costs of income acquisition, the 
value of own labour and materials in building and repairs, forestry expenses, 
and the benefit of own residence and summer residence. 
3
 Quinn (1987, 64) has written ’The most important characteristics of the 
aged is their diversity. The average can be very deceptive, because it 
ignores the tremendous dispersion around it. Beware of the mean.’ 
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The purpose of the article is to give detailed answers to the following questions: 
 
The article is structured as follows. It starts with an analysis of the labour force participation 
rates of the different age groups in the mid-1990s. This is followed by a study of the income 
packages of the age groups, starting with the youngest group. The article will conclude with a 
summary of the central research results and a more general discussion of the issues. 
 
2. Labour Force Participation Rates 
As stated in the introduction, the role of the old-age pension system in regulating labour market 
participation has changed. A pattern of leaving the labour force before the official retirement 
age is evident if we study the labour force participation rates among the aged (Figures 1a and 
1b). Men’s labour market participation has declined in all the countries compared here since the 
1970s in all the age groups investigated. The differences in the labour market participation rates 
of 50-54 and 55-59-year-old men are not large as yet, but as we move on to the 60-64-year-olds, 
the differences between the countries become more stark. Correspondingly, the labour force 
participation rates among the 50-54 and 55-59-year-old women have increased in all the 
countries under investigation. As with men, the differences between female labour force par-
ticipation rates in different countries are most evident in the 60-64 age group.  
 
Is it the case that 
 
 in countries of the encompassing model, the labour market participation rates among the 
aged are lower than in countries of the basic and targeted models, and as a consequence 
pensions and other income transfers have in the encompassing model replaced income 
from work as the primary source of income? 
 
 in countries of the encompassing model where the level of public pensions is high, an 
increasing share of the income packages of the aged consists of the so-called social in-
come (pensions and other income transfers)? (see Haveman et al. 1984; Luoma 1987; 
Aarts & de Jong 1990; Hänninen et al. 1990; Ippolito 1990; Quinn et al. 1990; Quinn & 
Burkhauser 1990; Kangas 1992a) 
 
 in countries of the encompassing model the high level of benefits and pensions has led to 
lower propensity to save as compared with saving rates among the populations in the 
countries of the basic security and targeted models? (c.f. Danziger et al. 1981; Achdut & 
Tamir 1985; OECD 1988) 
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Figure 1a. Labour force participation rates of aged men 
UK=United Kingdom  CN=Canada  US=USA  AS=Australia  NL=Netherlands  
FR=France  GE=Germany  NW=Norway  SW=Sweden  FI=Finland  DK=Denmark 
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50-54-year-old women 55-59-year-old women
60-64-year-old women Over 65-year-old women
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Figure 1b. Labour force participation rates of aged women 
UK=United Kingdom  CN=Canada  US=USA  AS=Australia  NL=Netherlands  
FR=France  GE=Germany  NW=Norway  SW=Sweden  FI=Finland  DK=Denmark 
Source: OECD 1997b. 
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In studying the labour market participation rates of the 60-64-year-old men, the countries of the 
corporatist welfare state model (France, Germany and the Netherlands), and the encompassing 
welfare state model as represented by Finland form their own distinctive: in these countries the 
labour market participation rates are extremely low. The labour market participation rates of the 
60-64-year-old women are relatively low in the above-mentioned countries as well as in 
Australia.  
 Institutional arrangements that make it possible to leave the labour force prior to 
the official retirement age bring about differences in the labour force participation rates of the 
60-64-year-olds. These institutional arrangements were originally created to cover for the risks 
of unemployment and work disability, but in many countries they have gradually been 
transformed into institutionalised routes of early labour force exit. These early exit pathways 
are more detailed described in table 1. 
 In France, decreasing participation rates have brought about changes in the early 
exit arrangements. France is the only country that has been forced to bring down the retirement 
age (with a full pension) from 65 to 60 years in 1983. The most common mode of exit in France 
has been through basic unemployment compensation, followed by a special minimum solidar-
ity payment during a waiting period for retirement. In France, unlike in the USA, the UK and 
the Netherlands, early exit arrangements have been mostly public, with private ones being 
largely an exception. (Guillemard 1991, 127-180; Reday-Mulvey 1996, 45-68; SSA 1997.) 
 In Germany older workers constitute a minority in the labour market: in 1993 
people aged 55 and over accounted for only 11 % of the total labour force. The most common 
forms of exit in Germany correspond largely to entry into public social security programs, 
either directly into the pension system or via other programmes such as unemployment insur-
ance. There are also possibilities for early exit outside the state programs, but they are usually 
linked to the public pension scheme. The German public pension system is relatively generous 
compared with most other OECD countries. The Retirement Reform which was introduced in 
1992 provide individuals more flexible retirement options (see table 1). The German system 
includes strict earnings test for all early retirements (before age 65). The threshold is around 15 
per cent of the average gross wage. After age 65, the earnings test does not apply, and full 
benefits are paid regardless of other sources of possible earnings. (Antolin & Scarpetta 1998.) 
The trend toward early exit from the labour force has not been a major topic of socio-political 
discourse, but in the 1990s it has become a significant issue of its own, especially with regard to 
the financing of old-age security. In the Netherlands, France and Germany, very early retire-
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ment has been encouraged over the last 15 years by a strong consensus between enterprises, the 
state and the labour force. Labour force participation rates in these countries are said to reflect 
more the availability of generous social security provisions than the situation in the labour 
markets. (Jacobs, Kohli & Rein 1991, 181-221; Schmähl, George & Oswald 1996, 69-93.) 
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Table 1. Pensionable Age and Early/Deferred Retirement 
a) is for actuarial adjustment of benefit, b) for partial pension, and c) for other schemes such as unemployment benefits.                                                           
Source: Kalisch et al. 1998; Blöndal & Scarpetta 1998a; SSA 1997; OECD 1995 
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Australia 65 61 
 
from 1.7 2013  
65 yrs 
c) Mature Age Allowance (MAA, introduced in 1994) 
 
60-64 (M) 60 (W) 
 0.0 0.0 
Canada 65 65 a) 60-64 (for earnings-related pension, introduced in 1987) 
a) flexible retirement under Canada pension plan (1987- 
any time between ages of 60 and 70 – before 65 reduction 6 % year. 
Introduction of partial pension is being considered. 
a) 65-70 
 
(for earnings-related scheme, introduced in 1987) 
0.0 -0.6 
UK 65 60 
 
increase to 65 yrs  
between 
2010-2020 
a) 50-64 (M) 
50-59 (W) 
 
(’personal pension’introduced in the 1986 Act, 
also available up to age 75) 
a) 65-70 (M) 61-70 (W)  
 
(state schemes) 
 
From 2010 can defer indefinitely. 
20.1 -0.4 
USA 65 
 
increase to 
67 yrs 
between  
2000-2027 
65 
 
increase to 
67 yrs 
between  
2000-2027 
a) 62-64 actuarially-reduced pension (1961 - ) 
 
Reduction of benefits 5/9 of 1% every month prior to age 65. 
 0.0 -1.1 
Netherlands 65 65 c) for 57 ½ years older unemployment benefit programmes – 70 % replacement rate  
 
Furthermore, private pension has those arrangements based on Collective agreements (VUT) – 80% replacement rate 
of previous gross earnings. 
Not a policy priority. 22.2 -0.5 
France 60 60 Under age 60 
Unemployment – solidarity benefit (long-term unemployed. Income tested. 
 18.3 -1.4 
Germany 65 60 
 
increase to 
65 yrs 
between 
2000-2004 
a) Needs partial cessation of Employment. 
63 
’flexible retirement’ for long service (1973 - ) 35 yrs of insurance contributions; full pension for the long-term 
unemployed. 
 
60 
unemployment (1957 - ) 15 yrs contributions and unemployed 52 weeks 
c) occupational disability – full old age benefit to 60 and over. 
c) general disability  - individuals receiving occupational disability can claim after 1 year of unsuccessful search for 
part-time employment, full level of old age retirement benefits. 
b) 0.5% bonus for each month working beyond 
age 65. 
 
19.8 -1.3 
Norway 67 67 a) 62-66 early retirement pension (1990 - ) 
 
a)  67-70 14.9 -1.3 
                                                 
4
 Percentage points increase in the synthetic pension replacement rate for a 55-year old male worker by working ten more years. 
5
 Changes in the pension wealth (measured as a multiple of annual earnings) for a 55-year old male by working ten more years. 
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Pension entitlement but is less favourably treated under income taxation  
than a full pension. 
Sweden 65 65 a) 60-64 
a) 61-64 (with reduced working hours) 
 
Reduction of 0.5% of benefits for every month prior to 65. 
c) 65-70 
 
Employer’s consent is required. Bonus of 0.7% for 
each month deferred. 
0.0 -1.8 
Finland 65 65 a) 60-64 (early retirement pension) 
b) 58-64 (part-time pension) 
c) 53-60 (unemployment daily allowance) 
c) 60-64 (unemployment pension) 
c)      65- (no upper limit) 
1% pension bonus for each month defered after 
age 65 for public sector workers. 
6.2 -2.3 
Denmark 67 67 b) 60-66 
Needs contribution of over 10 yrs in last 20 yrs. Needs to continue working part-time. 
c) voluntary early retirement (January 1979- 
Scheme is open to both employees and the self-employed who are covered by unemployment insurance 
c) voluntary early retirement (1984- For persons in arduos occupations. 
c)’anticipatory’ pension (1984- 
 n.a n.a 
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 Participation in the labour market has always been very low in the Netherlands in 
comparison with other industrialised countries and in the case of women it has been historically 
low. One reason to low female participation rates is that in the Netherlands the man is seen as 
the main income provider. So the Netherlands can be considered as a typical male breadwinner 
society. But also male activity rates are extremely low: over the period 1960-1990, the drop in 
the male activity rate in the 55-64 age group (-42 %) has been sharper than in any other OECD 
country. The Dutch social security system can be characterised as a private system within a 
public framework. The private nature of the social policy system is rather important in ex-
plaining early exit from the labour market in the 1980s. As a result of bargaining between 
employers and trade unions the so-called pre-retirement scheme was created in the late seven-
ties to induce older workers to retire early in order to make place for young unemployed 
workers. This voluntary early retirement scheme, VUT, became a popular private exit path 
because of the relatively small income loss. Net replacement rates may in some cases be close 
to 100 per cent. The average replacement rate is 80 per cent of previous gross earnings. (de 
Vroom & Blomsma 1991, 97-126; Delsen 1996, 111-134.) In his study Lindeboom (1998) has 
shown that the Dutch early retirement schemes have strong incentive effects on the probability 
to retire. Early retirement replacement rates also affect the transition rates of the other exit 
routes. The alternative exit routes are taken into account in the decision to retire and these 
alternative exit routes act as substitutes, implying that changes in the regulation of one exit 
route have an effect on the exit rate of the others. The non-working Dutch elderly seldom 
re-enter to working-life, because elderly unemployment and disability insurance recipients are 
not required to actively search for (re)employment. Early retirement recipients loose retirement 
benefits upon re-entering employment. (Lindeboom 1998.) 
 On the basis of figures 1a and 1b it is obvious that Finland has become a country 
where early exit from work has changed from being an exception to being the rule. The situa-
tion is illustrated by the fact that only 10% of Finns withdraw their first pension payment after 
they have turned 65. This is partly affected by many available options for early retirement. The 
option for deferred retirement has been less used  (see table 1). Work disability pension was 
incorporated in the Finnish pension system from the very start. Improvements in pensions 
security in combination with structural changes in society increased the number of work dis-
ability pensions in payment in the early 1970s. Until the late 1970s, work disability pension was 
the only significant form of early retirement in Finland. Work disability pensions were com-
plemented in the 1980s by the so-called flexible types of pension. Retirement became more 
flexible in the private sector in 1986 when individual early retirement pension (YVE) and early 
old age pension were introduced. Flexible pensions were introduced in the public sector in 
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1989. YVE has been the most popular form of flexible retirement. Simultaneously with YVE, 
part-time pension was introduced in Finland. This pension form mirrored the Swedish system 
but did not become equally popular in Finland. Part-time pension is the only Finnish early 
retirement pension that is clearly a component of the active labour market policy. Before mass 
unemployment the disability pathway was the most common exit path in Finland, but in the 
1990s most of those who withdraw from the labour market start their exit process under un-
employment programmes. (Hytti 1993; 1998; Gould & Takala 1997; Takala 1997.) 
 The labour force participation rates among the 60-64-year-old men and women 
are relatively high in Norway and Sweden (representatives of the encompassing model) and in 
Canada and the USA (basic security model). Among the Nordic countries, Norway has had the 
highest male labour force participation rate. In 1973, Norway became the first country to in-
troduce a pension explicitly designed to complement part-time work. However, unlike the 
options available in other countries which involve receiving benefits before the standard re-
tirement age, the partial pension in Norway is payable only after the normal retirement age of 
67. (OECD 1995, 85.) On the basis of table 1 Norway can be said to lack institutional ar-
rangements that provide financial incentives to leave the labour market before statutory pension 
age. This is one explanation of the high labour force participation rate in Norway.  
 Sweden still has a rather high rate of employment among the elderly, and Sweden 
can be said to be a ‘late-exit’ country in comparison with most other countries. There are many 
reasons for this. Sweden has had favourable labour market development with low unemploy-
ment which means that there has not been as much pressure on older workers to exit early in 
favour of younger workers as there has been in other countries. Full employment for everyone 
has been the catchphrase. Another factor explaining the relatively high labour force participa-
tion among the elderly is the Swedish pension system that facilitates part-time work for older 
workers and thus enables people to gradually decrease the number of  hours they work. The 
age-wage profile is also less steep in Sweden than in most other countries, and economic in-
centives to get rid of older workers are consequently weaker. The obstacles to taking on older 
workers may also be lessened if age and wage are unrelated or only weakly related. Flexibility 
and integration have been words that have differentiated Sweden from most other countries. 
The combination of part-time work and part-time pension has kept the aged in working life. 
This flexible route, that has been deemed too costly, is due to disappear in 2000. (Wadensjö 
1991, 284-323; 1996; SSA 1997.) 
 Canada belongs to those countries where labour force participation among men 
aged between 60 and 64 has remained relatively high. In Canada there are two kinds of early 
retirement programmes. The first is so-called flexible retirement under Canada pension plan in 
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which retirement pensions can commence any time between the ages of 60 and 70. For pensions 
commencing before the age of 65 benefit reduction is 6 per cent per year. The other option is 
voluntary early retirement for those aged 60. This benefit provides the same net benefit as the 
unemployment benefit. (OECD 1995.) 
 Early retirement culture is not anymore as visible in the USA. A combination of 
public policy initiatives regarding mandatory retirement and Social Security, a trend toward 
defined-contribution pensions and a strong domestic economy have halted the dramatic 
post-war early retirement trend and encouraged many older workers to remain employed. Many 
Americans combine earnings and retirement income by remaining employed, often on a new 
job, and often part-time, after they have left their career employer and began collecting public 
and/or private retirement benefits. For example, in Finland and France public pensions are 
granted only if individuals stop working with their current employer, a qualification that can be 
seen a de facto restriction on remaining employed. The amount individuals can earn in the USA 
before losing Social Security benefits has increased, and is about to rise dramatically for 
workers aged 65 to 69 (from $13 500 in 1997 to $ 30 000 by 2002). The USA differs from the 
other countries included in this study in that American companies have offered incentives to 
those who wish to withdraw from the labour market earlier than the norm. These special ar-
rangements - ‘the golden handshakes’ - have become fairly common since the early 1980s. 
However, the primary exit pathway in the USA has been through the retired-worker benefits 
programme under Social Security. The number of persons exiting via the disability route has 
increased at a much higher rate than the ‘normal’ retirement pensions. The requirements for 
eligibility to Social Security disability programme are more stringent – no partial disability 
benefits or explicit linkage to unemployment or chronological age – than in countries such as 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany. Therefore, in the USA, Social Security disability 
benefits are not a common alternative to early retirement benefits under another name. (Chen 
1996, 164-176; Sheppard 1991, 252-283; Walker & Maltby 1997, 80; Quinn et al. 1998; 
Bjöndal & Scarpetta 1998b.) 
 It is not easy to classify Australia, Denmark, and the UK as high or low labour 
force participation countries on the basis of figures 1a and 1b. If we analyse welfare state 
models we notice that countries included in the corporatist model seem to be low labour force 
participation countries. In the case of the encompassing and basic security models the deviation 
is greater. Among the countries of the encompassing model, only Finland is clearly a case of 
low labour force participation, whereas in Norway and Sweden the labour market participation 
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rates of the aged have remained relatively high. In other words, the individual countries are not 
positioned in figures 1a and 1b in the way we would expect on the basis of the welfare state 
models.  
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3. Income packages by age groups 
Figure 2 analyses the income packages of the aged in the countries included in this comparison. 
For the purposes of condensing information, income from salaries/wages and enterprise have 
been combined in income earned. The share of public pensions and occupational pensions of 
household gross income has been calculated. Sickness daily benefit, unemployment and work 
disability benefits and means-tested benefits form the ‘other income transfers’ component. The 
‘other income’ component consists of income obtained from miscellaneous private sources and 
includes income transfers between households, transfers from private non-profit organisations 
and from abroad (taxable/tax-free pensions from abroad) and compensation for loss of income 
through private insurance. 
50-54-year-olds 55-59-year-olds
60-64-year-olds Over 65-year-olds
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
U
K
9
5
C
N
9
4
U
S
9
4
A
S
9
4
N
L
9
1
F
R
8
9
G
E
9
4
N
W
9
5
S
W
9
2
F
I9
5
D
K
9
2
%
other income
other income
transfers
pensions
property
income
earnings
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
U
K
9
5
C
N
9
4
U
S
9
4
A
S
9
4
N
L
9
1
F
R
8
9
G
E
9
4
N
W
9
5
S
W
9
2
F
I9
5
D
K
9
2
%
other income
other income
transfers
pensions
property
income
earnings 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
U
K
9
5
C
N
9
4
U
S
9
4
A
S
9
4
N
L
9
1
F
R
8
9
G
E
9
4
N
W
9
5
S
W
9
2
F
I9
5
D
K
9
2
%
other income
other income
transfers
pensions
property
income
earnings
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
U
K
9
5
C
N
9
4
U
S
9
4
A
S
9
4
N
L
9
1
F
R
8
9
G
E
9
4
N
W
9
5
S
W
9
2
F
I9
5
D
K
9
2
%
other income
other income
transfers
pensions
property
income
earnings
 
 
 
Figure 2. Income packages of the aged 
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3.1. 50-54-year-olds 
 
Income from work constitutes - not surprisingly - the most important source of income of the 
50-54-year-olds. The share of income earned from work is highest among the 50-54-year-olds 
in Germany
6
. In Canada, the USA, Australia and Norway, the share of income from 
wage/salary and private business of the total income package of the 50-54-year-olds raises 
above the average in the countries studied here. The share of income from work is clearly 
smallest in Finland. This can be explained by the relatively low labour force participation rates 
of the 50-54-year-olds in Finland (c.f. figure 1a). Furthermore, unemployment was higher in 
Finland in 1995 than in any other country included in this comparison which accounts partly for 
the relatively small share of income from work (OECD 1997a). 
 The share of income from capital among the 50-54-year-olds is clearly smaller 
than in the other age groups. The share of income from capital is slightly higher in the UK and 
the USA than in the other countries. The small share of income from capital in this age group is 
partly explained by the fact that individuals in this group tend to have more debts than indi-
viduals in the older age groups. After debts have been paid, there is more scope for saving, and 
wealth tends to increase with age. For instance in Finland, households where the reference 
person is 65 years or older tend to have little or no debts, and have larger savings and other 
assets than younger households (Statistics Finland 1997a). The share of capital income and 
income from ‘other sources’ in the total income package of the 50-54-year-olds  is relatively 
small. Only in Finland, Denmark, Canada, Australia and France do 50-54-year-olds gain some 
income from the private sources identified above. 
 Public income transfer, and above all pensions, are not central components in the 
total income package of 50-54-year-olds. Finland is an exception here. The share of pensions of 
total household income is significantly higher in Finland than in the other countries. The ex-
ceptionally high share of pensions in Finland is explained by the use of pensions as a compo-
nent of employment policy. Firms laid off staff during the recession, and older workers were 
often among the first to lose their jobs. Special unemployment benefit arrangements made it 
possible for older workers to simply wait for retirement while unemployed. Anybody older than 
53 years and one month could withdraw unemployment benefit until the age of 60 if he or she 
failed to find employment. After this waiting period, most people were entitled to unemploy-
                                                 
6 In analysing the share of earned income in Germany one need to take into account 
the fact that LIS counts sickness daily benefit as part of earned income. 
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ment pension. (Komiteanmietintö 1996; Lämsä et al. 1997.) The share of pensions in the in-
come package of the 50-54-year-olds is lowest in Australia and Denmark. 
 The share of non-pension income transfers in the income package of the 
50-54-year-olds is clearly highest in the Netherlands and Denmark. In the Dutch case, this can 
be explained by the fact that work disability benefits have been traditionally awarded even on 
the basis of relatively harmless disability (de Vroom and Blomsma 1991). The share of other 
income transfers is not particularly high in Finland due to the large share of pensions. The share 
of other income transfers of gross income is the lowest in the USA, Australia and Germany. 
 The results obtained here indicate that the share of income from work is some-
what higher in Australia, Canada and the USA (countries that represent the basic security and 
targeted models) than in Sweden, Finland and Denmark which represent the encompassing 
model. The most concrete example is the difference between the shares of income from work in 
Finland and the USA (-11 percentage points). If  ‘social income’ is defined as ‘other income 
transfers’ in figure 2, the share of social income among the 50-54-year-olds is clearly higher in 
Denmark with an encompassing welfare state and the Netherlands with a ‘Nearly Nordic’ 
welfare state, than in Australia and the USA where basic security and targeting are emphasised. 
In the Dutch and Danish cases, the relatively high replacement rates of pensions and early 
retirement pensions increase the share of social income (see appendices 1 and 2). 
 
It has been argued that the high level of benefits in countries of the encompassing model lead to 
a lower propensity to save in comparison with countries of the basic security and targeted 
models (Danziger et al. 1981). If eagerness to save is explained by the share of capital income 
of gross income, the UK and the USA as countries representing the basic security model are the 
most thrifty among the countries included in figure 2. In all countries of the encompassing 
model, the share of capital income is smaller than in the UK and the USA. 
 Some of the assumptions presented in the introduction appear to be verified for 
the group of 50-54-year-olds. Among the countries of the encompassing model, Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark have a smaller share of income from work than Australia, Canada and the 
USA which emphasise basic security and means-testing. In the Finnish case it is the pensions, 
and in the Danish case the transfers other than pensions that reduce the share of income from 
work and private enterprise in the income packages of the 50-54-year-olds. Based on income 
from capital, the Americans and the British 50-54-year-olds save and invest more than for 
example their Nordic counterparts. However, figure 2 indicates clearly that income from work 
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is the main source of income among the 50-54-year-olds in all the countries compared. The 
significance of other income components is considerably smaller. 
 
3.2. 55-59-year-olds 
 
If we compare the income packages of 50-54-yer-olds and 55-59-year-olds in figure 2, we 
notice that the share of income from work is smaller in all countries. The small share of income 
from work can be partly explained by the lower labour market participation rates among the 
55-59-year-olds (c.f. figure 1). The decline in the share of income from work has been steepest 
in the UK, France and Finland. The share of pensions of the gross income of 55-59-year-olds 
has correspondingly increased in these countries. For income from capital, the gap between 
50-54-year-olds and 55-59-year-olds is smaller. 
 The share of income from work and private enterprise of the gross income among 
the 55-59-year-olds is clearly smallest in Finland. In the Finnish case, the small share of income 
from work can be explained by the exceptionally high unemployment among people in this age 
group; in 1995, unemployment among men was approximately 30 percent, and among women 
about 25 percent (OECD 1997a). In the UK, the Netherlands and France, too, the share of 
income from work remains smaller than in the other countries compared. In contrast, in the 
USA, Australia, Germany and Norway, the share of income from work of the total income 
package is relatively large. 
 The difference between capital incomes of the 50-54 and 55-59-year-olds is not 
significant: in both age groups the income from capital is higher in the USA and the UK than in 
the other countries. In contrast, income from capital accounts only for a small part of gross 
income in Denmark and the Netherlands. 55-59-year-olds in Canada, Finland and Denmark 
receive the largest shares of income from private sources. 
 Figure 2 indicates that Finns are the keenest to retire. The share of pensions is also 
relatively high in the UK and France. In contrast, the share of pensions has remained com-
paratively small in Australia, Norway and Denmark. Even in this age group, income from work 
accounts for a large share of total income in Australia and Norway. In Denmark, the large share 
of income transfers reduces the share of pensions. 
 The Netherlands and Denmark stand out also among the 55-59-year-olds as 
countries where non-pension income transfers form the most significant share of gross income. 
In the USA and Germany, the share of other incomes of the total income package remains 
small. A relatively large share of income from work reduces the income obtained through other 
income transfers by the 55-59-year-olds in the USA and Germany. 
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 Figure 2 indicates that in Canada, the USA and Australia where basic security and 
targeting are emphasised, the share of income from work in the total income package of the 
55-59-year-olds has remained higher than in the countries of the encompassing model 
represented by Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the ‘nearly Nordic’ system of the Netherlands. 
Among the countries of the encompassing model, Norway constitutes an interesting exception 
since the share of income from work has remained relatively high there. As with income from 
work, the share of income from capital among the 55-59-year-olds is larger in countries of the 
basic security model (Canada and the UK) than in countries of the encompassing model. As 
with the younger age group, the share of non-pension income transfers in the 55-59 age group is 
highest in the Netherlands and Denmark. Some of the assumptions outlined above appear to be 
reinforced by the data on 55-59-year-olds: work and capital constitute a somewhat more 
important source of income in the countries emphasising basic security and means-testing than 
in the countries of the encompassing model. However, it is worth noting that among the 
55-59-year-olds, income from work is still the main source of income. This group derives its 
livelihood mainly from paid labour rather than social transfers. The situation is therefore 
broadly similar in all the countries included in this comparison despite different institutional 
redistributive principles. 
 
3.3. 60-64-year-olds 
 
In analysing the income packages of the 60-64-year-olds, the USA and Norway stand out as 
countries where the share of income from work and private business of the total income 
package has remained clearly largest. Also in Canada and Australia, income from work 
constitutes a significant share of the income of the 60-64-year-olds. Among the countries of the 
encompassing model, wage labour has retained its position as the primary source of income 
among the 60-64-year-olds in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. 
 
In the case of Norway, the result can be partly explained by the highest labour force 
participation among the countries compared and by the retirement age of 67 (see table 1). The 
high labour force participation rate can further be explained by the tradition of disapproving of 
staying away from or leaving the labour force. On the other hand, the absence of routes of early 
exit from the labour force (with the exception of work disability pensions) also accounts for the 
high labour force participation rates among the 60-64-year-old Norwegians (Hytti 1998; 
Kosonen 1998; Øverbye 1997). In the case of Sweden, fairly low unemployment, the 
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opportunity to opt for part-time work and the solidaristic wage policy have contributed towards 
income from work remaining the most important source of income among the 60-64-year-olds. 
 In contrast, in Finland and in the Netherlands the importance of work as a source 
of income for the 60-64-year-olds is considerably less. Labour market participation among 
60-64-year-old men is low in France, Finland and the Netherlands (see figure 1). Leaving work 
before the official retirement age has been made easier by various institutional arrangements 
(see table 1) that have enabled people to exit the labour market prior to reaching the pensionable 
age in Finland, the Netherlands and France (Guillemard 1991; de Vroom and Blomsma 1991; 
Reday-Mulvey 1996; Delsen 1996). 
 The share of capital income of the total income package among the 
60-64-year-olds is clearly highest in Australia. This finding is also supported by national 
sources as according to the Australian property statistics, the 60-64 age group together with the 
65-69-year-olds is the thriftiest age group (Marketing Insights April 1997). Also in the UK the 
share of income from capital is relatively high. In contrast, in Germany and Finland the 
significance of income from capital is small among the 60-64-year-olds. Income from private 
sources has a significant influence on the livelihoods of Canadians and Australians only. 
 A number of interesting observations on pensions can be made on the basis of 
figure 2. Finland and France stand out as countries where pensions account for a larger share of 
the total income of the 60-64-year-olds than income from work. In the case of France, this result 
is influenced by the minimum age limit of the age-old pension which is as low as 60 (see table 
1). Among the Nordic countries, Denmark, Sweden and, above all, Norway have smaller shares 
of income from pensions in the income packages of the 60-64-year-olds than Finland. The share 
of pensions is clearly the lowest in Norway and Australia. 
 The share of non-pension income transfers of the gross income in the 60-64 age 
group is largest in the Netherlands. This can be explained by the fact that many Dutch people 
have made their permanent exit from the labour market via unemployment or work disability 
(de Vroom and Blomsma 1991, 97-126). In the Netherlands, perhaps more than in the other 
OECD countries, it is difficult for older people to find work once they have become 
unemployed. The very existence of different compensatory programmes has blocked the 
development of effective integration and reintegration programmes by individual firms, trade 
unions and the state. From the perspective of the individual firm there is no need to feel 
responsible for lifetime employment of their workers or to elaborate specific management 
strategies to cope with ageing workforce since these problems can be easily shifted to the 
external safety net. From the perspective of employers, early exit of older workers has become 
a tool that can be used to increase productivity. (Delsen 1996, 111-134.) 
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 The relatively high share of income transfers in the income package of the Danish 
60-64-year-olds is partly a result of the so-called efterløn (‘delayed wage’) system: the efterløn 
is paid to over 60-year-olds out of the unemployment insurance, but it can still be counted as 
part of the pension (Laitinen 1996; Øverbye 1997). In Denmark the ‘delayed wage’ has become 
a popular form of early exit from the labour market. Income transfers are least significant in the 
income packages of the 60-64-year-old Germans and Americans. 
 When we combine income from pensions and transfers, the Netherlands, France 
and Finland stand out as countries where so-called social income has replaced wage labour as 
the primary guarantor of livelihood among the 60-64-year-olds. In these countries, the low rates 
of labour market participation then seem to be connected to a smaller share of income from 
work and private enterprise in the total income package of the 60-64-year-olds. Work has most 
clearly remained the primary source of income in the USA, Australia and Norway. In the USA 
and Norway, the relatively high labour market participation rates in the 60-64 age group have 
contributed towards the share of income from work and enterprise remaining relatively 
significant. The composition of income packages of the 60-64-year-olds is not homogeneous 
within the different welfare state models. For instance, there are marked differences between 
the Norwegian and Finnish income packages. 
 
 
3.4. Over 65-year-olds 
 
One of the assumptions of this study was that in countries of encompassing social policies, over 
65-year-olds have generally withdrawn from active participation in the labour market due to 
sufficient pension security. Figure 2 offers partial support to this assumption. Among the 
countries of high pensions, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands are characterised by small 
shares of income from work (see appendix 1). In Norway and Denmark, too, the level of public 
pensions is relatively high, but the share of income from work in the income packages of over 
65-year-olds remains higher than in Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland. In Norway and 
Denmark the age limit of old-age pension (67 years) accounts partly for the larger share of 
income from work in the gross income of over 65-year-olds (c.f. Hedström & Ringen 1985, 11).  
 In Australia and the USA where basic security and means-testing are emphasised, 
the level of public pensions is lower than in the countries of the encompassing model, and 
income from wage labour forms a more significant share of the total income package of the 
aged. The USA has adopted a law that forbids discrimination on grounds of age by employers 
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hiring new workers. The same law, dating from 1986, also forbids the application of a 
compulsory retirement age. This legislation contributes towards the elderly in the USA 
remaining active in the labour market. The other countries which have legislated against age 
discrimination are France, Spain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland. (Chen 1996, 
164-176; Sheppard 1991, 252-283.) However, age discrimination legislation has been less 
effective in these countries than in the USA: the labour market participation rates among the 
over 65-year-olds are lower than in the USA. In Spain, Ireland and New Zealand the labour 
market participation rate of the 55-64-year-olds has remained relatively high, but labour market 
participation by those over 65 is low in these countries, too (OECD 1997b).  
 A key feature of the UK retirement system is said to be that individuals who are 
drawing an occupational pension may continue to work as long as they change employer and 
consequently, can not classified as ‘retirees’ (Miniaci & Stancanelli 1998). Regardless of this 
opportunity labour force participation rates of British over 65-year-olds remain modest, and 
also the share of earnings from gross income stays lower than other countries classified to basic 
security welfare sate model.  
 The introduction put forward the idea that sufficient public pensions discourage 
saving for old age among those nearing the pensionable age in countries with encompassing 
social policies. The review of the earlier research reveals a wide variety of estimates of the 
effect of the introduction and increased generosity of public pension systems on private saving, 
with total effects ranging from 100 per cent displacement of non-pension wealth to no effect, or 
even to providing a small stimulus (for a detailed survey see Kohl & O’Brien 1998). According 
to Cooper & Scherer (1998) in countries where pension schemes (public or occupational) offer 
less assistance, individuals tend to work longer as well, accumulating increased savings for 
their own future requirements. In other words this means that in countries with sufficient public 
pensions households are not keen on save for old age. However, in countries with not that good 
public pensions eagerness to save is not necessarily more visible (see Kangas 1992b). Figure 2 
offers support for the disincentive effect of sufficient public pensions. In Australia and the 
USA, savings and investment prior to retirement appear to bear fruit after retirement. The 
difference between Australia and countries of the encompassing model is quite striking. This 
finding is backed by a study that compared the numbers of the aged living in owner-occupied 
housing. According to the study, owner-occupancy was by far most common in Australia, and 
owner-occupancy rates were fairly even across different income deciles (Castles1997, 39). If 
we compare the situation in Australia with the situation in the USA, the UK and Finland, we 
notice that owner-occupancy rates differ more across the income deciles. For instance in 
Finland, owner-occupancy is most common among the 35-54-year-olds. (Statistics Finland 
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1997b; Hancock 1998; Kendig 1990.) Owner occupancy is one way of improving old-age 
security. Partial letting of the housing owned, or changing for a smaller house or flat increases 
the resources available for aged households. We can find among the elderly those older people 
who are estimated to be income-poor but house-rich (Hancock 1998). Thus, home-ownership 
alone can not alleviate the income poverty in old age. 
 The importance of income from capital in social policy regimes that emphasise 
basic security and means-testing can also be assessed by studying the poverty rates among the 
over 65-year-olds. Pre-transfer poverty in Australia and the USA is clearly lower than for 
instance in Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands. Income from capital combined with income 
from work then improves the pre-transfer incomes of over 65-year-olds living in countries of 
the basic security and targeted models. The low poverty rates in Australia and in the USA 
among those who receive income from work is partly explained by the fact that LIS classifies 
private pensions as income from work, and not as income transfers. These factors reduce the 
pre-transfer poverty rates in the countries with the weakest public pensions. The post-transfer 
situation, however, is more favourable in the countries with encompassing social policies. 
Among the countries of the basic security model, Canada constitutes an interesting exception as 
the poverty rate among the over 65-year-olds is exceptionally low there. The low poverty rate in 
Canada results mainly from the targeting of improved pension security at the worst-off 
pensioners (Card & Freeman 1990; Banting 1997; Mäkinen 1998). 
 In assessing the incomes of the aged it is important to bear in mind that in the 
USA and Australia, the costs of long-term institutional care for the patient are based on his or 
her income and resources. In the USA, the income limit is fairly low, close to the qualifying 
level for income support, and hence the better-off patients need to invest their own income and 
other resources in institutional care. A recent development is a private insurance that protects 
the aged in the case of long-term institutional care. In the USA, only 3 percent of the aged have 
such an insurance policy, and only 1 percent of the costs of institutional care are paid through 
such policies. There is increasing interest in such insurance in, for instance, France, Japan and 
the UK. These insurance policies are most common in Japan. (Hennessy 1997, 29-31.) Also in 
Finland, there are plans to take the patient’s income and wealth into account when determining 
the monthly payment for those in long-term institutional care. As in Australia, the patient’s 
house and a reasonable allowance for personal expenditure would not in any case be touched. 
As Australia and the USA have had such practices in place for 30 years, they provide practical 
examples for other countries that are planning to introduce income-based contribution rules. 
 The Netherlands, Finland and Sweden form their own distinctive group in the 
comparison of pensions: the share of pensions in the total income package of over 65-year-olds 
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is clearly larger than in the other countries studied here. This result is partly explained by the 
comparatively high income replacement levels of public pensions in the Netherlands and 
Sweden (see appendix 1). The small difference between the share of pensions in Canada and 
Denmark is particularly interesting. The Canadian exceptionalism in relation to other countries 
with a liberal model of social policy can be explained by the continuous improvement of the 
basic pension since the 1960s. In comparison with the income replacement level of the Finnish 
national pension, the replacement level of the Canadian basic pension is clearly higher (Palme 
1990; Kangas 1997, 53). The share of pensions is clearly lowest in the income packages of over 
65-year-old Australians. 
 The share of income transfers is clearly highest in the UK and Denmark. Income 
transfers form the smallest share in the USA, Canada and Germany. In Germany, as in other 
OECD countries, the population is ageing. Germany is projected to have the highest proportion 
of elderly in the population and the most drastic population decline. While there are currently 
about four retired persons per every ten active persons, the ratio will reach 9/10 by the year 
2050, unless participation rates among older German workers increase significantly (OECD 
1995; Antolin & Scarpetta 1998). This may cause problems in financing old-age security and a 
shortage of labour supply may also add to the problem. Income from private sources is most 
significant in the income packages of over 65-year-old Australians. 
 The differences between different welfare state models become very clear when 
we focus on the over-65 age group. In basic security and targeted models, the share of pensions 
and other transfers in the income package of over 65-year-olds is significantly smaller, but 
income from work and capital plays a considerably bigger role than in countries of the 
encompassing model. This result can be interpreted as a consequence of the differences in 
pension systems between the countries (c.f. appendix 1). In countries of the encompassing 
model, pensions are a sufficient guarantee of the livelihood of the aged, but work and wealth 
form the safest option for security in old age to those aged living in countries classified to basic 
security and targeted welfare state models.  
 Comparing the composition of income packages in the mid-1990s with the 
situation at the start of the 1980s, we notice that the share of income from work has declined in 
all the countries compared here, regardless of the age group under study. Income from work has 
been increasingly replaced by so-called social income from pensions and income transfers (see 
appendix 3). 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this article has been to analyse the income packages of the aged from the 
viewpoint of their livelihood and labour market participation. It was assumed that pensions and 
other income transfers have replaced income from work as the primary source of income of the 
aged in those countries where the labour market participation rates of the aged are low. 
Furthermore, this article departed from the assumption that the share of so-called social income, 
consisting of pensions and other transfers, has grown in the income packages of the aged in the 
countries of the encompassing model. Due to their universalistic nature and comparatively high 
level, pensions were assumed to guarantee a sufficient income during old age so that the over 
65-year-olds no longer need to work in order to secure their livelihood. It was furthermore 
assumed that the high level of benefits and pensions in countries of the encompassing model 
would lead to lower saving rates among the citizens who no longer feel the need to save for their 
old age. 
 Income from work has remained the primary source of income among the 50-54 
and 55-59-year-olds in all the countries included in this comparison. However, the countries 
differ in terms of the exact share of earned income of the total income package. Among the 
countries of the basic security and targeted models, the share of income from work is larger in 
Australia and the USA than it is in Finland and in the Netherlands. The small share of income 
from work in Finland and the Netherlands is partly explained by the labour market participation 
rates that are lower than in the countries with basic security and targeted social policy regimes. 
Pensions in the Finnish case and other income transfers in the Dutch case have reduced the 
share of earned income in the total income package. Income from work forms the largest share 
of the income packages in all age groups in the USA, the UK and Australia. We can hence 
assume that the poorer level of social security in the countries of the basic security and targeted 
models encourages people to save for their old age. 
 At the start of the article I presented the hypothesis that the labour force 
participation rates of the aged are low, and the so-called social income from pensions and other 
transfers has replaced earned income as the primary source of income in the countries of the 
encompassing model. From table 2, we can draw the conclusion that among the countries 
belonging to the encompassing model, only Finland confirms this hypothesis. Low labour 
market participation rates combined with a small share of earned income of the total income is 
associated most strongly with the countries of the corporatist welfare state model. Among the 
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different age groups, the 60-64-year-olds constitute the group where the differences between, as 
well as within, the different welfare state models are most visible. The composition of income 
packages is not homogenous even within the countries classified as belonging to the same 
welfare state model. For instance, there are significant differences between the income 
packages in Finland and Norway, and in Germany and the Netherlands. 
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Table 2. Countries included in the comparison classified by labour force participation rate of  
   60-64- year-olds men and the share of earned income of gross income (%) 
 
  
high share of  
earned income of  
gross income 
(> 60 %) 
 
low share of  
earned income of  
gross income 
(< 60 %) 
 
high 
labour force participation rate 
(> 30 %) 
 
Canada (b) 
USA (b) 
Australia (t) 
Norway (e) 
 
United Kingdom (b) 
Sweden (e) 
Denmark (e) 
 
low  
labour force participation rate 
(< 30 %) 
 
Germany (c) 
 
Netherlands (c) 
France (c) 
Finland (e) 
 b = basic security  t = targeted  c = corporatist  e = encompassing welfare state model 
 
The opportunities for early retirement have traditionally been scarce in the countries of the 
basic security and targeted models (c.f. table 1). This scarcity of opportunities for early exit 
from the labour market is obvious from the share of earned income in the income packages of 
the 60-64-year-olds. Among the countries with basic security models, the USA has a clearly 
higher share of income from work than the countries of continental Europe where there are 
more opportunities for early exit (c.f. Laitinen 1998, 20-22).  
 Among the countries of the encompassing model, Norwegian and Swedish pen-
sion systems have offered fewer opportunities to opt for early retirement than the Danish and 
Finnish systems. The share of earned income in the income packages of the 60-64-year-olds, 
however, indicates divergences among the Nordic countries: in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, 
wage labour has retained its position as the primary source of income of the 60-64-year-olds, 
whereas in Finland the significance of work as a source of income is much smaller. In the case 
of Denmark, the larger share of earned income is partly explained by the higher retirement age. 
The difference between Finland and the other Nordic countries is also accounted for by the fact 
that income support has been correlated with permanent exit from the labour market in Finland. 
In the other Nordic countries, income support has been used to keep people in the labour 
market: the income lost through temporary absence from work has been replaced by sickness 
benefits in Sweden and Norway, by unemployment benefits in Denmark, and by early retire-
ment pensions in Finland (Hytti 1998). The divergence of Finland from the other Nordic 
countries is evident when we combine the income from pensions and other transfers: Finland, 
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France and the Netherlands stand out as countries where the share of the so-called social in-
come in the gross income of the 60-64-year-olds is highest.  
 The differences between the welfare state models become most evident when we 
focus on the income packages of the over 65-year-olds. The hypothesis that, in the countries of 
the encompassing model, over 65-year-old no longer extensively participate in the labour 
market due to the sufficiently high standard of pension security, is backed by the results of this 
study. Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden stand out as countries where the share of earned 
income is low, whereas in the USA and in Australia income from work forms a more significant 
share of the total income package of the aged. Alongside earned income, the share of income 
from capital among the over 65-year-olds is larger in Australia and in the USA than in the 
countries of the encompassing model. 
 Work has remained the principal source of income until the age of 60 in all the 
countries compared here. After this, the different institutional arrangements become more 
evident in the income packages of the aged. However, the prevalent trend is that the relative 
share of income from work and enterprise has declined in all age groups since the beginning of 
the 1980s, regardless of the welfare state model. Earned income has been increasingly replaced 
by the so-called social income i.e. income from pensions and other income transfers. 
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APPENDIX 1. Replacement Rates of Public Pension Programmes 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y 
Description 
A
U
S
T
R
A
L
I
A 
AS THERE IS ONLY A FLAT-RATE SCHEME, WHICH IS NEED-BASED, THERE IS NO TARGET 
REPLACEMENT RATE. HOWEVER, THE MAXIMUM PAYMENT 
 rate is equivalent to 25 % of  male average total weekly Earnings for a single person and 40 % for a couple. 
Canada 
TARGET REPLACEMENT RATE (STATUTORY) IS 25 % FOR INDIVIDUALS (EARNINGS-RELATED 
SCHEME ONLY). COMBINED WITH FLAT-RATE 
 pension, About 40 % (53 % for one-earner couple) is currently insured. 
Denmark 
CURRENT REPLACEMENT RATE IS NEARLY 80 % FOR A SINGLE PERSON, A LITTLE OVER 50 % FOR 
A MARRIED OR COHABITING COUPLE, IN 1994, FOR BASIC  
and supplementary pension inclusive. No target replacement rate is provided. 
Finland 
TARGET REPLACEMENT RATE IS 60 % OF EARNINGS FOR 37-42 YEARS OF COVERAGE. IN 
PRACTICE, AN ACTUAL REPLACEMENT RATE IS USUALLY 
40-50 %. As to public sector, the target rate is 66 %. 
France 
DEPENDING ON AGE AND DURATION OF INSURANCE COVERAGE, 25-50 % OF AVERAGE SALARY 
FOR THE BEST 25 YEARS, AS OF 1 JAN 2008. IN 
the meantime, the length of the best years varies between 11 and 24 years. Net replacement rate (public and  
occupational/compulsory schemes inclusive) in the private sector in 1993 is about 78 %. (b) 
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Germany 
TARGET REPLACEMENT RATE IS ABOUT 70 % AFTER INSURANCE PERIOD OF 45 WORKING YEARS. 
THIS IS ENVISAGED TO BE REDUCED TO 64 % 
 in about 30 years. 
Netherlands 
BENEFITS OF PUBLIC PENSION ARE RELATED TO NET MINIMUM WAGE: 100 %, 90 %, 70 % FOR A 
COUPLE, SINGLE PARENTS AND SINGLE 
PERSONS RESPECTIVELY. 
Norway 
CURRENT REPLACEMENT RATE IS NEARLY 70 % FOR A SINGLE PERSON, A LITTLE LESS THAN 60 % 
FOR A MARRIED OR COHABITING COUPLE IN 1994, 
basic and supplementary pension inclusive. There is no target replacement rate. 
Sweden 
CURRENT REPLACEMENT RATE IS NEARLY 70 % IN 1998,  BASIC AND SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION 
INCLUSIVE. THERE IS NO TARGET 
replacement rate. 
United Kingdom 
AS TO EARNINGS-RELATED SCHEMES, 25 % OF AVERAGE EARNINGS OVER NATIONAL WORKING 
LIFE OF BEST 20 YEARS IS ENSURED. THIS IS  
PLANNED TO BE REDUCED TO 20 % OF AVERAGE EARNINGS OVER ENTIRE WORKING LIFE, FOR 
PENSIONERS REACHING PENSIONABLE AGE BETWEEN 
April 1999 and April 2009. There is no target replacement rate. 
United States  There is no target replacement rate. Historically, about 40 % of earned income has been ensured. 
Source: Kalisch et al. 1998 
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APPENDIX 2. REPLACEMENT RATES OF EARLY RETIREMENT SCHEMES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 
1989 
Percentage of Net Income (after direct taxes) That Is Replaced: 
 
 
Country and Scheme   
       
Canada 
   Early pension at age 60:   
     *  Without earnings – related pension 
 42 
 *  With earnings – related pension  62 
 *  Unemployment pension  
 51 
 
Denmark 
 Single man   
 73 
 Single woman   89 
 Married man with 2 children, 
 (6 & 9 years) and working wife  76 
 
Finland  
 Single man   
 68 
 Single woman   73 
 Married man with 2 children, 
 (6 & 9 years) and working wife  81 
 
Germany 
 Long service   70 
 Unemployment   70 
 
Netherlands 
 Unemployment pension   100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD 1995 
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Country and Scheme 
Norway 
 Single man   
 72 
 Single woman   73 
 Married man with 2 children 
 (6 & 9 years) and working wife  78 
 
Sweden 
 Single man   
 73 
 Single woman   75 
 Married man with 2 children 
 (6 & 9 years) and working wife  77 
 
United Kingdom 
 Income support: 
 -  single person   27 
 -  couple    42 
 
United States 
 Retired worker claiming social 
 Security at age 62   43 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX 3. Income Packages of the Aged in 1980 
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